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I. Introduction
In the past, one would have expected families afflicted by a degenerative
and fatal disease to rejoice at medical researchers' development of reliable
carrier and prenatal screening to detect the genetic mutation causing the
condition.' However, a recent legal action, initiated by families suffering from
a rare genetic disorder known as Canavan disease 2 against the researchers who
isolated the gene associated with this condition, illustrates the complexities
inherent in the relationships among human research participants and medical
I. See Larry 1. Palmer, Disease Management and Liability in the Human Genome Era,
47 VILL. L. REV. 1, 10-11 (2002) ("Although we might have expected researchers and disease-
specific advocacy groups to be jubilant at the prospect of an effective screening device.., we
are now clearly in a period where the control of significant genetic data is a potential source of
economic return.").
2. This neurological disorder, which results from a recessive genetic mutation, is
characterized by degeneration of the myelin sheath, the protective insulation for the brain's
nerve cells. Individuals born with Canavan disease suffer from a lack of motor coordination,
poor vision, and death, usually before their teen years. There is no known cure for Canavan
disease, which occurs with particular frequency among people of Eastern European Jewish, or
Ashkenazi, descent. See R. Matalon et al., Canavan Disease: From Spongy Degeneration to
Molecular Analysis, 127 J. PEDIATRICS 511, 511 (1995) (describing Canavan disease as a
progressive disease that often leads to death in the first ten years of life and is especially
prevalent among Jews of Eastern European descent); see also Matthew Hay Brown, Hope in a
New Treatment for a Fatal Genetic Flaw, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1995, § 13CN, at 1 (stating that
Canavan disease is caused by a genetic mutation that prevents production of an enzyme needed
to metabolize an acid in the brain that, left unmetabolized, is believed to destroy myelin, the
insulation that allows nerves in the brain to function properly); Paul Smaglik, Tissue Donors
Use Their Influence in Deal over Gene Patent Terms, 407 NATURE 821, 821 (2000) (noting that
Canavan disease is a "neurological disorder characterized by the degeneration of the myelin
sheath, the protective insulation for the brain's nerve cells").
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researchers in our current era of genomic exploration and commercialization.
In that case, Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hospital Research Institute, Inc.,'
the plaintiffs included a group of parents who gave birth to children afflicted
with Canavan disease4 and also three nonprofit community groups dedicated to
assisting those affected by this condition.5 All plaintiffs supplied some
combination of tissue, autopsy, blood, urine, and other pathology samples,
personal data, funding, and other resources in order to advance medical
research of Canavan disease.6 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants, a
scientific researcher and a hospital,7 breached both their duty of informed
consent and their fiduciary duty when they failed to disclose to the plaintiffs
their intention to patent the gene and diagnostic test for Canavan disease.8 In
addition, the plaintiffs asserted that the defendants wrongfully converted the
plaintiffs' property by using the plaintiffs' contributions to reap personal
economic benefit rather than to promote widely affordable and accessible
carrier and prenatal testing for Canavan disease in accordance with the
plaintiffs' goals.9 According to the plaintiffs, had they known of the
defendants' intention to patent the gene associated with Canavan disease, they
either would have imposed restrictions on the researchers' use of their genetic
material in order to avoid commercialization of the Canavan disease gene or,
instead, would have chosen to donate their samples to researchers who pursued
objectives compatible with their own.'0 Based upon these same facts, the
plaintiffs also asserted claims of unjust enrichment," fraudulent concealment, 2
3. The Greenberg plaintiffs originally filed their complaint in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Complaint, Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp.
Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1068 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (No. 00-C-6779) [hereinafter
Greenberg Complaint] (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). On July 8, 2002,
Judge Robert W. Gettleman of that court dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint on the grounds that
the court lacked personal jurisdiction and venue over all the defendants, and transferred the
action to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, where jurisdiction
and venue would be proper. Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 208 F.
Supp. 2d 918, 928-29 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
4. Greenberg Complaint, supra note 3, M 4-7.
5. Id. 7 8-10; see also infra note 288 (listing the various plaintiffs).
6. Greenberg Complaint, supra note 3, 7 15-21.
7. Id. 1112-13.
8. See id. IM 33-45 (stating allegations that defendants breached their fiduciary duty and
their duty of informed consent).
9. See id. IM 61-67 (stating allegations of conversion).
10. Id. 59-60.
I1. Id. 7 46-54.
12. Id. 11 55-60.
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and misappropriation of trade secrets.' 3 On May 29, 2003, Judge Federico A.
Moreno of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
dismissed five of the plaintiffs' six claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
He did, however, hold that only the plaintiffs' unjust enrichment cause of
action survived the motion.'
4
Among the myriad ethical and legal issues raised, but not resolved, by the
Greenberg action is the optimal means of distribution among biomedical
researchers and their research participants 5 of any rights in commercial
products and revenues derived from human tissue.' 6 In the case that has
addressed this question most squarely, Moore v. Regents of the University of
California,7 the Supreme Court of California held in 1990 that plaintiff John
Moore, a patient undergoing treatment for cancer, did not possess property
rights in the commercial products that his physician-researcher developed from
13. Id. 68-75.
14. See Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064,
1077-78 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (dismissing plaintiffs' claims for lack of informed consent, breach of
fiduciary duty, fraudulent concealment, conversion, and misappropriation of trade secrets, and
denying motion to dismiss plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claim). The parties ultimately reached a
confidential settlement agreement effective August 6, 2003. See Press Release, Canavan
Foundation, Canavan in the News: Joint Press Release (describing the "highlights" of the
confidential settlement agreement), at http://www.canavanfoundation .org/news/ 09-
03 miami.php (Sept. 29, 2003) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also
infra Part IV (discussing the Greenberg action).
15. This Article expressly uses the terms "researcher," on the one hand, and "research
participant" (or "participant"), on the other, rather than "physician" and "patient," when referring
to the parties involved in scientific research. This terminology emphasizes the fact that the
Article examines not only the relationships among physicians and the patients whom they are
treating for illness or disease, but also focuses more broadly upon the interactions among
scientific researchers and the individuals participating in their studies, even in the absence of
any therapeutic relationship. Furthermore, this Article consciously avoids the term "research
subject," except in verbatim quotes, in order to avoid objectification of the individuals who
participate in biomedical research, whether out of entirely eleemosynary motives or to help
diagnose and treat a condition affecting them personally, or even unwittingly.
16. Tissue has been defined as follows:
A collection of cells of similar structure organized to carry out one or more
particular functions. For example, in animals nervous tissue is specialized to
perceive and transmit stimuli. An organ, such as a lung or kidney, contains many
different types of tissues.
OxFoRD DICTIONARY OF BIOLOGY 592 (Elizabeth Martin & Robert S. Hine eds., 4th ed. 2000).
This Article discusses human tissue that is used for biomedical research, as distinguished from:
(I) tissue used for therapeutic purposes, such as blood collected for transfusion as well as skin,
heart valves, and solid organs provided for transplantation; and (2) tissue used for nonmedical
purposes such as manufacturing.
17. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
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his excised tissue.'8 The Moore majority based its holding in large measure on
its belief that judicial extension of the conversion doctrine would hinder the
growth of the fledgling biotechnology 9 industry by making each cell sample
"the potential subject matter of a lawsuit. 0 0 The Moore majority also found
that the plaintiff' s rights were protected adequately under the theories of breach
of fiduciary duty and lack of informed consent, claims that the court decided in
Mr. Moore's favor.21 Although Moore constitutes binding precedent only in
California, this decision is extremely influential in shaping the public policy
debate regarding research participants' property rights in their bodily tissue.22
Indeed, the Florida federal court that decided Greenberg cited Moore for the
proposition that the law does not recognize a property interest in excised
biological materials for the purposes of a conversion claim.23
While the judicial precedent established by the Moore and Greenberg
courts seems to suggest that research participants lack property rights in their
tissue,24 the experiences of another group of research participants provide
striking evidence to the contrary. In 2001, PXE International, a patient group
that represents the interests of individuals afflicted with pseudoxanthoma
elasticum (PXE), a genetic disease that causes calcification of the connective
tissue of the skin, eyes, and arteries, 25 successfully negotiated for a share in the
patent rights obtained by researchers who identified and filed a patent
18. See id. at 497 (holding that Moore failed to state a claim for conversion); see also
infra Part I.A (discussing in detail the Moore proceeding).
19. Biotechnology has been defined as including "any technique that uses living
organisms (or parts of organisms) to make or modify products, to improve plants or animals, or
to develop micro-organisms for specific uses-including.., techniques such as gene cloning
and cell fusion." UNITED STATES CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, OTA-BA-
337, NEw DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY: OWNERSIP OF HUMAN TISSUES AND CELLS-
SPECIAL REPORT 24 (1987) [hereinafter OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUES AND CELLS].
20. Moore, 793 P.2d at 495.
21. See id. at 494, 497 (stating that liability "based upon existing disclosure
obligations.., protects patients' rights of privacy and autonomy without unnecessarily
hindering research"); see also infra note 76 and accompanying text (noting that because various
defendants in the Moore case were not doctors, they owed neither a fiduciary duty nor a duty of
informed consent to Moore).
22. See infra note 43 and accompanying text (noting that since Moore, the medical
community has tended to treat those who contribute tissue for research as donors).
23. Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064,
1074 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
24. The Greenberg court did, however, hold that the plaintiffs' claim for unjust
enrichment survived the defendants' motion to dismiss. Id. at 1072-73; see also infra text
accompanying note 363 (noting that the plaintiffs did invest significant time and resources in the
Canavan research, and deserved compensation for the valuable tissue they donated).
25. Smaglik, supra note 2, at 821.
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application for the gene associated with the disorder.26 These rights include
royalties from any diagnostic test or marketable product resulting from the
discovery of the gene, as well as the authority to control licensing of such
genetic tests. PXE International negotiated for these rights in exchange for its
contributions to the research effort, which included help in identifying and
soliciting participation on the part of affected families, setting up a tissue
repository, and raising money to support scientific investigation. 27 Like the
plaintiffs in Greenberg, PXE International sought to ensure broad and
affordable availability of the test for their disease, as well as any downstream
developments.28 Unlike the Greenberg plaintiffs, however, PXE International
negotiated directly with the scientists to whom they gave research support and
materials in exchange for these rights.
Presently, because neither the members of PXE International nor the
researchers who identified the gene associated with PXE disease have raised
a legal challenge to their agreement, no court has considered the
enforceability of this contract. However, the very existence of their
agreement invites consideration of how a court would rule if the researchers
were to bring a suit alleging that their contract with PXE International is void
as against public policy on the grounds that research participants cannot
possess property rights in their tissue pursuant to Moore. Certainly, it would
be surprising if the court were to strike this agreement, which was the product
of free and full negotiation among the parties. 29 Adherence to a market-
26. Id.
27. See Matt Fleischer, Patent Thyself, Am. LAW., June 2001, at 84, 86, 98 (stating that
Sharon Terry, founder of PXE International, marshaled patients' medical information and
gathered blood samples, recruited scientists, and reported the latest developments to scientists);
see also Smaglik, supra note 2, at 821 ("Researchers wanting to use the samples must agree to
the group's terms, which include joint possession of any intellectual property that might
result."); Gina Kolata, Sharing of Profits Is Debated as the Value of Tissue Rises, N.Y. IMES,
May 15, 2000, at A l ("Ms. Terry and her husband found 2,000 people with the disease, set up a
repository to store tissue samples, and began raising money for research.").
28. See Smaglik, supra note 2 (stating that PXE International advocates either free
licensing, or, if the researchers insist, a modest fee). PXE International has indicated that it will
resist profiteering from its intellectual property should the PXE gene become significant to other
researchers, while conceding that any licensing deal would of course have to further the goals of
PXE International's members. See Fleischer, supra note 27, at 100 (noting that Sharon Terry
and her group have said that they will resist patient profiteering, but will seek to enter into deals
that maximize PXE patients' access to diagnostic testing and treatment). See infra notes 273-
75 and accompanying text for a discussion of the potential conflicts of interests arising from
control of gene patents by patient groups.
29. It should be noted that this Article's consideration of a potential lawsuit relating to the
agreement between PXE International and researchers who identified the gene associated with
this disease is entirely hypothetical, and no such case is pending. If, however, such an action
were to arise, some support for the enforceability of the agreement might be found in various
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inalienability model,a° which posits that human research participants do not
possess property rights in their tissue, invites increased scrutiny in an era
marked by dramatic commercial gains from biomedicine.
legal decisions upholding contracts governing the disposition of human pre-embryos. See infra
note 80 for a description of several of these cases. Because courts have honored contracts that
control the disposition of pre-embryos, which possess the potential for new human life, one
would expect that courts likewise would uphold contracts for the disposition of nonreproductive
human cells.
In response to a theoretical argument by the researchers that their agreement with PXE
International is void as against public policy, PXE International could argue that the
consideration it gave in exchange for patent rights was not a good, meaning the body tissue
itself, but rather a service, namely help in locating and contacting tissue donors. Such a
contention would seem disingenuous, however, in that the service has no value unaccompanied
by the body tissue. Moreover, PXE International does not hold itself out as a tissue broker. See
PXE INTERNATIONAL, MISSION STATEMENT ("PXE International, Inc. seeks to further an
understanding of pseudoxanthoma elasticum by providing support and education for affected
individuals, their families and their physicians. We support and fund medical research."), at
http://www.pxe.org/news/l_3.html#doc begin (Winter 1996) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review). As Professor Mahoney has noted in the context of transplantable human
organs, although the federal National Organ Transplant Act, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 273-74(g) (2000)
(codifying the National Organ Transplant Act), and many state statutes prohibit their sale,
transplantable organs essentially become marketable goods once they are sold to patients as part
of a package of medical services. See Julia D. Mahoney, The Market for Human Tissue, 86 VA.
L. REv. 163, 182 (2000) ("One can argue that the organ is not sold, and that patients pay only
for medical services, but in fact the services have no value without the organ, and patients have
no opportunity to acquire organs in a separate transaction.").
Another potential means of recovery open to PXE International would be a claim for
fraudulent misrepresentation. The success of such a claim would depend upon the plaintiff's
ability to prove that the researchers entered into the contract with the intention of later initiating
legal proceedings to void the agreement.
30. Professor Radin has observed that "[s]ometimes inalienable means nontransferable;
sometimes only nonsalable." Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REv.
1849, 1849-50 (1987) (footnotes omitted). She coined the term "market-inalienable" to
describe a situation in which entitlements may be given away but not sold. Id. at 1853 ("In
precluding sales but not gifts, market-inalienability places some things outside the marketplace
but not outside the realm of social intercourse.").
The Moore court clearly accepts the premise that an individual can donate, as opposed to
sell, his tissue to researchers. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 489
n.20 (Cal. 1990) (citing a California statute that specifies the acceptable methods of disposal of
human tissue used for experimentation); see also id. at 492 n.34 (citing a California statute that
permits all scientific use of human tissue, whether commercial or noncommercial); id. at 494-95
(noting that biomedical researchers, including those engaged in commercial exploitation,
depend upon cell lines derived from human tissue samples).
It should be further noted that, strictly speaking, the Moore court did not reject entirely the
notion of property rights in human tissue. The majority emphasized that it did not "purport to
hold that excised cells can never be property for any purpose whatsoever." Id. at 493. In
addition, although Justice Arabian expressed in his concurring opinion profound moral
reservations regarding recognition of property rights in human tissue, especially if achieved by
judicial fiat, he also suggested that the legislature was the "proper deliberative forum" to create a
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A comparison of the Moore case, which denied the plaintiff a share in the
profits resulting from the commercialization of his bodily tissue, and the PXE
agreement, which suggests that research participants are permitted to negotiate
for such rights, reveals a fundamental inconsistency. Of course, one key
distinction between the Moore case and the PXE example is that plaintiff John
Moore did not bargain for any ownership interest, while PXE International did
negotiate expressly for property rights in order to protect the interests of its
members. This distinction fails to justify the disparate treatment accorded to
the research participants in these examples, however, when one considers that
Mr. Moore's physician engaged in deception by denying his intention to
conduct research upon Mr. Moore's tissue.3' Certainly, if the courts do
"licensing scheme" that would establish "a fixed rate of profit sharing between researcher and
subject." Id. at 498 (Arabian, J., concurring). More precisely, the Moore court declined to
extend the tort of conversion, a strict liability tort, to apply to human tissue used in research.
See infra notes 77-78 and accompanying text (noting that the Moore court declined to extend
conversion liability and declared that the legislature is better adapted to determine whether such
liability should be extended). Nonetheless, the Moore majority opinion did articulate many
policy arguments against recognizing a research participant's claim to an ownership interest in
his tissue.
Subsequent courts have interpreted Moore to preclude a property interest in the right to
profit from human tissue, even absent any patient involvement. See, e.g., Miles, Inc. v. Scripps
Clinic & Research Found., 810 F. Supp. 1091, 1096-98 (S.D. Cal. 1993) (citing Moore in
dismissing the conversion action brought by the plaintiff, a pharmaceutical company, against the
defendant, a nonprofit research foundation, with respect to the right to commercialize a cell
line). But see United States v. Arora, 860 F. Supp. 1091, 1099-1101 (D. Md. 1994) (holding
that a researcher's intentional destruction of a rival scientist's cell line, which was part of a
valuable research project, was a conversion, and awarding both compensatory and punitive
damages), affd, 56 F.3d 62 (4th Cir. 1995). Of course, both Miles and Arora are
distinguishable from Moore and Greenberg in that they involve property rights in already-
developed cell lines, as opposed to the original human biological materials obtained from the
research participant.
31. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 486 (Cal. 1990) (holding
that plaintiff properly alleged that his physician concealed an economic interest in his tissue).
While the Moore majority seemed to assert that plaintiff had somehow "abandoned" his property
interest in his tissue, the court's holding that plaintiff's physician breached the duty of informed
consent effectively undermined this argument. See id. at 488-89 (stating that "Moore clearly
did not expect to retain possession of his cells following their removal"); Laura Ivey, Comment,
Moore v. Regents of the University of California: Insufficient Protection of Patients 'Rights in
the Biotechnological Market, 25 GA. L. REv. 489, 518 (1991) ("The court therefore argued
inconsistently with its own informed-consent holding when it asserted that Moore could have
surrendered possessory rights to his cells while being deceived about why he was surrendering
them."); Jeffrey A. Potts, Note, Moore v. Regents of the University of California: Expanded
Disclosure, Limited Property Rights, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 453, 486 n.210 (1992) ("[A] patient
could hardly abandon something to which the patient did not have the opportunity to consent.").
Perhaps the Moore court meant rather to express its belief that plaintiff John Moore was
not entitled to a share in the profitable products developedfrom his tissue because his corporeal
contribution did not aid significantly in their creation, an idea to which the court alluded in
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recognize the right of savvy research participants such as the members of PXE
International to negotiate for property rights in the commercial products
developed from their tissue, it is not only illogical, but also unjust, to deny any
property rights whatsoever to the Moore and Greenberg plaintiffs, from whom
researchers withheld critical information about their designs to commercialize
their scientific findings.32
In light of the Moore majority's rejection of the plaintiffs conversion
claim, other courts likely will hold, in the absence of any contractual provisions
to the contrary, that research participants possess no property rights in their
body tissue. Clearly, any broad judicial recognition of property rights in human
tissue used for research would raise many vexing ethical and policy questions
upon which courts generally prefer to defer to the legislature.33 Thus far,
stating that "Moore does not seek possession of his cells or claim the right to possess them,"
Moore, 793 P.2d at 489 n.20, thereby implicitly suggesting that Mr. Moore himself could not
have created value from his own tissue. This notion is separate, however, from an abandonment
argument. Moreover, the question is not whether Mr. Moore could himself create a marketable
product from his own tissue, but rather whether he could profit by selling it to the highest
bidder. See id. at 501 (Broussard, J., dissenting in part) (disagreeing with majority's view that a
conversion did not take place). In his separate opinion, Justice Broussard stated:
The majority opinion fails to recognize, however, that, in light of the allegations of
the present complaint, the pertinent inquiry is not whether a patient generally
retains an ownership interest in a body part after its removal from his body, but
rather whether a patient has a right to determine, before a body part is removed, the
use to which the part will be put after removal.
Id.
By denying Mr. Moore's claim for a share of the profits deriving from the commercial
products developed from his tissue, the majority incorrectly assumed that an individual whose
tissue is valuable for research would be able only to reject experimentation on his tissue, and
would never be able to bargain for consideration in exchange for his tissue. Id. at 492-93. The
PXE example definitively disproves this assumption.
32. See id. at 486 (holding that plaintiff established causes of action for breach of
fiduciary duty and lack of informed consent when his physician-researcher concealed his
economic interest in plaintiffs bodily tissue); see also Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp.
Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1068-72 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (accepting as true
plaintiffs' allegations that defendants did not reveal their intent to commercialize their research
findings based upon plaintiffs' tissue, though declining to hold this behavior actionable under
the theories of lack of informed consent or breach of fiduciary duty).
33. See Moore, 793 P.2d at 488 (declining to "'impose [new tort duties] when to do so
would involve complex policy decisions,' especially when such decisions are more
appropriately the subject of legislative deliberation and resolution"). As noted by Professors
Litman and Robertson:
The notion that legislative solutions are preferable to judicial ones is a theme often
articulated in cases involving novel questions of property. This is so for reasons of
principle and, as well, for practical reasons that go to the disparate abilities of
courts and legislatures to resolve complex problems. With regard to principle, the
view has often been expressed that it is more appropriate for an institution with a
266
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however, the United States Congress has declined to address this policy
debate.34
democratic mandate to resolve fundamental questions of policy. Similarly, there is
widespread recognition and acceptance that legislatures are far better equipped to
properly resolve complex problems.
Moe Litman & Gerald Robertson, The Common Law Status of Genetic Material in LEGAL
RIGHTS AND HUMAN GENETIC MATERIAL 51, 76 (Bartha Maria Knoppers et al. eds., 1996)
(footnotes omitted).
The judicial disinclination to create judge-made law in the area of human genetics and
patent law in particular is evidenced in the order issued by Judge Marilyn Patel, Chief Judge of
the Federal District Court for the Northern District of California, who presided over a mock trial
held at the California Institute of Technology in November 2001 involving a hypothetical patent
infringement action brought by a fictional biotech company against a fictional individual whose
genome they patented. See Memorandum and Order, Nugenera, Inc. v. Salvador Dolly (No.
019999) (declining to recognize property rights in genetic material without clear legislative
action to do so), available at http://techlaw.lls.edu/events/atc200l/order.pdf, at 24-29 (2001).
For more documents relating to this fascinating mock trial, see CAL. INST. OF TECH, PRoG. FOR
LAW & TECH., AT THE CROSSROADS OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY, THIRD ANNUAL CONFERENCE,
LAW, TECHNOLOGY & THE HUMAN GENOME, at http://techlaw.lls.edu/events/atc
2001 /mockl .html (2001) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
34. One commentator noted recently that "[flederal laws do not generally forbid the
payment of valuable consideration in the acquisition of human research materials," and "[i]n
much, if not most of the United States, non-payment for research materials is a norm rather than
a mandate." Charlotte H. Harrison, Neither Moore nor the Market: Alternative Modelsfor
Compensating Contributors of Human Tissue, 28 AM. J.L. &MED. 77,80(2002). For example,
although Congress prohibits the sale of solid organs for transplant, it does not bar the sale of
organs for research use. See National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA), 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a)
(2000) (making it unlawful to acquire or transfer any human organ for valuable consideration
for the purpose of human transplantation); Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy, and the Human
Body, 80 B.U. L. REV. 359, 376 (2000) (stating that NOTA "seems to permit" the sale of organs
for purposes such as "research or education"). Nor does federal law bar the sale of blood for
either transfusion or research. Robert Heidt, Maintaining Incentives for Bioprospecting: The
Occasional Needfor a Right to Lie, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667, 673 n. 19 (1998) (observing
that NOTA may forbid only sales for transplantation, rather than for research purposes); see
Mahoney, supra note 29, at 171 ("[F]rom about 1917 to the 1970s, a significant percentage of
the United States' blood supply was derived from paid human donors.").
While some states have enacted legislation absolutely forbidding commerce in human
organs and tissue, including for scientific use, these states generally exempt regenerative human
tissue, ostensibly because its removal will not harm appreciably its contributor. See, e.g., MD.
HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 5-408 (Michie 2000) (stating that "[a] person ... may not sell, buy,
or act as a broker for a profit in the transfer of any human organ that[] [i]s removed from a
human body that is alive or dead at the time of removal," but excepting from this provision
blood and plasma); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.10204 (West 2001) (providing that "a
person shall not knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer a human organ or part of a
human organ for valuable consideration for any purpose, including but not limited to
transplantation, implantation, infusion, injection, or other medical or scientific purpose," but
excepting from this provision "whole blood, blood plasma, blood products, blood derivatives,
other self-replicating body fluids, or human hair"); VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-289.1 (Michie 2001)
(barring the sale of"any natural body part for any reason including, but not limited to, medical
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This Article proposes that Congress enact legislation permitting and
regulating the sale of human tissue used for research purposes, 5 and establish a
tort of conversion in the event that a scientific researcher wrongfully exercises
dominion over a research participant's tissue. Uniform national legislation is
essential because scientists typically obtain the tissue upon which they
experiment from research participants, tissue banks, and repositories
throughout the United States, and from other nations as well.36
In advocating for congressionally mandated recognition of property rights
in human tissue used for genetic research, this Article begins in Part II with a
critique of the market-inalienability approach. Although the Moore court did
not advocate strictly for this model,37 the majority decision nonetheless did
and scientific uses such as transplantation, implantation, infusion, or injection," but excepting
from this prohibition "hair, ova, blood, and other self-replicating body fluids").
35. This Article treats the sale of human tissue only in the context of scientific
experimentation, not the sale of tissue for therapeutic purposes, including transplantation. See
supra note 16 (describing many different uses of tissue and noting that this Article specifically
discusses human tissue that is used for biomedical research). Moreover, the legislative scheme
proposed here would apply only to tissue that must be removed from the research participant for
medical treatment purposes or the removal of which would not have a permanent deleterious
effect upon the participant, as opposed to organs necessary for human health. See Mary Taylor
Danforth, Cells, Sales, and Royalties: The Patient's Right to a Portion of the Profits, 6 YALE L.
& POL'Y REV. 179, 195 (1988) (explaining that "fo]utlawing organ sales is generally thought of
as a public policy measure that protects people from acting against their own best interests in the
pursuit of financial gain," and noting that "[t]he same justification, however, does not apply to
regenerative body fluids" such as "blood, plasma, and semen," because their removal does not
threaten significantly the health of the research participant). The topic of the sale of organs and
tissue for transplant or other therapeutic purposes is beyond the scope of this Article.
36. In the case of Canavan disease research, for example, scientists relied upon samples
provided by over one hundred families from around the world as well as about six thousand
stored blood samples furnished by a nonprofit organization. Jon F. Merz, Discoveries: Are
There Limits on What May Be Patented?, in WHO wNSLEFE? 99, 102-03 (David Magnus et al.
eds., 2002) ("The research drew on tissue samples provided to Matalon by the Greenbergs and
over 100 other families from around the world who had been stricken by the disease, as well as
blood samples provided by Rabbi Josef Eckstein, Executive Director of Dor Yeshorim
Committee for the Prevention of Jewish Genetic Diseases."); see also Bartha Maria Knoppers et
al., Commercialization of Genetic Research and Public Policy, 286 Scl. 2277, 2278 (1999)
(stating that human genetic research and pharmacogenomics are increasingly international in
scope).
Congress's authority to regulate the interstate and international transfer of human tissue
derives from the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
3. Congress exercised this power in enacting NOTA. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (2000) ("It shall be
unlawful for any person to knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any human organ
for valuable consideration for use in human transplantation if the transfer affects interstate
commerce."). An analysis of the limitations on Congress's power to regulate interstate
commerce is beyond the scope of this Article.
37. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (explaining that the Moore court did not
reject entirely the notion of property rights in human tissue).
OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUE
present the primary policy arguments advanced in support of the normative
view that human research participants lack property rights in their tissue. Part
II thus begins with a discussion of the facts of the Moore case before
proceeding to a detailed analysis of the shortcomings of the market-
inalienability model. This part also refutes the Moore majority's assertion that
the doctrines of fiduciary duty and lack of informed consent are sufficient to
protect individuals' rights to control the research use of their tissue.
Part III then considers the property model,38 as demonstrated by PXE
International, a patient advocacy group that negotiated successfully with
scientists for a share in the commercial products developed from its group
members' tissue. This Part analyzes both the advantages and drawbacks of this
approach to apportioning the profits of biotechnological innovation among
scientists and research participants.
Notwithstanding the merits of the property model, it is clear that reliance
on a property model alone proves insufficient, in light of the fact that many
research participants do not negotiate for property rights in their tissue because
they lack (and, indeed, have often been denied by the researchers) significant
information, both in terms of the tissue removed from their bodies and the
potential value of that material. Part TV examines one such instance, the
pending Greenberg proceeding, which is the latest legal action to raise the issue
of research participants' rights in commercial products developed from their
genetic material.
Part V then proposes a hybrid model, which invokes both a property rule
and, when necessary, a liability rule39 in the form of an action for conversion.
Such an approach is essential because recourse to the property rights model
becomes impossible once tissue has been taken and developed into a
commercial product.40  It is simply inconsistent to recognize research
38. In their classic work, Professor Calabresi and Mr. Melamed categorized the legal rules
protecting entitlements as either property rules, liability rules, or rules of inalienability.
Property rules provide that no one can "take the entitlement to private property from the holder
unless the holder sells it willingly and at the price at which he subjectively values it"; liability
rules establish "an external, objective standard of value used to facilitate the transfer of the
entitlement"; and inalienability rules prevent the sale of the property altogether. Guido
Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1089, 1105-06 (1972).
39. Id.
40. See Richard A. Epstein, Symposium: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: A Twenty-Five Year Retrospective: A Clear View of the Cathedral: The
Dominance of Property Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091, 2100 (1997) (explaining the need for a
liability rule where "restoration to the original owner is not possible," thereby necessitating
invocation of the liability rule "by default"). Moreover, a willing research participant frequently
neither rues the fact that commercial products were developed from the tissue nor desires return
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participants' property rights in their tissue only so long as those rights have
been negotiated in advance, but then to deny recovery under a liability rule to
other research participants who were denied full information regarding the
commercialization of their tissue.
Part V considers some alternative approaches, including a hybrid model
combining the donative and liability regimes, as proposed by one commentator.
In her article, Charlotte Harrison advocates a ban on private sales of tissue from
the original source and instead calls for a statutorily established tribunal or
administrative agency to compensate tissue contributors after the fact according
to statutory criteria. 4' This model proves inadequate, however, because it
denies research participants the opportunity to bargain autonomously, and also
threatens to strip power from patient advocacy groups such as PXE
International that have been so effective in advancing the rights of their
members. Part V also briefly examines the creation of a federal tissue trust,
concluding that the implementation of such a system is unlikely, as a practical
matter.
1I. The Market-Inalienability Model
A. Moore v. Regents of the University of California
The normative view that research participants possess no property rights in
their tissue or the commercial products developed therefrom finds its
underpinnings in the 1990 California Supreme Court decision Moore v.
Regents of the University of California.42 Pursuant to the Moore market-
inalienability model, researchers generally treat their research participants as
donors unentitled to any remuneration for their tissue and other bodily
material.43 Moreover, as stated by Professor Mahoney, "[a] substantial amount
of the tissue used in biotechnology research is extracted in the course of
medical treatment" from an individual "who is often-at least at the time of the
of the tissue, but simply wishes for a share in the profits.
41. Harrison, supra note 34, at 96-97.
42. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479,497 (Cal. 1990) (denying
Moore's cause of action for conversion).
43. See Harrison, supra note 34, at 77-78 ("Since the Moore decision, commentators and
the medical community have wrestled with the appropriate treatment of tissue sources, whose
contributions still tend to be handled as gifts."); see also Mahoney, supra note 29, at 191
("Sources of human cells intended for genetic research are encouraged to make their tissue
available without charge to organizations that intend to exercise proprietary rights over the
assembled information.").
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extraction-unaware that her medical waste carries any potential economic
returns." 4
Plaintiff John Moore was among those individuals from whom scientists
harvested tissue for research use without first obtaining informed consent. Mr.
Moore first sought treatment at the Medical Center at the University of
California at Los Angeles (UCLA Medical Center) in October 1976, shortly
after learning that he had hairy-cell leukemia.45 Mr. Moore's attending
physician, Dr. David W. Golde,46 confirmed Mr. Moore's diagnosis and
recommended removal of his spleen for therapeutic purposes.47 Surgeons at
UCLA Medical Center performed the splenectomy in October 1976.48
Unbeknownst to Mr. Moore, before his operation, Dr. Golde, his attending
physician, and Shirley Quan, a UCLA researcher, 49 arranged for further
scientific study of the spleen tissue removed from Mr. Moore's body.50 This
tissue particularly interested researchers because its tendency to overproduce
certain proteins, called lymphokines, rendered it especially useful in locating
the gene responsible for creating those proteins. Some lymphokines possess
therapeutic value, and knowledge of the genetic material associated with their
production in the body could enable researchers to manufacture large quantities
of lymphokines through recombinant DNA techniques. 5' This research had no
relation to Mr. Moore's medical care, and neither Dr. Golde nor Ms. Quan ever
44. See Mahoney, supra note 29, at 189-90 & n. 108 (citing the Moore case as well as the
exploitation of Henrietta Lacks). In 1951, after Ms. Lacks, a thirty-one-year-old African-
American woman of limited financial resources, died of ovarian cancer, researchers took her
tissue without the knowledge or consent of her family and "made it into a cell line that is still
being sold today." LoRi.ANDREws & DOROTHY NEUUN, BODY BAZAAR: TFE MARKET FOR
HuMAN TISSUE IN THE BIOTECHNOWOY AGE 33 (2001); see also Harrison, supra note 34, at 79
("More often than not, consent forms given to hospital admittees--the primary source of
existing tissue samples--have not disclosed the possibility of commercial use for tissue that is
initially removed for diagnostic or therapeutic purposes.").
45. Moore, 793 P.2d at 481.
46. Dr. Golde was the head of the Hematology-Oncology Department of the UCLA
Medical Center when he treated Mr. Moore. Anne T. Corrigan, Note, A Paper Tiger.- Lawsuits
Against Doctors for Non-Disclosure of Economic Interests in Patients' Cells, Tissue and
Organs, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 565, 568 n.12 (1992).
47. Moore, 793 P.2d at 481.
48. Id. The Moore majority noted that plaintiff John Moore had signed a written consent
form authorizing the procedure, id., which did indeed serve a therapeutic purpose, as "Moore
had a grossly enlarged spleen and.., its excision improved his condition." Id. at 486 n. 11.
49. Id. at 481.
50. See id. ("Before the operation, Golde and Quan 'formed the intent and made
arrangements' ... to take [Moore's samples] to a separate research unit.").
5 I. Id. at 481 n.2. Recombinant DNA is "composed of genetic material from more than
one individual or species." Id. at 490 n.29.
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informed Moore of their research plans for this tissue or requested his
consent.
52
Dr. Golde and Ms. Quan continued their research on Mr. Moore for
several years, causing him great inconvenience and expense. Mr. Moore
returned to the UCLA Medical Center from his home in Seattle approximately
twelve times between 1976 and 1983 at the direction of Dr. Golde, who misled
Mr. Moore by misrepresenting to him that such visits were in the interest of his
health. 3 During these visits, Dr. Golde drew additional samples of blood,
blood serum, skin, bone marrow aspirate, and sperm.54 Not until 1983, about
seven years after the initial surgery and after they had already filed a patent
application,55 did the researchers inform Mr. Moore that they were engaged in
medical experimentation, 56 and even then the defendants assured him that this
research was purely scientific rather than commercial. Mr. Moore further
asserted that, despite his express inquiries about the potential financial benefits
flowing from their research, defendants repeatedly denied that his biological
materials possessed any commercial value.
57
52. See id. at 481 (stating that Moore alleged that the research activities had no relation to
his medical care, and that neither Golde nor Quan informed him of their plans to conduct the
research nor requested his permission).
53. See id. at 485 (alleging that Golde represented that the withdrawals of blood and
tissue were essential for Moore's continued medical care); see also id. at 513 n. 14 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting) (alleging that Moore was told blood could only be extracted at UCLA, and that such
extractions were for the purpose of promoting his health); The Use of Human Biological
Materials in the Development of Biomedical Products: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Investigations and Oversight of the House Comm. on Science and Technology, 99th Cong. 241,
241-42 (1985) [hereinafter House Hearing] (statement of John Moore) (stating that Moore had
returned to the medical center approximately twelve times after his splendectomy).
54. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 481 (Cal. 1990).
55. See infra notes 60-61 and accompanying text (noting that the patent was applied for
on January 30, 1981).
56. Mr. Moore stated that the defendants presented him with consent forms during his last
two visits with Dr. Golde, on April 11, 1983 and September 20, 1983. Moore v. Regents ofthe
Univ. of Cal., 249 Cal. Rptr. 494, 500-01 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988), aff'd in part and rev 'd in part,
793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990); see also id. at 536 n.5 (George, J., dissenting) (stating that Moore's
complaint conceded that he signed the consent forms, one in April 1983 and another in
September 1983); House Hearing, supra note 53, at 241-42 (testifying as to the dates that
Moore was presented with the consent forms).
57. See Moore, 793 P.2d at 485-86 (stating that defendants "repeatedly and affirmatively
represented to [Moore] that there was no commercial or financial value to his Blood and Bodily
Substances"). Indeed, on the second research consent form presented to him in 1983, the
plaintiff expressly declined to relinquish all rights in his cell line or any potential products
developed from his tissue or blood. See Moore, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 501 (stating that Moore was
given a second consent form in September 1983); supra note 56 (same); see also Moore, 249
Cal. Rpr. at 536 n.5 (George, J., dissenting) (noting that when Moore signed the September
consent form, he circled the words "'do not,' preceding a provision relinquishing his 'rights...
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Notwithstanding their disavowals of any financial interests in Mr.
Moore's tissue, Dr. Golde had succeeded, sometime before August 1979,
in developing a cell line from it. 58 On January 30, 1981, the Regents of
the University of California (Regents)59 applied for a patent on the cell
line, and the patent issued on March 20, 1984, naming Dr. Golde and Ms.
Quan as the inventors of the cell line and the Regents as the assignee of
the patent. 6° The patent also covered various methods for using the cell
line to produce lymphokines. 61 With the Regents' assistance, Dr. Golde
negotiated license agreements for commercial development of the cell
line and corresponding products with two pharmaceutical firms, Genetics
Institute, Inc. and Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corporation (Sandoz).62
John Moore learned of the patent on the so-called Mo cell line63 only
because he had become suspicious of his doctor's insistence upon
conducting so many tests after the curative splenectomy, and also of the
doctor's refusal to have a doctor in Seattle perform the supposedly
necessary tests. An attorney hired by Mr. Moore, Jonathan Zackey,
located online a scholarly scientific article in which the coauthors,
including Dr. Golde, described their research upon the tissue of an
in any cell line...."'); House Hearing, supra note 53, at 242-43 (testifying that Moore refused
to circle "I do" on a consent form, which would have relinquished the rights to his cell line).
58. See Moore, 793 P.2d at 481 ("Sometime before August 1979, Golde established a cell
line from Moore's T-lymphocytes."). Scientists can use human cells to develop a cell line,
which is a culture capable of reproducing indefinitely. In contrast, cells taken directly from the
human body, known as primary cells, typically reproduce a few times and then die. Thus, cell
lines are better suited for research purposes than primary cells. Id. at 481 n.2; see Moore, 249
Cal. Rptr. at 498 n.3 (briefly describing the genetic engineering techniques used by the Moore
defendants to create the cell line).
59. The Regents of the University of California is the legal entity that operates UCLA.
Moore, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 498 n.2.
60. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479,482 (Cal. 1990) (citing U.S.
Patent No. 4,438,032). UCLA policy provided that the Regents, Dr. Golde and Ms. Quan
would share in any royalties or profits. Id.
61. Id.
62. See id. (stating that the Genetics Institute was given "exclusive access to materials and
research performed," and that Sandoz was later added to the agreement). According to Mr.
Moore's complaint, pursuant to these contracts, the Genetics Institute gave Dr. Golde 75,000
shares of stock at a nominal price and also paid Dr. Golde and the Regents $330,000 over three
years, while Sandoz paid Dr. Golde and the Regents another $110,000. Id.
63. The cell line was "named Mo after its unwitting progenitor." Ivey, supra note 31, at
492 n.27 (citation omitted). The defendants later renamed the cell line "to avoid detection by
plaintiff." Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 249 Cal. Rptr. 494,500 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
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unnamed "37-year-old white male from Seattle, Washington, ' 64 who proved to
be John Moore.65
In September 1984, Mr. Moore initiated a lawsuit against Dr. Golde, Ms.
Quan, the Regents of the University of California, Genetics Institute, and Sandoz,
alleging, among other things, conversion,66 lack of informed consent, and breach of
fiduciary duty.67 For his conversion claim, plaintiff's theory of recovery was that
the tissue removed from his body was his tangible personal property, at least in the
sense that he was entitled to direct its use, and that he never consented to its use in
commercial research.68 According to this theory, the unauthorized use of his cells
constituted conversion, and Mr. Moore therefore claimed a proprietary interest in
each of the products that the defendants developed from his cells or the patented cell
line.69 In his complaint, Mr. Moore sought a share in the proceeds of the products
from that cell line, which he estimated at over $3 billion by 1990.70 Even today, the
American Type Culture Collection (ATCC)71 continues to sell Mr. Moore's cells.
7 2
In its five-to-two majority opinion in Moore, the Supreme Court of California
declined to acknowledge a claim for conversion of Mr. Moore's property under
California law.73 In deciding this issue of first impression, the court took the
64. See V.S. Kalyanaraman et al., A New Subtype of Human T-Cell Leukemia Virus
(HTL V-II) Associated with a T-Cell Variant of Hairy Cell Leukemia, 218 SCIENCE 571, 572
(1982).
65. See ANDREWS & NELKIN, supra note 44, at 27-28 ("The co-authors, who included
Golde, described a thirty-seven-year-old white male from Seattle whose blood contained
unusual and valuable viral anti-bodies. Golde created a special cell-line from Moore's blood,
patented it, and named it the Mo-cell line.").
66. The California Supreme Court defined conversion as "interference with possessory
and ownership interests in personal property." Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d
479, 487 (Cal. 1990).
67. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 249 Cal. Rptr. 494,498-99 (Cal. Ct. App.
1988) (alleging causes of action for conversion, lack of informed consent, breach of fiduciary
duty, fraud and deceit, and unjust enrichment, among others).
68. ld.at50l.
69. Moore, 793 P.2d at 487.
70. See id. at 482 (alleging a potential market of approximately $3.01 billion by the year
1990 for a wide range of lymphokines).
71. ATCC describes itself on its web site as "a global nonprofit bioresource center that
provides biological products, technical services, and educational programs to private industry,
government, and academic organizations around the world." AMERICAN TYPE CULTURE
COLLECTION, at http://www.atcc.org/About/AboutATCC.cfin (last visited Nov. 4,2003) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
72. See ANDREWS & NELKIN, supra note 44, at 31 & 192 nn.21-22 ("John Moore's cells
are for sale as CRL-8066; a plasmid containing Moore's DNA sequence that codes for colony
stimulating factor is sold as ATCC 39754.").
73. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 498, 506 (Cal. 1990)
(finding by a majority that Moore did not allege a conversion claim; only Justices Broussard and
OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUE
position that society's need for new medical products must outweigh the interests of
research participants, or else the fledgling biotechnology industry would suffer.74
Moreover, the court stated that it did not need to expand the tort doctrine of
conversion because the legal theories of breach of fiduciary duty and lack of
informed consent adequately protected the plaintiffs interests. 7s Specifically, the
court recognized a duty on the part of a physician-researcher to "disclose personal
interests unrelated to the patient's health, whether research or economic, that may
affect his medical judgment" in connection with procedures he recommends to
patients.76 Finally, the justices were especially mindful that the conversion theory
relied on by Mr. Moore is a strict liability tort, meaning that liability would attach to
every party in possession of the cells, even those who had no responsibility for or
knowledge of the deception.7 The court declared that "[i]f the scientific users of
human cells are to be held liable for failing to investigate the consensual pedigree of
their raw materials, we believe the Legislature should make that decision.
7
1
In fact, the California legislature did not enact legislation invalidating Moore,
79
nor has any other legislature enacted a statute expressly according research
Mosk filed dissenting opinions).
74. Id. at 495-96 (warning that "[i]f the use of cells in research is a conversion, then with
every cell sample a researcher purchases a ticket in a litigation lottery" and also predicting that
,'companies are unlikely to invest heavily in developing, manufacturing, or marketing a product
when uncertainty about clear title exists"' (citing OWNERSFIP OF HUMAN TISSUES AND CELLS,
supra note 19)).
75. Id. at 496 ("Any injury to his right to make informed decisions remains actionable
through the fiduciary-duty and informed-consent theories.").
76. Id. at 485. With respect to the other defendants, however, the court noted that since
the Regents, Ms. Quan, Genetic Institute, and Sandoz were not physicians, these defendants
owed neither a fiduciary duty nor a duty of informed consent to Mr. Moore. Thus, these four
defendants would face liability only through a theory of secondary liability, such as respondeat
superior, an issue the court did not reach due to the procedural posture of the case. Id. at 485-
86.
77. Id. at 494 ("Since conversion is a strict liability tort, it would impose liability on all
those into whose hands the cells come, whether or not the particular defendant participated in,
or knew of, the inadequate disclosures that violated the patient's right to make an informed
decision.").
78. Id. at 496. The court emphasized that legislatures "have the ability to gather empirical
evidence, solicit the advice of experts, and hold hearings at which all interested parties present
evidence and express their views." Id. (footnote omitted).
79. In 1995, the California Senate considered Senate Bill 1363, which proposed to grant
an individual a cause of action for the tort of conversion in cases where physicians or
researchers removed or used gametes without that individual's knowledge or informed consent.
Kristi Ayala, Note, The Application of Traditional Criminal Law to Misappropriation of
Gametic Materials, 24 Am. J. Cum. L. 503, 523-24 (1997). This bill, which was intended by
the Senate to overrule Moore expressly, at least with respect to gametes, was never enacted. Id.
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participants the right to sell their tissue for research purposes.80 In examining
80. While no state has expressly accorded research participants the right to sell their
tissue, all the states have enacted legislation that relies upon a quasi-property rights theory in
permitting a decedent to donate his body after death for the purposes of transplantation, therapy,
research, or education. See Rao, supra note 34, at 377-79 (noting that the Uniform Anatomical
Gift Act (UAGA), which has been adopted in some form in all fifty states, "appears to regard the
bodies and body parts of the deceased as property" because "individuals possess the right to
consent to postmortem donation of their bodies and body parts while they are alive or to devise
them by means of a will"). The UAGA also permits the following classes of people, in order of
priority, to serve as proxies to donate a decedent's organs: the spouse, an adult son or daughter,
either parent, an adult sibling, a guardian, and any other person authorized. UNIF. ANATOMICAL
GIFT ACT § 2(b) (amended 1987), 8A U.L.A. 99 (1968). However, if either the decedent or a
member of the same or prior class opposes the gift, the donee cannot accept it. UNIF.
ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 2(c) (amended 1987), 8A U.L.A. 99-100 (1968).
U.S. courts have recognized common law rights in the human body that are akin to
property rights. For example, in certain circumstances a decedent's relatives possess "property
or quasi-property rights" in the decedent's body for the purpose of controlling the disposition of
the body after death. See Dorothy Nelkin & Lori Andrews, Do the Dead Have Interests?
Policy Issues for Research After Life, 24 AM. J. L. & MED. 261, 284-85 & nn.247-48 (1998)
(footnotes omitted) (citing a case that described the "quasi- property rights of the survivors" as
"the right to custody of the body; to receive it in the condition in which it was left, without
mutilation; to have the body treated with decent respect, without outrage or indignity thereto;
and to bury or otherwise dispose of the body without interference").
U.S. courts have also recognized a common law ownership interest in human reproductive
materials, including sperm and pre-embryos, also called pre-zygotes, which have been defined
as "fertilized eggs before they attach to the uterine wall." Philip J. Prygoski, The Implications of
Davis v. Davisfor Reproductive Rights Analysis, 61 TENN. L. REv. 609, 609 n.2 (1994); see
also Helen S. Shapo, Frozen Pre-Embryos and the Right to Change One's Mind, 12 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 75, 76 n.3 (2002) (noting that some courts refer to the early-developed
fertilized egg as a zygote or pre-zygote, and others use the term pre-embryo); see, e.g., York v.
Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421, 426-27 (E.D. Va. 1989) (recognizing that a bailment agreement
between plaintiffs, a couple seeking infertility treatment, and defendants, who were fertility
doctors and a clinic, granted plaintiffs "property rights" in their cryopreserved embryo, and
holding that these rights arose out of the language in the agreement rather than out of state law);
Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275,283 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that decedent
who devised his sperm to his girlfriend after his death "had an interest, in the nature of
ownership, to the extent that he had decisionmaking authority as to the use of his sperm for
reproduction" and that "such interest is sufficient to constitute 'property"' under California
law); Kass v. Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d 5 81, 588, 590 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997), aJJ'd, 696 N.E.2d 174
(N.Y. 1998) (affirming an appellate court's enforcement of an agreement whereby a couple
provided, before their divorce, that their cryogenically preserved pre-embryos would be retained
by their fertility clinic for research if the couple could not reach ajoint decision regarding the
disposition of the pre-embryos); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992) (holding, in
a dispute over the control of cryogenically preserved pre-embryos, that, although plaintiff
progenitors did not, strictly speaking, have "a true property interest" in their pre-embryo, they
did possess "an interest in the nature of ownership, to the extent that they have decision-making
authority concerning disposition of the pre-embryos"). Likewise, the American Fertility Society
has taken the position in its Ethical Statement on In Vitro Fertilization that: "It is understood
that the gametes and concepti are the property of the donors. The donors therefore have the right
to decide at their sole discretion the disposition of these items, provided such disposition is
276
OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUE
whether the United States Congress ought to recognize such a right, it is
necessary to consider the policy arguments set forth in Moore. As stated
previously, the California Supreme Court did not go so far as to declare
that human tissue could never be considered property for any purpose
whatsoever."' Nevertheless, the Moore opinion does indeed rely upon the
three major arguments proffered by advocates of the market-inalienability
model. First, according to this view, granting research participants
property rights in their tissue will hinder investment in the biotechnology
industry and, concomitantly, the advancement of public health. Second,
as a related principle, research participants do not merit property rights
because, unlike scientific researchers, they perform no innovative or
creative work. Third, the commodification of the human body is immoral
and unethical. In addition, commentators concerned about the protection
of human health offer two additional arguments, which were not
discussed in the Moore opinion, in support of the market-inalienability
model. They fear that widespread pecuniary compensation for human
research participants will permit scientists to lure participants with false
or misguided promises of profits and also induce individuals to risk their
physical health in exchange for financial gain. Moreover, they assert that
the promise of profits will lead to a decline in gratuitous donation of
human tissue for research purposes.
within medical and ethical guidelines as outlined herein." ETHIcs COMM. OF THE AM. FERTILrrY
Soc'Y, ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF THE NEw REPRODUCTVETEcHNOLOGIES, 46 FERTILITY AND
STERILITY 89s (Sept. 1986). Of course, as noted by Professor Shapo, courts are reluctant to
classify frozen pre-embryos as property, because of their potential to develop into human
beings. Shapo, supra, at 77 n.5. Thus, legal actions involving pre-embryos present issues
different from cases concerning individuals' rights to exercise control over their
nonreproductive tissue.
Finally, sales of sperm, blood, and hair are widely accepted under the law based on the
rationale that they are renewable and their removal presents little threat to the health of the
individual from whom they are removed. See supra note 34 (explaining that state laws
forbidding sales of organs generally exempt regenerative human tissue); see also Green v.
Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1229, 1234-35 (1980) (holding that, under the tax code, an individual's
sales of her rare blood plasma constituted the "sale of a tangible product").
81. See supra note 30 (noting that the Moore majority did not reject outright the notion of
property rights in human tissue and emphasized that its opinion did not mean that cells can
never be property for any purpose).
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B. Analysis of the Policy Considerations Underlying the Market-
Inalienability Model
1. According Research Participants Property Rights in Their Tissue Will
Not Impede Investment in the Biotechnology Industry or the
Advancement of Public Health
Absent a clear legislative command, the California Supreme Court in
Moore declined to extend the tort of conversion so as to grant a research
participant property rights in the products derived from his tissue. 2 TheMoore
majority emphasized that the primary policy reason underlying its decision was
the need to facilitate research scientists' access to human tissue, and thereby
foster public health8 3 Thus, the Moore majority embraced the Kaldor-Hicks
model of efficiency,14 which prescribes that:
[A] proposal for increasing aggregate economic welfare ought to be
adopted if, in consequence, gainers could, in concept, have sufficient gain
to compensate losers and be left with a net gain. Whether compensation is
actually given, however, is not a matter of relevance to the economic
analysis of the inlementation decision. As Kaldor put it, "this is a
political question. "
The Moore court's application of the Kaldor-Hicks model in this policy area
raises the question of whether that court correctly assessed the effects upon the
biotechnology industry of according human research participants property
rights in their tissue.
Because biomedical research is a costly and financially risky endeavor,
8 6
82. See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text (examining the court's finding that
Moore failed to state a cause of action for conversion).
83. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479,493-97 (Cal. 1990) (explaining
the court's preference for the value of socially useful research over a patient's right to make
autonomous medical decisions).
84. The seminal essays setting forth the approach that has come to be known as the
Kaldor-Hicks test are Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and Inter-Personal
Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549 (1939), and J.R. Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare
Economics, 49 ECON. J. 696 (1939).
85. Denis J. Brion, Law Making-. Utilitarian Reasoning in Judicial Decisionmaking, 23
LEGAL STUD. FORUM 93, 107 (1999) (noting that the Moore court applied Kaldor-Hicks
reasoning in reaching its holding).
86. According to an industry trade organization, bringing a biotechnology drug or vaccine
to market requires on average $800 million and ten to fifteen years. Of each 5,000 to 10,000
compounds screened, only one product will earn FDA approval. Telephone Interview with
Carrie Housman, Communications Coordinator, Biotechnology Industry Organization (Dec. 11,
2002) (on file with author); see also Michael A. Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust
Paradox, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 761, 824-25 (2002) (citing numerous sources that present the
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Congress must consider carefully whether according human research
participants property rights in their tissue will diminish the incentives to invest
in this industry. Certainly, if research participants were to enjoy property rights
in their tissue, biomedical scientists would face a significant increase in their
transaction costs. First, scientists would be obliged to compensate research
participants for their genetic material, whether pursuant to a contract negotiated
at the inception of the research or pursuant to a liability rule after the fact. This
obligation to remunerate research participants presents a particular risk to
scientists in the nonprofit sector, who do not necessarily plan to commercialize
their findings.8 7 Second, researchers would face significant transaction costs 8
in locating and then negotiating compensation arrangements with each
individual participant involved in a given research effort, and research
institutions would incur considerable monitoring and enforcement costs in
ensuring the compliance of their staff. Because many biotechnological research
studies involve numerous tissue samples from individuals worldwide,8 9 such
significant costs and risks faced by the biopharmaceutical industry). For the year 2001, research
and development expenses in the biotech industry totaled $15.7 billion while product sales
equaled $20.7 billion. See BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUS. ORG., BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY
STATISTICS, at http://www.bio.org/er/statistics.asp (last visited Oct. 15, 2003) (citing as the
source for its statistics Ernst & Young LLP, annual biotechnology industry reports, 1993-2002)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
87. As numerous scholars have pointed out, it has become increasingly difficult to
distinguish clearly between commercial versus nonprofit research in light of the fact that
academic research has become increasingly commercialized since the mid-1980s. See
OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUES AND CELLS, supra note 19, at 54 ("The present economic
dynamics of research coupled with the proliferation of biotechnology companies have spawned
a plethora of university-industry relationships that have made it increasingly difficult to separate
the use of human samples in university (or other institution-based) basic research from basic and
applied research in commercial settings."); Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research.
Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 77, 110-11 (1999)
(noting the increase in academic-industrial biotech partnerships since the 1980s and citing
examples); see also Sheldon Krimsky, The Profit of Scientific Discovery and Its Normative
Implications, 75 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 15, 15-22 (1999) (describing the trend toward alliances
among for-profit and academic researchers). This trend was apparent to the judges deciding
Moore. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 249 Cal. Rptr. 494, 536 (Cal. Ct. App.
1988) (George, J., dissenting) ("[lI]t should be noted that no perfect dichotomy exists between
research and commercial use.").
88. Transaction costs have been defined as "the costs of all resources required to transfer
property rights from one economic agent to another. They include the costs of making an
exchange (for example, discovering exchange opportunities, negotiating exchange, monitoring,
and enforcement), and the costs of maintaining and protecting the institutional structure (for
example, judiciary, police, armed forces)." SVETOZAR PEJOVICH, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
INSTITUTIONS AND SYSTEMS 84 (1995).
89. See supra note 36 (noting that thousands of families worldwide provided tissue for
Canavan disease research).
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negotiations could prove quite complex and protracted. Furthermore,
bargaining among scientists and research participants could prove impossible in
cases where the identities of these participants are unknown, either because
researchers obtained the tissue from another scientist, a tissue bank, or a
repository without the tissue's identifying information,9" or because the
participants remain anonymous. 9' Third, the problems of increased financial
and transaction costs reach their apex in the case of the potential holdout who
refuses to participate in research unless she is compensated at a very high rate.92
Finally, recognizing the research participant's right to share in the revenues
may imply some right to control the products of that research; for example,
research participants may demand widespread and affordable licensing of the
intellectual property developed from their tissue, thereby further decreasing the
scientists' profits.93 All of these factors combined would present significant
disincentives to researchers, who presumably would encounter these
impediments well before they could ascertain the profitability of their research
90. The California Supreme Court noted in Moore the frequency with which researchers
obtain tissue from repositories and from other scientists. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,
793 P.2d 479,494-95 (Cal. 1990). While the Moore majority, writing in 1990, suggested that
scientists provided tissue to their colleagues free of charge, in the spirit of professional
cooperation, id. at 495 & n.39, Justice Mosk contended in his dissent that such sharing was
quite limited in light of the commercialization of biotechnology research. Id. at 513-14 (Mosk,
J., dissenting). In our present day, researchers typically exchange tissue samples in return for
valuable consideration as participants in a thriving commercial market. The merchants in this
market include hospitals, research centers, private depositories, and numerous public sector
bodies, including state public health departments, the U.S. Armed Forces, the U.S. Department
of Defense, and the Centers for Disease Control. See ANDREWS & NELCIN, supra note 44, at 4-
5, 24-41 (describing the extensive commercial market in human tissue).
91. The American Society of Human Genetics explained in its Statement on Informed
Consent for Genetic Research that some biomedical research involves anonymous or
anonymized biological materials. The former "were originally collected without identifiers and
are impossible to link to their sources," while the latter "were initially identified but have been
irreversibly stripped of all identifiers and are impossible to link to their sources" although "this
process does not preclude linkage with clinical, pathological, and demographic information
before the subject identifiers are removed." American Society of Human Genetics, Statement on
Informed Consent for Genetic Research, 59 AM. J. HuM. GENET. 471, 472 fig. 1 (1996)
[hereinafter Statement on Informed Consent].
92. For example, a gerontologist in Boston became interested in studying a local family
whose members had very long life spans, but the parties were unable to agree upon a level of
compensation and negotiations ultimately ceased. Certainly, there is a risk that potential
research participants will tend to overvalue their tissue, thereby greatly increasing transaction
costs. See generally Kolata, supra note 27.
93. See supra note 28 (noting that PXE International advocates either free licensing of the
intellectual property developed by the researchers with whom they have collaborated, or, if the
researchers insist, a modest fee).
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enterprise. On the other hand, countervailing arguments support the notion that
compensating research participants might stimulate innovation.
a. An Analysis of the Economic and Transaction Costs Involved in
Compensating Research Participants and the Importance of Compensation
in Terms of Stimulating Participation
While a legal regime that accords research participants property rights in
their tissue arguably threatens to increase to some degree the economic and
transaction costs facing researchers, thereby negatively affecting scientific
innovation, commentators have warned that failure to recognize such rights
entails costs of its own. For example, some altruistic individuals who
ordinarily would contribute their tissue for biomedical research may decline to
participate if they feel exploited because everyone else involved in researching
their genes, aside from them, is making a profit.94 In addition, less selfless
individuals might refuse to undergo the inconvenience, medical risks, loss of
privacy, and possibility of genetic discrimination associated with biomedical
research without legal protection of their right to remuneration, thereby
decreasing the supply of tissue available for research. 95
What is more, a system that assures compensation for research participants
encourages individuals to propose research that scientists might not have
conceived on their own, thereby stimulating biotechnological research. For
instance, in 1988, Mr. Erich Karl Fuchs, a gay man who had been exposed to
the HIV virus on many occasions, began to suspect that he was unusually
resistant to it. He continually contacted researchers over a period of six years to
94. See Kolata, supra note 27 (quoting Professor Hank Greely of Stanford Law School as
stating: "You don't want research subjects to feel cheated and embittered and betrayed .... In
the long run, for research with human subjects to survive, those human subjects have to feel that
they've been treated fairly.").
95. Dr. Robert Cook-Deegan, Director of the Center for Genome Ethics, Law and Policy
at Duke University, has criticized the tendency to treat research participants as "pure altruists,"
whereas "everyone else is treated as a pure capitalist." Id. As noted by Professor Hoffmaster:
Curiously,... when commercialization works to the advantage of scientists, its
negative impact on research is less emphasized. The possibility of obtaining
patents has already begun to cast a shroud of secrecy around science and has
decreased the extent to which research materials and results are freely shared
among scientists. Nevertheless, allowing researchers to profit is regarded as a
stimulant to science, whereas compensating sources for their materials is regarded
as a depressant.
Barry Hoffimaster, Between the Sacred and the Profane: Bodies, Property, and Patents in the
Moore Case, 7 INTELL. PROP. J. 115, 134 (1992).
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suggest that they study his genetic material, and, in 1994, scientists eventually
agreed to study Mr. Fuchs and another man exhibiting similar resistance to the
virus, Mr. Steve Crohn. Ultimately, researchers were able to isolate the gene
responsible for immunity to the H1V virus and to patent a test to identify others
with a similar genetic makeup.96 As this example illustrates, individuals
affected by a medical condition are often among the first to note scientifically
significant phenomena within themselves.97 On the other hand, potential
research participants, motivated by the promise of material gain, might distort
the information they provide to researchers in order to increase their value as
research participants. Such behavior could detract from the quality of the
research results, and even endanger the health of the research participant and
others in the study.98 Scientists can minimize this problem, however, by
96. Kolata, supra note 27.
97. In this particular case, neither Mr. Fuchs nor Mr. Crohn participated in research in
return for compensation, although Mr. Fuchs did express the opinion that, while his primary
goal was altruism, he believed that he merited some share in the financial rewards from the
research. Id. (quoting Mr. Fuchs as saying, "I just wanted to do something good. But once
money came into the picture, why not have it be shared with me?"). Mr. Fuch's reaction also
supports the notion that research participants will feel exploited if others profit from their
selflessness. See supra note 94 and accompanying text (citing academic support for the
proposition that altruistic individuals might feel cheated if others are paid).
Professor Heidt maintains that if the law wishes to stimulate individuals to conduct "self-
searching" of their bodies in search of commercially valuable material, it ought to implement a
default rule that denies research participants a share in the profits from products developed from
their tissue. According to this view, individuals would be more motivated to "self-search" if the
only way to realize the value of their cells would be to negotiate for the highest bid. See Heidt,
supra note 34, at 710-11 & nn. 121-22 (describing that "the more the law favors researchers
over subjects, the more the law encourages people to self-search and keep all researchers out of
the search as much as possible"). This argument neglects, however, to consider the benefits of a
system that relies on a property rule combined with a liability rule, see supra notes 38-40 and
accompanying text (citing scholarship examining the interplay between property and liability
rules), invoking the latter in cases where researchers wrongfully deny a research participant full
information regarding the commercial nature of their work. Such a system still encourages
"self-checking" by individual research participants, who know that they will be more likely to
share in the profits of research if they obtain as much information as possible about the value of
their tissue in advance and negotiate a contract based upon this knowledge, as opposed to
bringing a legal action for conversion after research has begun. Indeed, it is possible that only
those individuals who are most likely to possess scientifically significant tissue will engage in
self-searching under this hybrid system, since only they will expect to reap from their self-
searching financial benefits that outweigh their costs. Those without valuable tissue are more
likely simply to rely upon the default liability rule. Thus, this hybrid system has the potential
additional benefit of avoiding socially inefficient "defensive" searches, see Heidt, supra note 34,
at 696 (describing the problems of "defensive" searches), by individuals who do not have
particularly valuable tissue (if we assume a direct relationship between the value of an
individual's tissue and her likelihood of investigating its worth).
98. See OWNERSI-HP OF HuMAN TISSUES AND CELLS, supra note 19, at 106 (noting that this
behavior could lead to flawed research results and put the subject and others at risk). For a
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screening potential research participants to determine whether they meet
eligibility criteria before disclosing the possibility of commercial benefits
flowing from the study.99
While researchers already can choose to encourage participation in
biomedical research by voluntarily offering compensation to research
participants, assuming that the contractual PXE model withstands judicial
scrutiny in the years to come,'00 this model fails to provide a complete solution.
Researchers may hesitate to compensate one research participant when others
are donating their tissue, lest donors feel exploited and come to expect
payment.' 0 ' Moreover, the pure property rights approach does not protect
research participants against scientists with whom they did not deal directly.
Consider, for example, a situation where a research participant permits one
researcher to use her tissue for a particular purpose, in exchange for
compensation. This researcher then sells the tissue to a second scientist who
lacks any contact with the research participant, and this second scientist uses
the tissue without the knowledge of its source. Under the current law as set
forth in Moore, the legal theories available to the research participant, namely
the doctrines of breach of informed consent and of fiduciary duty, are most
likely ineffective against that second scientist. After all, the second scientist
owes the research participant no duties, and therefore would not be liable for
the first researcher's wrongful sale of the tissue according to dicta set forth by
the Moore majority.10 2  Faced with this possibility, potential research
participants might decline to participate at all. Congressional recognition of
property rights in human tissue would encourage the research participant's
involvement by offering her a remedy for unauthorized use of her tissue by
strangers.
discussion of the converse danger, the possibility that researchers will lure research participants
with exaggerated promises of financial gain, see infra notes 209-16 and accompanying text
(presenting scholarly speculation on the topic).
99. OWNERSMP OF HUMAN IssuEs AND CELLS, supra note 19, at 106.
100. See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text (explaining the PXE International
contractual model).
101. See Kolata, supra note 27 (quoting a researcher from a Boston medical center who
expressed discomfort with paying one family for their tissue when others had donated their
tissue).
102. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 486-87 (Cal. 1990)
(declining to hold any defendant other than Dr. Golde, Mr. Moore's attending physician, liable
for breach of fiduciary duty or lack of informed consent absent any "recognized theory of
secondary liability, such as respondeat superior"); see also supra note 76 and accompanying text
(explaining that the Moore court declined to ascribe liability to the nonphysician defendants).
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Another potential problem raised by recognition of research participants'
rights in their tissue, quite apart from the financial costs of compensating them
for the tissue itself, is the issue of transaction costs. Indeed, one United States
government report stated that "ft]he actual compensation to the human sources
of original tissues and cells is unlikely to have a large economic impact on the
use of human biological materials, but transaction costs are likely to dwarf the
costs of payments to these individuals."' 3 One can argue, however, that
pursuant to Moore, the duty of informed consent already requires physician-
researchers to communicate their financial interests to the research participants
with whom they deal directly.'04 This duty must surely extend as well to
scientists engaged in primarily research-oriented, as opposed to therapeutic,
relationships with their research participants. Courts have held that researchers,
as compared to treating physicians, must be held to a higher duty of disclosure
vis-A-vis their research participants because research participants stand to reap
little or no personal benefit from their involvement in biomedical
experimentation.'0 5 As stated in one government report, "[s]ince greater
103. OWERSHIP oF HUMAN TissuEs AND CELLS, supra note 19, at 13; see also Heidt, supra
note 34, at 712 (stating that "even when negotiations proceed smoothly, the negotiating costs
may be substantial compared to their benefits in light of the many patients whose collections
researchers may wish to examine and the tiny percent of these negotiated agreements that will
ever be used").
104. See Moore, 793 P.2d at 483 (holding that in obtaining a patient's consent to a
procedure, "a physician must disclose personal interests unrelated to the patient's health,
whether research or economic, that may affect the physician's professional judgment" and "a
physician's failure to disclose such interests may give rise to a cause of action for performing
medical procedures without informed consent or breach of fiduciary duty" (emphasis added)).
For a detailed discussion of the limits of the doctrines of informed consent and fiduciary duty in
protecting research subjects, see infra notes 184-207 and accompanying text.
105. SeeWhitlockv. Duke Univ., 637 F. Supp. 1463, 1467(M.D.N.C. 1986) (holding that
because the doctrine of informed consent applies "in therapeutic circumstances where the health
care provider has as an objective to benefit the patient," a fortiori it applies "in the
nontherapeutic context where the researcher does not have as an objective to benefit the
subject"), aff'd, 829 F.2d 1340 (4th Cir. 1987); see also Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc.,
782 A.2d 807, 834-35 (Md. 2001) (holding that "the very nature of nontherapeutic scientific
research on human subjects can, and normally will, create special relationships out of which
duties arise").
Similarly, in the leading Canadian case on informed consent, Halushka v. Univ. of Sask.,
[1965] 53 D.L.R. 2d 436, 443-44, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal imposed upon medical
researchers a duty of disclosure toward research participants "as great as, if not greater than, the
duty owed by the ordinary physician or surgeon to his patient." Id. at 443-44. As noted by one
commentator, because Halushka is "one of the few cases [dealing with nontherapeutic,
experimental research] in North America that has produced a legal judgment, it has set the
standard." Daryl Pullman, Subject Comprehension, Standards of Information Disclosure and
Potential Liability in Research, 9 HEALTH L.J. 113, 115 (2001), United States legal
commentators frequently invoke Halushka in support of the principle that the doctrine of
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disclosure is usually required in a research setting, it would follow that
disclosure of potential commercial gain would be required there as well." 
106
The report added: "It should not be assumed that all persons, upon learning
that they carry a unique cell strain or other type of biological material, will
agree to its commercial marketing as a developed cell line. Some people may
be opposed to such use .... ,,o7
Thus, in light of the generally recognized principle that research scientists
who deal directly with a research participant owe a duty of informed consent,
which would include the duty to reveal their economic interests in the
research, 10 8 the only scientists who would face an entirely new duty if Congress
were to recognize a federal tort of conversion of body tissue would be (1) those
who obtain the tissue from other researchers, tissue banks, or repositories'0 9 and
(2) those who conceive of a research use for tissue after having obtained it from
the research participant." ' 0 Both of these groups presently may be free of any
duty of informed consent under federal or state law.' " The exemption of such
informed consent may apply more rigorously in the research setting. See, e.g., Richard Delgado
& Helen Leskovac, Informed Consent in Human Experimentation: Bridging the Gap Between
Ethical Thought and Current Practice, 34 UCLA L. REV. 67,80-81 (1986) (describing the facts
and holding of Halushka); Jesse A. Goldner, An Overview of Legal Controls on Human
Experimentation and the Regulatory Implications of Taking Professor Katz Seriously, 38 ST.
Louis L.J. 63, 78-79 (1993) (same); Richard S. Saver, Critical Care Research and Informed
Consent, 75 N.C. L. REv. 205, 223 n.61 (1996) (same).
106. OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUES AND CELLS, supra note 19, at 102.
107. Id. at 104.
108. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text (citing case law and commentary to
establish researchers' duty to disclose economic interests). But see Greenberg v. Miami
Children's Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1070 (S.D. Fla. 2003)
(acknowledging that "in certain circumstances a medical researcher does have a duty of
informed consent," but nonetheless declining "to extend the duty of informed consent to cover a
researcher's economic interests in this case").
109. Federal law does not require informed consent for "[r]esearch, involving the
collection or study of existing data, documents, records, pathological specimens, or diagnostic
specimens, if these sources are publicly available or if the information is recorded by the
investigator in such a manner that subjects cannot be identified, directly or through identifiers
linked to the subjects." 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b)(4) (2002). Similarly, the Moore court did not
require informed consent where scientists obtained tissue from depositories or other researchers.
See supra note 102 and accompanying text (noting the Moore court's refusal to hold anyone
other than the attending physician liable).
110. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 484 (Cal. 1990) ("If a
physician has no plans to conduct research on a patient's cells at the time he recommends the
medical procedure by which they are taken, then the patient's medical interests have not been
impaired.").
111. Federal regulations on informed consent apply directly only to research that meets one
of the following criteria: the research is federally funded; the research is conducted at an
institution that has given the federal government assurances that it will comply with federal
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researchers from the requirements of informed consent is quite controversial,
and in recent years has generated vigorous debate among, and proposals for
reform by, government officials, industry leaders, policy makers, and
scholars. 1
2
In deciding whether to extend the law of informed consent to apply to
researchers who obtain tissue from other researchers, tissue banks, or
repositories, it is worth noting that, as a practical matter, a system that exempts
researchers from obtaining informed consent if they procure tissue from anyone
other than the research participant might slow the pace of biomedical research
by encouraging scientists to leave the tissue collection to others rather than risk
incurring the duty of informed consent. Moreover, "[t]he fundamental principle
underlying the need for consent for medical or research purposes is respect for
personal autonomy,"" 3 and strict adherence to this principle militates against
exempting such researchers from the duty of informed consent. Because
research participants can refuse involvement altogether,"' they ought to have
regulations; or the research involves an investigational new drug or medical device regulated by
the Food and Drug Administration. See Henry T. Greely, Breaking the Stalemate: A
Prospective Regulatory Framework for Unforeseen Research Uses of Human Tissue Samples
and Health Information, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 737, 738-39 (1999); see also 45 C.F.R.
§ 46.111 (a)(4) (2002) (requiring informed consent); 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2002) (explaining
informed consent). For privately-funded research, the doctrine of informed consent has
developed through state common law and, less frequently, state statutory law. See OWNERSMP
OF HUMAN TISSUES AND CELLS, supra note 19, at 93-96 (tracing the development of state
common law theories of informed consent and noting the paucity of state regulation of this
issue); see also Ketchup v. Howard, 543 S.E.2d 371, 381-86 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (summarizing
very briefly the law of informed consent in the fifty states).
112. See generally I NAT'L BIOETHICs ADVISORY COMM'N, RESEARCH INVOLviNG HUMAN
BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS: ETHICAL ISSUES AND POLICY GUIDANCE (1999) (providing
recommendations for reform concerning human biological research) [hereinafter RESEARCH
INVOLVING HUMAN BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS]; Ellen Wright Clayton et al., Informed Consentfor
Genetic Research on Stored Tissue Samples, 274 JAMA 1786 (1995) (proposing that informed
consent is necessary for linkable samples and may be considered for samples being
anonymized); Greely, supra note I I (proposing a new regulatory framework for the future
collection of human biological materials to be used in research); Bartha Maria Knoppers &
Claude M. Laberge, Research and Stored Tissues: Persons as Sources, Samples as Persons?,
274 JAMA 1806 (1995) (advocating changes in the law of informed consent for research on
human biological materials).
113. OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN ISSUES AND CELLS, supra note 19, at 10.
114. The Moore court, in holding for the plaintiff on his claims for breach of fiduciary duty
and lack of informed consent, effectively acknowledged that he had a right to refuse research
participation altogether. Federal law also mandates that participation in federally funded
research is voluntary, providing that a research participant shall be furnished with "[a] statement
that participation is voluntary, refusal to participate will involve no penalty or loss of benefits to
which the subject is otherwise entitled, and the subject may discontinue participation at any time
without penalty or loss of benefits to which the subject is otherwise entitled." 45 C.F.R.
§ 46.116(a)(8) (2002). In addition, the Nuremberg Code, which was written after World War 11 by
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access to information about all research uses of their tissue." 5 This logic
applies equally to anonymized tissue samples,' 16 even though federal
regulations do not require informed consent for research on them.1 7 As stated
in a report of the National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC):
[lit is incorrect to assume that because the sources cannot be identified they
cannot be harmed or wronged. Some interests of the sample sources may
be harmed even if they are not completely identifiable, and interests of
others also may be at risk. For example, there may be group or family
interests that could be revealed or placed at risk because of research that is
conducted on a class of similar, albeit individually unidentifiable, samples.
Individuals have an interest in avoiding uses of their tissues that they regard
as morally impermissible or objectionable. Thus, were their materials to be
used in research that they would consider objectionable, it is possible that
some individuals could be wronged, if not harmed.18
American judges involved in trying Nazi doctors for their crimes, provides that "[t]he voluntary
consent of the human subject is absolutely essential." THE NUREMBERG CODE, reprinted in THE
NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION 2,2
(George J. Annas & Michael A. Grodin eds., 1992). As stated previously, however, the right to
refuse research participation is less clear when researchers use existing anonymized tissue
specimens, and this issue is currently the subject of much debate. See supra notes 109 & I I 
and accompanying text (outlining the relevant law and scholarship surrounding the issue).
115. As stated in a report on genetic research by a committee of the National Academy of
Sciences: "It is not ethically or legally acceptable to ask research participants to 'consent' to
future but yet-unknown uses of their identifiable DNA samples." COMM. ON HUMAN GENOME
DIVERsITY, COMM'N ON LIFE SCIENCES, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, EVALUATING HUMAN
GENETIC DIVERSITY 65 (1997); see also Statement on Informed Consent, supra note 91, at 473
("It is inappropriate to ask a subject to grant blanket consent for all future unspecified genetic
research projects on any disease or in any area if the samples are identifiable in those subsequent
studies.").
116. See supra note 91 (defining anonymous and anonymized tissue samples).
117. See supra note 109 (describing relevant federal law).
118. RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS, supra note 112, at 60-6 1.
While acknowledging that "these concerns are valid," the NBAC declined to "find that they are
sufficiently substantial to restrict further use of such samples." Id. at 61. Of course, informed
consent and, by extension, compensation for the research participant's tissue, may prove
impossible in cases where tissue specimens are anonymous or anonymized. See supra note 91
(defining anonymous and anonymized tissue samples). Any federal legislation ensuring
compensation to research participants in exchange for their tissue must include a provision
allowing a research participant to waive her right to compensation so long as she understands
clearly the implications of the waiver and signs a written waiver agreement. Such a provision
would protect researchers from financial liability not only in cases in which a scientist wishes to
conduct research on anonymous or anonymized human tissue samples, but also in cases in
which a research participant indicates her willingness to make a gratuitous donation of her
tissue. As a practical matter, Congress realistically could impose this waiver requirement only
for tissue collected after the effective date of such legislation. Federal regulations currently,
however, bar research participants from executing voluntary waivers of their rights in their
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In order to assist researchers in tracking whether informed consent was given
for the use of tissue obtained from tissue banks and repositories, federal
legislation could require these institutions to retain informed consent
documents and contact information relating to the suppliers of its tissue
samples.
In terms of the application of the law of informed consent in cases where
later research uses are conceived for previously collected tissue, it is clear that
both federal and state law recognize the importance of a continuing duty of
informed consent on the part of researchers." 9 According to a government
report, "[i]t can be argued that the discovery in a subject's body of a unique cell
line that may be commercially valuable constitutes a significant new finding"
that "could influence a subject in deciding whether or not to continue his role in
tissue. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2002) ("No informed consent, whether oral or written, may
include any exculpatory language through which the subject or the representative is made to
waive or appear to waive any of the subject's legal rights, or releases or appears to release the
investigator, the sponsor, the institution or its agents from liability for negligence."). Congress
must therefore amend federal law to permit research participants to waive their financial interest
in their tissue. The legislative language barring participants from waiving their financial interest
in their tissue actually was intended to preserve a research participant's right to sue for injuries
resulting from his research participation, see House Hearing, supra note 53, at 233 (statement of
Dr. Charles R. McCarthy, Director, Office of Protection From Research Risks, National
Institutes of Health), and therefore should not preclude a research participant from waiving his
right to compensation for his tissue. See OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUES AND CELLS, supra note
19, at 107-08 (proposing specific changes to the federal law to permit research participants to
waive any rights to commercial gain from their tissue); Heidt, supra note 34, at 668 n.3 & 709
n. 118 (contending that research participants ought to be able to waive their rights to
compensation for their tissue).
In any event, most biomedical researchers prefer identifiable, not anonymous or
anonymized, tissue samples, so that they can track individual health histories and symptoms, as
well as preserve the ability to recontact the individual contributor to gather additional data or
provide therapeutic information. See RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS,
supra note 112, at 18 (explaining why a researcher may want to contact the provider of a tissue
sample); Fleischer, supra note 27, at 100 (citing an analyst with RAND's Science and
Technology Policy Institute, who explained that biomedical researchers prefer tissue samples
that are linked to an identifiable contributor).
119. Federal statutory law requires disclosure of "significant new findings developed
during the course of the research which may relate to the subject's willingness to continue
participation." 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(b)(5) (2002). State court decisions likewise have upheld a
physician's continuing duty of informed consent in a therapeutic context. See, e.g., Tresemer v.
Barke, 150 Cal. Rptr. 384, 393-94 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that patient stated a cause of
action against doctor for failure to contact the former patient and warn of newly discovered risks
of intervention); Taber v. Riordan, 403 N.E.2d 1349,1353 (111. App. Ct. 1980) (analogizing the
duty to inform a patient of certain risks before a medical procedure to the physician's duty to
inform the patient that complications have indeed arisen after the procedure).
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the research project," and therefore must be disclosed to the research
participant. "°
Another set of transaction costs faced by researchers required to
compensate their research participants involves record-keeping. Professor
Heidt states that "researchers would need to keep track of patients, cell lines,
the patient's contribution to each cell line, [and] the role of each cell line in
developing the end products" and that "[s]tudies involving the development of
cell lines can takes years to complete and commercial application even
longer." 12' There is good reason, however, to require researchers to keep
careful track of human tissue, whether used separately or in combination with
the tissue of others. The Moore majority itself acknowledged the importance of
keeping biological materials in safe hands, as the cell line derived from Mr.
Moore's body contained genetic material capable of reproducing a harmful
virus.' 22  Certainly, the current fear in the United States regarding the
possibility of bioterrorism, as demonstrated by recent concern about anthrax,
has highlighted the importance of monitoring closely the exchange of
potentially hazardous biological materials. 23 Such record keeping to track the
use of each biological sample surely would not prove unduly burdensome in
light of "the meticulous care and planning necessary in serious modem medical
research."1
24
Another transaction cost facing researchers obliged to compensate their
research participants is the problem of the potential holdout who refuses to
supply tissue unless his price is met. Some courts and scholars reject the notion
that a research participant is entitled to determine the amount of consideration
tendered for his tissue, arguing that such behavior by research participants
smacks of inappropriate profiteering by individuals seeking a windfall from the
120. OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUES AND CELLS, supra note 19, at 102.
121. Heidt, supra note 34, at 713.
122. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479,491-92 (Cal. 1990). The Moore
majority invoked this notion in support of an argument contrary to the one advanced here,
contending that California statutory law vests in medical practitioners, not patients, the right to
dispose of biological materials, and therefore does not recognize patients' property interest in
these materials. Id. at 492 ("[T1he statute eliminates so many of the rights ordinarily attached to
property that one cannot simply assume that what is left amounts to 'property' or 'ownership'
for purposes of conversion law.").
123. See Laurie Garrett & Earl Lane, Scientists Stymied in Anthrax Probe: Spores May
Not Be Traceable, NEWSDAY (New York), Jan. 1, 2002 (Queens Edition), at A8 ("It is difficult
to say how many labs might have obtained copies of the reference Ames strain [of anthrax] by
informal exchange among scientists before the 1996 federal Centers of Disease Control and
Prevention rules on transfer of select agents such as anthrax.").
124. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 249 Cal. Rptr. 494, 508 n. 14 (Cal. Ct. App.
1998).
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research efforts of others. 25 On the other hand, the principle of informed
consent enshrined in both state and federal law already recognizes the right of
research participants to refuse involvement in biomedical research on moral,
ethical, religious, health, privacy, or any other personal grounds. 126 While some
may contend that widespread acceptance of the notion that research participants
merit compensation will discourage altruism on the part of certain individuals
who otherwise would donate their tissue gratuitously, it is already the case that
research participants can negotiate with researchers for a share in the profits
from commercial products developed from their tissue. 27 Federal codification
of this right would merely ensure that even those research participants denied
informed consent would receive compensation, alongside their counterparts
who had bargained for remuneration.
As a practical matter, it is difficult for biomedical researchers to determine
the terms of compensation for their various research participants in light of the
fact that only rarely is the tissue "provided by any single (or very few)
individual(s) potentially profit-yielding to the research community because the
[tissue] is both commercially useful and rare."'2 Instead, "[r]esearch results are
typically a series of several joint efforts with specimens provided by several
individuals,"' 129 and "many laboratory transformations over a long period of
time separate the original extraction from the end product."' 3 Ultimately,
125. See Moore, 793 P.2d at 493 (stating that it is "inventive effort that patent law rewards,
not the discovery of naturally occurring raw materials," so "Moore's allegations that he owns the
cell line and the products derived from it are inconsistent with the patent, which constitutes an
authoritative determination that the cell line is the product of invention"); see also Heidt, supra
note 34, at 673 (characterizing a research participant with commercially valuable tissue who
seeks to negotiate with the researcher who detected that tissue as "a free rider on the search
efforts of the researcher").
126. See supra note 114 and accompanying text (noting that there is a general right to
refuse participation in research altogether); see also Schloendorffv. New York Hosp., 211 N.Y.
125, 129-30 (1914) (stating, in the context of a surgery performed without informed consent,
that "[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be
done with his own body").
127. See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text (examining PXE International's
success in contracting for a share of profits from tissue research).
128. OWNERSU' OF HUMAN TIssUES AND CELLS, supra note 19, at 55. Mr. John Moore was
unusual in that a highly profitable cell line was developed solely from his tissue. See supra Part
1I.A and accompanying text (describing the unique nature of Moore's tissue).
129. OWNERSIUP oF HuMAN TiSSUES AND CELLS, supra note 19, at 55; see also supra note
36 and accompanying text (noting that Canavan research is an example of scientific
experimentation involving thousands of individual specimens).
130. Heidt, supra note 34, at 711 (citing OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TissuEs AND CELLS, supra
note 19, at 54). Professor Heidt seems to suggest that a research participant is even less entitled
to compensation when his tissue did not "constitute any physical part of the end product," but
then acknowledges that this approach is rather arbitrary. Id. at 711-712. Indeed, any
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however, researchers would adapt to a legal regime that accords research
participants property rights in their tissue by negotiating with each putative
participant in advance,' thereby strengthening the law of informed consent.
132
Furthermore, should judicial calculation of damages prove necessary pursuant
to a liability rule, "mere difficulty in ascertaining damages is not a basis for
denying them," as explained by a federal court that awarded a researcher both
compensatory and punitive damages on his conversion claim after a rival
scientist destroyed his cell line, which was part of a valuable research project.'33
Speaking purely in terms of economic efficiency, facilitating the ability of
research participants to negotiate for compensation in exchange for their tissue
calculation of damages should depend upon the value of the research participant's contribution,
including educational benefit to the researcher, rather than hinging upon whether such tissue
constitutes some part of a physical end product.
131. Id. at 712 (theorizing that "measurement problems should diminish in the face of a
clear rule recognizing the patient's right to share, because researchers would react to that rule by
negotiating the patient's share at the time of the collection," but concluding that transaction
costs would nonetheless stifle innovation). While Heidt alludes to the unseemliness of bedside
negotiations between doctor and patient, id., which could impair feelings of trust between them,
Harrison, supra note 34, at 91, it is important to note that a patient is even more likely to feel
exploited if everyone else profits from her tissue while she cannot. See supra note 94 and
accompanying text (citing academic support for the proposition that altruistic individuals might
feel cheated if others are paid). Moreover, as explained by one commentator:
The relationship is already a contractual one, however, and not merely a
humanitarian one. The physician agrees to treat the patient for a certain fee. If the
fee is too high, theoretically the patient will go elsewhere or possibly discuss a fee
reduction, which is itself adversarial bargaining. The only added element due to
requiring disclosure of research and potential monetary interests is that such face-
to-face bargaining is likely to occur. This adversarial confrontation does not itself
indicate an absence of trust, however, because it is at least forthright. A calculated
deception by which the doctor profits secretly from his patient would do much
more harm to the trust relationship, when discovered, than would a straightforward
bartering session.
Ivey, supra note 31, at 511-12.
A diminution of the trust between physician and patient also raises serious public health
concerns, because the unspoken fear that the physician plans to profit from the patient's tissue
might render the patient less likely place confidence in the physician and heed his medical
advice, or might even render the patient reluctant to seek medical care in the first place. Cf
Rochelle Graff Salguero, Note, Medical Ethics and Competency to Be Executed, 96 YALE L.J.
167, 183 (1986) ("The state's interest in protecting the public health requires it to ensure both
the availability of competent, ethical physicians, and a population with sufficient trust in
physicians to avail themselves of medical care.").
132. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479,494 (Cal. 1990) (conceding that
"the threat of liability for conversion might help to enforce patients' rights [of informed consent]
indirectly").
133. United States v. Arora, 860 F. Supp. 1091, 1 100(D. Md. 1994), aft'd, 56 F.3d62 (4th
Cir. 1995).
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might actually stimulate more productive biomedical research. Our current
system, which permits many researchers to obtain biological materials for
nominal cost, fails to allocate these materials to the highest bidder, who
presumably would put them to their most efficient use. 134 While Professor
Gold argues persuasively that market analysis proves an inappropriate means of
valuing human tissue because of the significant nonmarket value inhering in
such material from the perspective of the research participant, 35 this analysis
does not settle the question. It is clear that at present the biomedical industry
rests firmly upon free market principles, 3 6 and that the creation of a nonprofit,
nongovernmental organization to control valuable tissue, as envisaged by
Professor Gold,137 is unlikely.138 Thus, in allocating property rights among
researchers, it is logical to rely upon the market system in order to ensure that
the tissue goes to the user who values it most highly and will, it is hoped, use it
most productively.
b. The Issue of Shared Control over the Products of Biomedical Research
Critics of any system that accords research participants property rights
in their tissue also fear that research participants will wish to control the
licensing of the intellectual property created using their tissue, thereby
leading to suboptimal use of the technology. This argument conflates,
however, the notions of property rights in human tissue and ownership of
the intellectual property developed from that tissue. Pursuant to federal
patent law, only the person holding the patent possesses the exclusive right
134. RiCHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 71 (1981) (stating that property
rights ought to be allocated to those individuals who value them at the highest dollar amount).
135. See Richard Gold, Owning Our Bodies: An Examination of Property Law and
Biotechnology, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1167, 1242-46 (1995) (examining Moore while
concluding that property law does not address appropriately the concerns raised by
biotechnology issues). The expanded doctrine of informed consent set forth in this Article,
supra notes 113-20 and accompanying text, respects the wishes of putative research participants
who ascribe a very high nonmarket value to their tissue and therefore prefer not to sell it in
many or all circumstances.
136. See Mahoney, supra note 29, at 166 (stating that "markets in human biological
materials not only exist but are for all practical purposes unavoidable"); see also supra note 90
(describing the market in human tissue used for research).
137. See Gold, supra note 135, at 1246-47 (outlining an alternative to placing the property
rights either with the patient or the researchers).
138. See Mahoney, supra note 29, at 199-200 (noting the "dearth of serious proposals to
remove human tissue from the realm of commercial activity" and contending that "true non-
commodification of human biological materials represents a radical position, one with no public
supporters").
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to make, use, or sell the invention, 3 9 or to license that property to others . 40
Implementation of a law according research participants a property interest
in their tissue would not ipso facto supplant federal patent law. Indeed,
absent any finding of joint inventorship, 14' a research participant has no
more right to control the intellectual property developed from her tissue
than would the person who supplied chemical reagents to the researchers.
Rather, federal law would simply recognize the research participant's right
to negotiate for compensation for her tissue, and also her right to receive
remuneration under a liability rule where she has neither negotiated for nor
expressly or impliedly waived her rights to payment. In such liability
cases, damages would depend upon the characteristics of the tissue, the
profit earned by researchers, and whether the researchers acted in good
faith, as opposed to concealing information from the research participant. 1
42
With respect to the right to control the intellectual property developed
from human tissue, however, Congress could provide that a research
participant must negotiate directly for such rights with her biomedical
researchers, as PXE International has done.
43
Notably, more than one commentator has expressed concern that
research participants might condition their consent to research upon
scientists' promise that "the patient's cells only be used in research
designed to benefit certain races" or social groups.'44 This argument is not
compelling, however, because not only research participants, but also
139. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1)(2000).
140. Id. § 261.
141. Federal patent law sets forth the basic requirements for joint inventorship. See 35
U.S.C. § I 16 (2000) (defining the requirements for joint inventorship). Case law has defined a
joint inventor as one who contributes to the "conception of the invention." Ethicon, Inc. v.
United States Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1460 (Fed. Cir. 1998). "Conception is the
'formation in the mind of the inventor, of a definite and permanent idea of the complete and
operative invention, as it is hereafter to be applied in practice."' Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal
Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (quoting I ROBINSON ON PATENTS 532
(1890)).
142. Where researchers did not act in good faith, courts could consider, as an equitable
remedy in exceptional cases, permitting tissue contributors to participate in the decision-making
process with respect to the licensing of the intellectual property developed from their tissue. See
infra text accompanying note 389 (explaining further this possible approach).
143. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text (discussing PXE International's
contract with researchers).
144. Heidt, supra note 34, at 718; see also Children's Hospital's Memorandum in Support
of Their Motion to Dismiss Complaint, Case No. 00-C-6779 (N.D. 11. 2000), at 15 (suggesting
that a hypothetical tissue contributor might dictate that a genetic test "be made available only to
people whose lifestyle he approved") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review)
[hereinafter Children's Hospital's Motion to Dismiss].
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scientists themselves, might exhibit such prejudices. Moreover, federal
antidiscrimination law is the appropriate means for dealing with such issues
if they arise, and could be amended, if necessary, for this purpose.
As demonstrated by the foregoing discussion, proponents of the
market-inalienability model overestimate the negative impact that
recognition of the property rights of human research participants would
have on biomedical research. In addition, they fail to consider fully that
research participants contribute considerable value to the research process,
and therefore merit compensation.
2. Considerations of Equity Militate in Favor of a System That
Compensates Research Participants for Their Involvement
in Furthering Biomedicine
Another principle underlying the market-inalienability model is the notion
that the biotechnology industry is entitled to reap all of the pecuniary rewards
flowing from its inventive work, because its endeavors require significant
investment of capital, labor, and time, and offer only a small likelihood of
success. 45 In Moore, for example, the Supreme Court of California held that
the plaintiff did not possess any property interest in the patented cell line and
the products derived therefrom because the patent awarded by the United States
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) demonstrated that the cell line was the
product of invention created by the researchers alone.' 46 According to this
view, research participants do not merit any share in the wealth because they
simply supply the naturally occurring raw materials. By contrast, researchers
employ skill and ingenuity to transform these materials into marketable
products.
While it is true that research participants do not fit within the definition of
a joint inventor, 147 this fact should not operate to deprive them of any property
145. See supra note 86 and accompanying text (outlining the costs associated with
biotechnology research and development).
146. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479,493 (Cal. 1990) (noting that
it is "inventive effort that patent law rewards, not the discovery of naturally occurring raw
materials," and that "Moore's allegations that he owns the cell line and the products derived
from it are inconsistent with the patent, which constitutes an authoritative determination that the
cell line is the product of invention").
147. See supra note 141 (presenting the requirements for joint inventorship); see also
OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUES AND CELLS, supra note 19, at 71 (stating that "patients and
research subjects who contribute cells to research will not be considered inventors").
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rights whatsoever in the valuable raw materials that they supply. As Justice
Mosk observed in his vigorous dissent in Moore:
[N]o one can question Moore's crucial contribution to the invention-an
invention named, ironically, after him: but for the cells of Moore's body
taken by defendants, there would have been no Mo cell line .... [F]or all
their expertise, defendants do not claim they could have extracted the Mo
cell line out of thin air.
148
Because human tissue is just as indispensable in the research process as
chemical reagents and other equipment used in scientific research, research
participants are no less deserving of compensation than the suppliers of these
materials. 149  In fact, researchers' obligation to remunerate their research
148. Moore, 793 P.2d at 511 (Mosk, J., dissenting); see also Roy Hardiman, Toward the
Right of Commerciality: Recognizing Property Rights in the Commercial Value of Human
Tissue, 34 UCLA L. Rev. 207,209 & n.6 (1986) (explaining that "human cells are indispensable
to the creation and production of human biologics" and that biotechnologists "must start with a
living cell as the raw material").
149. Commentators often analogize human tissue used in biomedical research to natural
resources. For example, the appellate court in Moore offered the example of a farmer who pays
an oil refinery company to remove from his land crude oil that is ruining his crop. According to
the court, "the farmer, who would be unable without the refinery's aid to turn the crude oil into
a usable commodity, is still entitled to a share of the refinery's profits from his land's product."
Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 249 Cal. Rptr. 494, 507 n. 13 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (citing
Rorie Sherman, The Selling of Body Parts, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 7, 1987, at 1); see also Knoll v.
Delta Dev. Co., 218 So. 2d 109, 111 (La. Ct. App. 1969) (holding that willful trespassers who
converted timber to their own use were liable to plaintiff for the market value of the converted
product, and stating in dicta that even a trespasser in good faith who cuts down timber believing
it to be his would be liable to the owner for the stumpage value, but not the value of the
converted products).
Professor Heidt has argued that a party who locates natural resources on the land of another
has no duty to disclose material information about which it knows the other party is mistaken.
See Heidt, supra note 34, at 674-75 & n.26 (citing "powerful precedent" for allowing
nondisclosure). In support of this proposition he invokes the 1969 decision of the Ontario High
Court of Justice in Leitch Gold Mines Ltd. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., [ 196913 D.L.R. (3d) 16 1,
184-85 (Ont. H.C.J.) (implying that the defendant mining company, which had purchased land
containing mineral deposits for a price far below its true value, was under no common law
obligation to disclose to land owners information regarding the value of their land that the
company had obtained through aerial surveys). This case proves inapposite, however, when
considering whether research participants merit compensation for their tissue used in research.
First, the parties in Leitch had an arm's length relationship, whereas a fiduciary relationship
exists between a researcher and the research participant, at least to the extent that the researcher
deals directly with the participant. See supra note 76 and accompanying text (describing
fiduciary duty as outlined in Moore). Second, the defendant in Leitch obtained its information
as to the value of plaintiff's land via aerial surveys and therefore never encroached upon
plaintiff's land, whereas direct physical contact with a research participant's body is necessary
in order to obtain human tissue. Finally, unlike the plaintiff in Leitch, a research participant
often is not even aware that she is conveying anything at all of value to a researcher, and
therefore is not in a position to investigate the value of what she provides. See supra note 44
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participants arises at the moment when the researchers begin to use that tissue,
even if a patent is never issued. In the Moore case, for example, where
researchers put Mr. Moore's tissue to productive use for more than seven years
before their patent was issued, the patent should not be understood to "operate
retroactively to immunize defendants from accountability for conduct occurring
long before the patent was granted." 5 Surely, as stated by Justice Mosk, "a
patent is not a license to defraud."''
In cases where a research participant sues for conversion, federal law
should provide that the fact-finder consider researchers' skill and efforts in
altering and enhancing the value of the tissue in calculating the damages, if any,
owed to the plaintiff. This approach is more equitable than denying research
participants any share whatsoever in the profits from the commercial products
developed from their tissue.' Ultimately, the development of a market in
human tissue would see the emergence of market prices for various human
tissues.
Those who oppose compensation of research participants for their tissue
also contend that it is unfair for an individual to enjoy a windfall simply
because he happens to possess tissue that is valuable to researchers, especially
when the health of all members of society depends upon biomedical
innovations developed through the use of such tissue. Property rights already
inhere, however, in that which we did not earn. As explained by one
commentator:
and accompanying text (noting that many patients are not aware of the potential value of their
medical waste).
The further argument that research participants somehow abandon their tissue when
researchers remove it from their body is without merit in cases where research participants do
not receive informed consent as to the commercial potential of that tissue. See supra note 31
and accompanying text (discussing the implications of informed consent in the Moore case); see
also Hardiman, supra note 148, at 242-44 (contending that the relationship between a patient
and his physician with respect to tissue removed for therapeutic purposes is one of bailment,
rather than abandonment). The doctrine of informed consent suggests that there is a
presumption against abandonment, and that a research participant should retain rights in his
tissue absent an express waiver.
150. Moore, 793 P.2d at 511 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at512.
152. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 249 Cal. Rptr. 494,507 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998)
("The complaint alleges that defendants exploited plaintiffs cells, not just the knowledge gained
from them. Without these small indispensable pieces of plaintiff, there could have been no three
billion dollar cell-line."); see also Moore, 793 P.2d at 503 (Broussard, J., dissenting in part)
("Although the damages which plaintiff may recover in a conversion action may not include the
value of the patent and the derivative products, the fact that plaintiff may not be entitled to all of
the damages which his complaint seeks does not justify denying his right to maintain any
conversion action at all.").
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In our present society.., people can freely exploit their natural beauty,
talent or scientific genius, and can even be paid for material contributions
to a blood or sperm bank for purposes other than research. Unless current
conditions change, an argument based on equality cannot justify denying
payment to contributors of tissue samples for research.' 
5 3
Research participants also merit property rights in their genetic material
because, like the scientists themselves, participants face risks associated with
biomedical research. While the scientists' risks are primarily financial, research
participants must contend with the potential for harm resulting from the
medical procedures they undergo in the experimentation process, the loss of
privacy, the dangers of negative consequences from the release of their medical
information, and the risk of learning emotionally disturbing information about
their health. 
5 4
While research participants may garner some benefit from their scientific
participation, this is not reason enough to exclude them from any share in the
profits from products created from their tissue. The notion that research
participants merit no compensation other than the chance to consume the
diagnostics and therapeutics developed from research on their tissue found
expression in the comments of Fima Lifshitz, chief of medical staff at Miami
Children's Hospital, who was quoted as declaring, in response to the lawsuit
initiated by the Greenberg plaintiffs, that "[t]he issue should be quenched [sic]
at once because these people are going to derive a great deal of benefit from
this. They shouldn't be complaining."'55 The reality, of course, is that research
participants often do not derive direct benefit from the experimentation on their
tissue, either because such research does not lead to a successful product;
because medical advances arrive too late to help individuals who had
participated in the research at an earlier stage, as was the case for many of those
who contributed tissue to the Canavan research effort; or because the research
participants are not directly affected by the disease being studied but, instead,
simply wish to assist a research effort for which their tissue could be useful.
Moreover, the potential for medical benefit from research is not reason enough
to deny any compensation whatsoever to research participants who contribute
valuable tissue to medical research. Just as a research scientist might derive
both professional prestige and pecuniary gain from a patented product, so might
153. Harrison, supra note 34, at 79; see also supra note 80 (explaining that sales of sperm,
blood, and hair are widely accepted).
154. Harrison, supra note 34, at 92 (noting the psychosocial risks associated with being a
research subject).
155. Karen Rafinski, Hospital's Patent Stokes Debate on Human Genes, MiAMI HERALD,
Nov. 14, 1999, at IA.
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a research participant benefit both financially and physically from her research
contributions.
The issue of the equitable distribution of the profits from biomedical
products developed through the use of human tissue has practical as well as
moral consequences. Widespread public perception that the current system is
unfair will not only lead to mistrust between patients and doctors'5 6 and a
general decrease in research participation," 7 but could also cause an overall
decline in public and, therefore, government, support of such research.'18 Thus,
considerations of equity militate in favor of acknowledging a research
participant's property rights in her tissue. Nevertheless, such an approach
raises complex moral, ethical, and religious questions about commodification of
the human body.
3. Recognition of Property Rights in Human Tissue Would Neither
Commodify Human Beings nor Erode Notions of Community
While the Moore majority did not address the moral, ethical, and religious
issues raised by a potential property interest in the human body, Justice Arabian
did do so in his separate concurring opinion. In rejecting Mr. Moore's claim,
Justice Arabian declared:
Plaintiff has asked us to recognize and enforce a right to sell one's own
body tissue for profit. He entreats us to regard the human vessel-the
single most venerated and protected subject in any civilized society-as
equal with the basest commercial commodity. He urges us to commingle
the sacred with the profane. He asks much.
r5
9
Justice Arabian did not, however, assert that under no circumstances should the
law recognize a property right in human tissue. Rather, he even spoke
approvingly of a "licensing scheme" establishing "a fixed rate of profit sharing"
156. See supra note 131 (contending that deception or a lack of ability to share in profits
will lead to research subjects' distrust of doctors).
157. See supra note 94 and accompanying text (speculating that research participation
would decline if patients began to feel cheated).
158. Cf Heidt, supra note 34, at 697-98 (stating, notwithstanding his support of the right
of biomedical researchers searching for valuable cells to deceive research participants in certain
situations, that the law's acceptance of such deception could possibly dissuade those who
currently support biomedical research both financially and through other volunteer efforts from
maintaining such support).
159. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 497 (Cal. 1990) (Arabian, J.,
concurring).
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between researcher and participant, and suggested that the legislature is the
proper forum for consideration of such a regime. 60
Some commentators warn, however, that legislative recognition of the
property rights of individual research participants in their tissue would both
commercialize and commodify the human body. 6' Professors Andrews and
Nelkin suggest chilling possibilities, such as a man being denied welfare
because of the value of his kidney, or a woman's eggs being harvested to pay
for her hospital bill. 62 Professor Radin raises the specter of the government
exercising its power of eminent domain to declare certain organs public
property. 63 Congress also has evinced concern about the commercialization of
human body parts through enactment of federal legislation prohibiting the
purchase and sale of human organs for transplantation.'6
Professor Mahoney responds that such arguments regarding the dangers of
commercialization of human tissue fail to consider that "[p]roperty is a flexible
160. Id. at 498 (Arabian, J., concurring) (citing with approval a profit-sharing proposal
advanced by Danforth, supra note 35, at 198-201).
161. See Rao, supra note 34, at 365 n. 15 (citing an extensive listing of scholarly articles
advocating against (and also in favor of) recognizing property rights in the human body).
162. See ANDREWS & NELKIN, supra note 44, at 165 (offering a series of hypothetical
scenarios stemming from the concern that if a property right in body tissue is established others
might also view that tissue with property value in mind).
163. See MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 156 (1993) (querying "If we
conceive of the body as property, can kidneys be condemned for public use?").
164. See National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2 73- 2 74e (2000)
(criminalizing the transfer of human organs for valuable consideration if that transfer "affects
interstate commerce" and the organ is to be used as a transplant); see also supra notes 34 & 36
and accompanying text (describing the scope of the NOTA and the role of states in regulation of
this area). Of course, there are critical distinctions between the sale of solid human organs for
transplantation on the one hand and, on the other hand, the sale for research purposes of human
tissue that is either (1) regenerative; (2) not necessary for health; or (3) removed from the
research participant for diagnostic or therapeutic purposes. First, while the removal of a solid
organ presents significant risks to the donor, excision of the three types of tissue listed
immediately above does not, and in the case of the third example is even medically necessary for
the health of the tissue contributor. This distinction forms the basis for state laws that bar
commerce in transplantable human organs but permit the sale of regenerative human tissue. See
supra note 34 (observing that state laws generally do not prohibit the sale of blood, regenerative
tissue, or other renewable biological materials). Second, because a patient in need of an organ
transplant typically faces imminent death, there are obvious ethical reasons for forbidding
bargaining in this context, such as the possibility that high-income patients will bid up the prices
of human organs beyond the reach of middle- or low-income people. By contrast, the law does
not have the same interest in procuring for researchers human tissue samples free of charge.
Certainly, society benefits to the extent that research scientists can obtain access to human tissue
at low cost, but the relationship between such research and the preservation of life is more
attenuated. In the purely research setting, it is justifiable to attach greater weight to the property
rights of the tissue contributor.
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concept, not an all-or-nothing one,"' 16 and that the existence of heavily
regulated markets such as the one in securities demonstrates that "the choice is
not between a completely unrestricted exchange system on the one hand and a
total absence of commercial activity in human tissue on the other."' 6 The sale
and purchase of human tissue for research would be appropriate for regulation
by federal agencies such as the Department of Health and Human Services and
Food and Drug Administration. What is more, federal law could be formulated
to provide that an individual who declares bankruptcy is entitled to retain his
biological property if he chooses, much as the bankruptcy laws in many states
permit a debtor to retain his Bible and other family treasure as well as the tools
of his trade, in recognition of their uniqueness.
167
Furthermore, warnings about the dangers of recognizing a property interest
in human tissue presuppose that such tissue is not yet commodified. It is clear,
however, that biomedical advances have already resulted in unprecedented
commercialization of the human body, and both researchers and shareholders in
biotech firms routinely profit from this process. In the Moore case, for
example, where the plaintiff alleged that the defendants could expect profits of
over three billion dollars from their research on his tissue, 68 the appellate court
declared that the researchers' position that "plaintiff cannot own his tissue, but
that they can, is fraught with irony."' 69  Indeed, human tissue provided
gratuitously can be exploited for its financial value once it has been taken from
the donor and stored in a secondary repository. 70 In addition, a thriving
commercial market already exists in blood and gametes. '
7'
165. Mahoney, supra note 29, at 202 (footnote omitted).
166. Id. at 204.
167. See G. Marcus Cole, The Federalist Cost of Bankruptcy Exemption Reform, 74 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 227, 228 (2000) (observing that debtor property exemption statutes generally
exclude property from the bankruptcy estate that is "deemed necessary for an individual debtor's
normal economic functioning" and "thought necessary for a new beginning").
168. See supra note 70 and accompanying text (noting the market potential of the products
that were derived from Moore's cell line).
169. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 249 Cal. Rptr. 494, 507 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
170. See Mahoney, supra note 29, at 175 ("Although the initial transferors (e.g., donors of
solid organs, patients who agree to provide tissue to be used in medical research) may be
spurred solely by beneficence, subsequent transferors (e.g., transplant programs, pharmaceutical
companies) often are not."). See generally ANDREWS & NELKIN, supra note 44 (describing the
market for human tissue).
171. See supra note 80. Scholars have described the U.S. market for gametes as follows:
Payment for sperm and eggs, referred to separately and together as "gametes," is
widespread in American clinical infertility programs. A large market for sperm
donation has existed for many years, and a market for eggs for IVF [in vitro
fertilization] programs is now flourishing. This market involves direct solicitation
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In any event, the mere fact that markets do exist for various types of
human biological materials does not dictate that market prices are the only
measure of their worth. It is possible to place a price tag on something without
that price being the only measure of its value. According to Professor Maguire
Shultz:
Many things that partake of the monetary economy also involve aspects of
life that are deeply revered. We buy a wedding ring or a home but its
personal worth is not equated with its price. Doctors deal with the creation,
sustenance and termination of life. We do not expect the fees we pay them
to capture all of their meaning and importance to us. Neither do we deny
them the capacity to get monetary recognition for their work. Similarly, we
appraise a couple's ability to sustain the costs of raising a child when we
decide whether they are fit adoptive parents. We award child support when
a divorce occurs; we assess damages for the costs of raising a child born
because of a negligent diagnostic test, or for an untimely death in a
wrongful death action. We are not confused about whether these financial
representations adequately sum the value of the lives or relationships in
question. We simply say that money is one dimension of human interaction
and valuing. The critical issue is not whether something involves monetary
exchange as one of its aspects, but whether it is treated as reducible solely
to its monetary features.
Analogously, life insurance "initially provoked condemnation but has come to
enjoy broad social acceptance." 173 This perspective challenges the Kantian
notion that pricelessness is the hallmark of dignity.' 74
of women donors through student newspapers and bulletin boards and arranged
transactions through egg brokers .... Sperm donors receive roughly $50, and egg
donors, $2000 per donation.
Ann Alpers & Bernard Lo, Commodification and Commercialization in Human Embryo
Research: The Absence of National Standards Sets the United States Apartfrom Other Western
Nations, 6 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 39, 41 (1995). Professor Mahoney has explained that,
although providers of gametes are termed "donors," they are routinely offered financial
compensation for their biological material. See Mahoney, supra note 29, at 186 (arguing that
donor is a misleading moniker for a person who exchanges gametes for money). She has
pointed out that payments to women for their ova have generated far more controversy than
payments to men for their sperm because egg donors are expected to harbor altruistic rather than
financial motives, notwithstanding the fact that removal of ova is much more invasive than the
process by which men provide sperm. See id. at 188-89 (noting the current re-examination of
payment for sperm donation in light of the negative reaction to payment for egg donation).
172. Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood:
An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 297, 336 (1990) (footnote omitted).
173. Mahoney, supra note 29, at 212 n.166.
174. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE ME'APHwSIC OF MORALS 96 (H.J. Paton
trans., Hutchinson & Co. 1972) ("In the kingdom of ends everything has either a price or a
dignity. If it has a price, something else can be put in its place as an equivalent; if it is exalted
above all price and so admits of no equivalent, then it has a dignity."); see also House Hearing,
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Indeed, fixing a price for human tissue might actually enhance its
dignity.175 As Professor Maguire Shultz stated in advocating for the rights of
private parties to contract for maternal surrogacy services:
Efforts sharply to segregate money and values are frequently regressive in
effect. "Either/or" thinking rarely captures the complexity or nuance of
human reality. Nor does experience suggest that the more we value
something, the less we entangle it with money. In fact, there is a strongly
competing truism suggesting that that which we reward with money is that
which we value.1
76
In addition, it is overly simplistic to conceive of the recognition of the
property rights of research participants as commodification of the human body.
Courts and scholars have noted that the concept of property law actually rests
upon the notion of a "bundle of rights," including the rights to "possess, to use,
to exclude, to profit, and to dispose." 77 Thus, according to Professors Litman
and Robertson, the issue of property rights in human tissue ought to be framed
in terms of control:
supra note 53, at 120 (statement of Dr. Thomas H. Murray, Institute for the Medical
Humanities, University of Texas Medical Branch) (noting "the deep conviction that the body
and its parts are somehow different from other things, central to our dignity as human beings...
[and] should not be for sale").
175. See Mahoney, supra note 29, at 205 ("Indeed, requesting compensation commensurate
with one's market 'worth' can be construed as an expression of self-respect.").
176. Maguire Shultz, supra note 172, at 336 (footnote omitted). Maguire Shultz cites as an
example the fact that, in the marketplace, occupations that society views as altruistic "'women's
work' (nursing, child care, teaching, etc.) are paid far lower wages than traditionally male work,
even where the skills and required credentials are equal to or higher than those of traditionally
masculine jobs." Id. at 336 n. 117.
177. Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477,481 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that removal of
decedent's corneas without permission of next-of-kin constitutes deprivation of a
constitutionally protected possessory interest); see also Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,
249 Cal. Rptr. 494, 504 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) ("As a matter of legal definition, 'property' refers
not to a particular material object but to the right and interest or domination rightfully obtained
over such object, with the unrestricted right to its use, enjoyment and disposition .... [Tlhus
'property' is nothing more than a collection of rights.") (quoting 63A Am. JUR. 2D Property
§ 1); Litman & Robertson, supra note 33, at 62 (defining property as "the bundle of rights,
powers, immunities, privileges, and obligations that give specific expression to the right of
control... includ[ing] the right of possession, the right of exclusion, the power of alienation
(including the right to sell, exchange, make gifts etc.), the liberty to use, enjoy, and manage, the
right of destruction and injurious use, and the right to the fruits and profits produced by the
object of property") (citing Roscoe Pound, The Law of Property and Recent Juristic Thought,
25 A.B.A. J. 993, 996 (1939)); STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 44-56 (1990)
(recognizing the "bundle of rights" theory to the extent that rights in the human body should be
considered limited property rights rather than full ownership).
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[I]f property is viewed more accurately, in terms of control over one's
body, these criticisms [regarding commodification of the human body] may
be inapt. If property confers exclusive control to people over their own
bodies, then their dignity is enhanced, not diminished. Indeed, as a general
proposition, the greater the control conferred on individuals in relation to
their bodies, the greater the respect that is being accorded to individuals. 1
78
Justice Broussard emphasized in his separate opinion this right of control,
suggesting that the "pertinent inquiry is not whether a patient generally retains
an ownership interest in a body part after its removal from his body, but rather
whether a patient has a right to determine, before a body part is removed, the
use to which the part will be put after removal."'
179
Certainly, if we assume that human tissue will generate profit in our
society, then our notions of individual autonomy militate in favor of according
the individual the power to control what becomes of that tissue. As the lower
court emphasized in Moore, to decide otherwise "would open the door to a
massive invasion of human privacy and dignity in the name of medical
progress."'8 0  This is especially true when the parties possess unequal
bargaining power, a circumstance recognized by the courts.' Biomedical
researchers possess scientific information about the value of body tissue and
their designs to obtain a patent that their research participants do not possess.
178. Litman & Robertson, supra note 33, at 60.
179. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 501 (Cal. 1990) (Broussard, J.,
dissenting in part). As explained by Professors Litman and Robertson, "the manner in which the
issue is framed can affect the resolution of the issue," Litman & Robertson, supra note 33, at 59,
and in the California Supreme Court decision in Moore, "Justice Arabian's approach is to
compare objects," see supra note 159 and accompanying text (explaining the intellectual
foundation of Justice Arabian's opinion), "whereas Justice Broussard focuses on the question of
right of control." Litman & Robertson, supra note 33, at 59 n.31.
180. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 249 Cal. Rptr. 494, 508 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
The lower court analogized a plaintiff's right to control and capitalize upon his tissue to his
entitlement to do likewise with his persona, including his name and likeness, id., a right
protected under California statutory law. See CA.. CIv. CODE § 3344(a) (West 1997) (providing
for damages where "[a]ny person... knowingly uses another's name, voice, signature,
photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in products, merchandise, or goods, or for
purposes of advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise, goods or
services, without such person's prior consent"). According to the lower court in Moore, "[i]f
the courts have found a sufficient proprietary interest in one's persona, how could one not have
a right in one's own genetic material, something far more profoundly the essence of one's
human uniqueness than a name or face." Moore, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 508.
181. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 n. 14 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("Patients
ordinarily are persons unlearned in the medical sciences... [and] it is only in the unusual case
that a court could safely assume that the patient's insights were on a parity with those of the
treating physician."); Moore, 793 P.2d at 516 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (stating that "the parties are
not in equal bargaining positions").
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Moreover, research participants are often concerned about a disease affecting
themselves or their loved ones and therefore may feel particularly vulnerable
during the bargaining process."8 2
Some contend that research participants can receive adequate protection of
their dignitary interests under the Moore holding, which provides that
physician-researchers who take an economic interest in their patients are
subject to a duty of informed consent and also a fiduciary duty to disclose this
information. "3 Nevertheless, these common law doctrines prove insufficient in
several respects to protect the autonomy and dignity of research participants.
4. The Doctrines of Informed Consent and Breach of Fiduciary Duty Prove
Inadequate to Protect Research Participants'Interests in
Dignity and Autonomy
The doctrines of informed consent and breach of fiduciary duty, as they
have been interpreted traditionally and were set forth in Moore, prove
inadequate in four major respects to protect research participants' interests in
their autonomy and dignity. This statement would prove true even if the
Supreme Court of California's decision in Moore, which is binding precedent
only in California, were to be adopted on a national scale.1
8 4
First, the Moore court itself undermined its holding by stating that "[i]n
some cases, ... a physician's research interest might play such an insignificant
role in the decision to recommend a medically indicated procedure that
disclosure should not be required because the interest is not material."'8' As
noted by one commentator, this qualification by the Moore court "abolishes a
182. For a discussion of the propriety of permitting bedside negotiations between physician
and patient/research participant in the first place, see supra note 131.
183. See supra note 76 and accompanying text (describing the duty the Moore court placed
on doctors to disclose monetary and nonmonetary interests they might have in a patient's
biological material). Professor Krause has noted, however, that the opinion of the Supreme
Court of California in Moore actually "came at the motion to dismiss stage, and holds only that
Moore stated a cause of action for breach of the physician's disclosure obligations; it does not
indicate whether he would have prevailed at trial on this theory." Joan H. Krause,
Reconceptualizing Informed Consent in an Era of Health Care Cost Containment, 85 IOWA L.
REv. 261, 340 (1999). Research revealed no published decision from any such trial.
184. Research did not reveal any state statute or, aside from Moore, any judicial decision
relating to informed consent or fiduciary duty that held specifically that physicians or
researchers are obliged to divulge to their research participants their economic interests in
research participants' tissue.
185. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 485 n.9 (Cal. 1990).
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uniform standard of disclosure" by introducing an ambiguous "materiality"
standard and then fails to specify whose definition of materiality will apply.'
86
Second, the doctrines of informed consent and breach of fiduciary duty
protect only those research participants involved in a physician-patient
relationship with the researchers. As stated by Professors Alpers and Lo:
[T]he Moore decision leaves large groups of patients unprotected and large
groups of profit-makers unregulated. The doctrines of informed consent
and fiduciary obligation operate only within the confines of the physician-
patient relationship. While informed consent is required in research on
human subjects, the relationship between the researcher and subject is not a
fiduciary one. The researcher need not be a physician, and even if he is, he
has no fiduciary responsibility if the research subject is not his patient in
the clinical sense. Furthermore, the requirements of informed consent and
fiduciary responsibility, which infuse the culture of clinicians, have no sway
over the activities of corporate entities engaged in biotechnological
research. These requirements leave completely unregulated commercial
entities which may exploit research materials for a profit.1
8 7
Thus, while the doctrines of informed consent and breach of fiduciary duty
required Mr. Moore's treating physician to inform Mr. Moore of the
physician's economic interests in his tissue, the researchers and biotech firms
with whom Mr. Moore had no therapeutic relationship faced no similar
obligation. 8
Third, even in cases involving physician-researchers, the amount of
damages available under the theories of lack of informed consent and breach of
186. Potts, supra note 31, at 469-70 (arguing that the inclusion of the materiality
requirement guts the majority rule of the Moore case and hinders its application).
187. Alpers & Lo, supra note 171, at 43 (footnote omitted). As an example, Justice
Broussard noted in his separate opinion in Moore that:
[I]f a patient donated his removed cells to a medical center, reserving the right to
approve or disapprove the research projects for which the cells would be used, and
if another medical center or a drug manufacturer stole the cells after removal and
used them in an unauthorized manner for its own economic gain, no breach-of-
fiduciary-duty cause of action would be available and a conversion action would be
necessary to vindicate the patient's rights.
Moore, 793 P.2d at 504 (Broussard, J., dissenting in part). In an analogous situation, where a
researcher intentionally destroyed a rival scientist's fully developed cell line (rather than mere
tissue) which was part of a valuable research project, a federal court has already recognized the
tort of conversion. See United States v. Arora, 860 F. Supp. 1091, 1099 (D. Md. 1994), aftd,
56 F.3d 62 (4th Cir. 1995). For a discussion of the arguments in support of extending the
application of the doctrines of breach of fiduciary duty and informed consent to researchers as
well as treating physicians, see supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
188. See supra note 78 and accompanying text (explaining that the Moore court left it to
the legislature to decide if a duty of informed consent or fiduciary duty traveled with the tissue
to subsequent research).
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fiduciary duty will not motivate them to disclose their financial interests. As
indicated by Justice Mosk in his Moore dissent, in order to recover under these
doctrines, which sound in negligence rather than battery, the plaintiff must
prove a "causal relationship between the physician's failure to inform and the
injury to the plaintiff," a connection that arises "only if it is established that had
revelation been made consent to treatment would not have been given."' 89 The
reason for this requirement is that the two doctrines aim to prevent physicians'
pecuniary interests from clouding their professional judgment concerning the
treatment of their patients, not at protecting patients' dignitary or financial
interests or their personal autonomy. 90 The Moore majority took care to
emphasize this point, declaring that "[a] physician is not the patient's financial
adviser," and "the reason why a physician must disclose possible conflicts is not
because he has a duty to protect his patient's financial interests, but because
certain personal interests may affect his professional judgment.' 91
Three years after Moore, the California Supreme Court clarified in Arato
v. Avedon 92 its narrow view of the scope of a physician's duty of informed
189. Moore, 793 P.2d at 519 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). Justice Mosk noted
in his dissenting opinion in Moore that the vast majority of jurisdictions apply an objective
standard of consent, requiring the plaintiff to prove that no reasonably prudent person would
have consented to the proposed procedure if he had been fully informed. The application of the
objective standard of consent renders a nondisclosure suit "largely a paper tiger," because few
plaintiffs will be able to establish that a reasonable person would decline medical treatment
rather than permit commercial exploitation of his tissue. Id. at 519-20. Another significant
problem with the objective standard, which still represents the majority rule, Krause, supra note
183, at 317, is that it impedes an individual's autonomy by foreclosing his ability to make an
atypical medical choice. See id. at 319 (positing that the objective standard actually hinders a
patient's freedom of personal choice in care by weighing his choice against that of a theoretical
reasonable patient who might not take the same risks).
190. See Susan L. Goldberg, Medical Advocates: A Callfora New Profession: A Cure for
What Ails? Why the Medical Advocate Is Not the Answer to Problems in the Doctor-Patient
Relationship, I WIDENER L. SYMp. J. 325,347 n.97 (1996) (declaring that the Moore court "was
more concerned that the physicians' interests were clouding their professional judgement
concerning treatment, rather than with the patient's financial interests in the sale of the cell
line"). Indeed, many commentators have observed that traditionally courts have "den[ied]
recovery for inadequate disclosure in the absence of bodily harm." Alan Meisel, A "Dignitary
Tort" as a Bridge Between the Idea of Informed Consent and the Law of Informed Consent, 16
LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 210, 211 (1988); see also Heidt, supra note 34, at 703 ("In most
states, a violation of the doctrine [of informed consent] only gives rise to an action in negligence
for injuries from the treatment."). The Moore court acknowledged that "questions about the
validity of a patient's consent to a procedure typically arise when the patient alleges that the
physician failed to disclose medical risks, as in malpractice cases, and not when the patient
alleges that the physician had a personal interest," but then the court declared that "[t]he concept
of informed consent.., is broad enough to encompass the latter." Moore, 793 P.2d at 483.
191. Moore, 793 P.2dat485 n.10.
192. Arato v. Avedon, 858 P.2d 598, 604-09 (Cal. 1993) (discussing the wide berth the
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consent. 193 In Arato, family members brought an informed consent action
against the decedent's physicians, alleging that the physicians' failure to
disclose statistical mortality information affected the decedent's nonmedical
interests. The family contended that, if the physicians had made decedent
aware of his short life expectancy, he would have put his business and
investment affairs in order. 94 The court rejected this argument, noting that:
[A]lthough an aspect of personal autonomy, the conditions for the exercise
of the patient's right of self-decision presuppose a therapeutic focus ....
The fact that a physician has "fiducial obligations"... which... prohibit
misrepresenting the nature of the patient's medical condition, does not
mean that he or she is under a duty, the scope of which is undefined, to
disclose every contin ency that might affect the patient's nonmedical
"rights and interests."
According to Professor Krause, "[b]y focusing exclusively on medical
interests, the Arato court limited Moore in a way that may exacerbate the
problems inherent in traditional informed consent law: where a patient's health
is improved at the expense of his 'non-medical' dignity interests, Moore will
not provide relief."' 96 Thus, the doctrines of lack of informed consent and
breach of fiduciary duty are inadequate to protect the interests of research
participants facing situations similar to those encountered by Mr. Moore and
the Greenberg plaintiffs. Arguably, research participants will be left without a
remedy, because the harm they suffered affected not their medical interests, but
rather their dignity and autonomy.
197
California courts grant to doctors in informing patients and noting that the information need
only concern medical issues and not the patient's nonmedical interests).
193. See id. at 601-02 (observing that the gravamen of the action was a supposed failure by
the physician to convey the life expectancy figures for the disease to the decedent and his family
prior to treatment).
194. See id. at 602 (relating the plaintiff's assertion that knowledge of the risks of treatment
would have convinced the decedent to live out his days with his family preparing for his death
and not undertaking treatment).
195. Id. at 608-09 (footnotes omitted).
196. Krause, supra note 183, at 341; see also Judith F. Daar, Informed Consent: Defining
Limits Through Therapeutic Parameters, 16 WHrTrIR L. REV. 187, 193 (1995) (stating that
"the Arato court turned Moore's broad disclosure requirement on its head, holding that where a
patient's economic interests are concerned, a doctor has no duty to disclose medical information
that may be relevant to those considerations because a 'physician is not the patient's financial
adviser"').
197. Theoretically, such plaintiffs could recover under the theories of intentional or
negligent infliction of emotional distress, because courts in most jurisdictions no longer require
the plaintiff to prove physical harm in these cases, as was necessary in the past. See Meredith A.
Moore, Note, South Dakota's Interpretation of Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress and
the "Zone ofDanger" Rule in Nielson v. AT&T Corporation: A Dangerous Hybrid, 45 S.D. L.
61 WASH. & LEE L. REV 257 (2004)
In response to Justice Mosk's contention in his dissent in Moore that the
remedies afforded under the theories of breach of fiduciary duty and lack of
informed consent are "largely illusory" and therefore insufficient to protect the
interests of research participants, 98 Justice Broussard suggested that, at least in
a therapeutic context where treatment is successful, such as the Moore case, a
plaintiff who did not give informed consent to research "should not be required
to establish that he would not have proceeded with the medical treatment in
question if his physician had made full disclosure, but only that the doctor's
wrongful failure to disclose information proximately caused the plaintiff some
type of compensable damage." 99 Thus, because the harm Mr. Moore alleged
arose from the use of his cells without his permission and not from his
splenectomy itself, the court should require him to prove only that he would
have refused research on his tissue, not that he would have declined surgical
treatment for his life-threatening leukemia.2°° Noting that the Moore majority
did not identify the damages Mr. Moore could recover in an action for breach
of fiduciary duty, Justice Broussard indicated in his separate opinion his belief
that "in appropriate circumstances, punitive as well as compensatory damages
would clearly be recoverable in such an action."' 0' 1
REv. 379, 381-82 & nn.] 1-14 (2000) (analyzing the historical development of tort recovery for
emotional distress and chronicling the decline of the physical harm test). Even in jurisdictions
where the courts now recognize these torts as separate and independent, however, the law
compensates only for emotional distress that is "so severe that no reasonable man could be
expected to endure it." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j (1965). Where bodily
harm is not present, "the courts may perhaps tend to look for more in the way of outrage as a
guarantee that the claim is genuine." Id. § 46 cmt. k (1965). It is therefore probable that, as
with the tort of lack of informed consent, plaintiffs who object to researchers' unrevealed plans
for their tissue but who suffer no physical harm will recover little in damages for emotional
distress.
198. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 519-20 (Cal. 1990) (Mosk, J.,
dissenting) (contending that the standard of proof in breach of fiduciary duty and lack of
informed consent cases render these theories ineffective for plaintiffs seeking damages).
199. Id. at 500 (Broussard, J., dissenting in part).
200. See Potts, supra note 3 1, at 473-74 (arguing that Mr. Moore's splenectomy and the
use of his cells after the surgery should be considered two distinct procedures, so that he need
demonstrate "only that he would have refused the use or disposal of his cells," rather than facing
the "much higher causation hurdle" of proving that he would have declined the splenectomy).
Of course, plaintiffs would have a much more difficult time prevailing in such an action if they
were aware from the outset that they were involved in biomedical research, and objected not to
that process, but rather to the commercialization of the products of that research.
201. Moore, 793 P.2d at 500 (Broussard, J., dissenting in part). Analogously, California's
Protection of Human Subjects in Medical Experimentation Act provides a maximum damages
award of only $10,000 for a willful violation that "exposes a subject to a known substantial risk
of serious injury, either bodily harm or psychological harm." CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 24176(c) (West 1992). The statute further provides that it does not "limit or expand the right
of an injured subject to recover damages under any other applicable law." Id. § 24176(g).
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Nevertheless, it remains doubtful whether courts and juries would award
the damages contemplated by Justice Broussard and, if so, fix such damages at
a dollar amount high enough to deter physician-researchers from breaching
their duty of informed consent and their fiduciary obligation. If not, many
physician-researchers simply would make the rational, albeit immoral,
economic choice to use human tissue to develop commercially lucrative
biotechnology products without first obtaining informed consent, rather than
negotiating with research participants in advance. Certainly, without
recognition of a property right in human tissue, it would not be surprising if
courts and juries awarded relatively low compensatory and punitive damages,
particularly when the plaintiff suffered no physical injury.2 °2 In addressing the
adequacy of damages in cases such as Moore, Professor Bobinski has proposed
more explicit reliance on the principle of unjust enrichment enshrined in
fiduciary law, explaining:
If the key to the claim is the impermissible benefit to the physician rather
than the actualization of risk for the patient, then unjust enrichment
principles might supply the measure of damages .... A breach of fiduciary
duty, for example, could be remedied by requiring that the fiduciary
disgorge profits from an undisclosed transaction, even if the transaction
also presented benefits to the entrustor.
20 3
A significant shortcoming of this approach, however, is that the plaintiff's
damages likely will prove to be quite small if a third party, such as a biotech
firm, rather than the research participant's physician-researcher, reaped the bulk
202. As explained by Justice Mosk in his dissent in Moore, the damages available under a
nondisclosure cause of action would prove limited because this legal theory fails to recognize
that research participants possess not only the negative right to refuse to provide their tissue for
experimentation, but also the positive right to bargain with researchers. See Moore, 793 P.2d at
520 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (explaining that a nondisclosure cause of action "gives the patient
only the right to refuse consent... [but] not the right to grant consent to...
commercialization"). Since the Moore decision, patient groups such as PXE International have
exercised this latter right by negotiating contracts with the scientists studying the disease
affecting their families. See infra Part III for a description of this change in patient-researcher
bargaining. The measure of damages available to research participants such as the Greenberg
plaintiffs should reflect this reality. By failing to reveal their intention to commercialize the
tissue provided by the Greenberg plaintiffs, researchers denied these individuals essential
information that would have permitted them to bargain for rights to compensation and control.
See infra Part IV.B for an analysis of the Greenberg action.
203. Mary Anne Bobinski, Autonomy and Privacy: Protecting Patients from Their
Physicians, 55 U. PITT. L. REv. 291, 374 (1994). It should be noted that the final judicial
decision in the Greenberg action permitted the plaintiffs' claim for unjust enrichment to
proceed. See Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064,
1072-73 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (denying a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claim
under Florida law).
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of the profits from the tissue studied. This issue is hardly a purely academic
one, because many physician-researchers transfer their patent rights to third
parties who then commercialize the patented innovations on a large scale) °4 As
noted above, these third parties owe no fiduciary duty or duty of informed
consent to the research participants. 20 5 Explicit recognition of individuals'
property rights in their tissue avoids this problem, and is consistent with
society's acceptance of the right of scientists to profit from their research on
human tissue.
For the reasons set forth above, the doctrines of lack of informed consent
and breach of fiduciary duty are of limited use in protecting research
participants' autonomy and right to control the use of their tissue. As stated in
one government report, "[t]he propriety of researchers achieving financial
success from manipulating human specimens in their research is an issue best
handled under other legal theories and principles," including "provisions in
research contracts [and] property law. 20 6 Professor Epstein concurs, stating
that even though punitive damages could be assessed, thereby assuring
plaintiffs in a breach of duty to disclose case damages equal to what they would
win in a conversion action, a conversion action is preferable "because it creates
cleaner property rights in those cases in which individuals do enter into various
kinds of business transactions.
20 7
5. Concerns About Scientists Luring Research Participants with Promises
of False Profits and Participants Elevating Financial Concerns over Health
Concerns Do Not Furnish Sufficient Reason to Deny-Research Participants
an Ownership Interest in Their Tissue
Those opposed to recognizing research participants' property rights in
their tissue often express concern that scientists will induce research
participation with false or misguided promises of profits.20 8 Professors
204. For example, in the Moore case, while Dr. Golde and the Regents were paid over
$400,000 by two biotech firms, one of which also offered Dr. Golde the opportunity to purchase
75,000 stock shares at a nominal price, see supra note 62 and accompanying text, Mr. Moore
alleged that the biotech industry could expect to earn $3 billion overall from his tissue. Supra
note 70 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 76, 187-88 and accompanying text (noting that because several
defendants, including Ms. Quan, Genetics Institute, and Sandoz, were not doctors, they did not
owe any fiduciary duty or duty of informed consent to the plaintiff).
206. OWNERSFIP OF HuMAN TiSSUES AND CELLS, supra note 19, at 107.
207. Richard A. Epstein, Steady the Course: Property Rights in Genetic Material, in F.
ScoTT KIEFF, PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 159 (2003).
208. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 249 Cal. Rptr. 494, 539 (Cal. Ct. App.
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Knoppers and Laberge warn that researchers might lure participants with
promises of "ultimately fictitious percentages of far-off royalties."2°9
Individuals with limited education and financial resources are particularly
vulnerable to such offers.2' ° Moreover, even those researchers wishing to deal
honestly with their research participants might find themselves unable to
estimate accurately the potential commercial value of particular tissue
specimens, and would therefore offer unintentionally misleading information.2 1
However, a legal system that refuses to recognize research participants'
property interest in their tissue does not forestall these problems.
First, it is already "common practice for sponsors and even research
institutions to compensate subjects for participating in research. 0 1 2 Thus, even
without legal recognition of individuals' property rights in their tissue,
scientists presently induce research participation with financial remuneration.
On the other hand, it is clear that widespread expectation that a research
participant can claim financial compensation, whether through a contractual
arrangement or a liability rule, could encourage even more research
participation by individuals willing to risk their health in the hope of pecuniary
gain.
There are several arguments in response to this concern. First, as a
practical matter, there is much to recommend in a legal system that increases
1998) (George, J., dissenting) (warning of the "threat of improper motivation in the area of
tissue acquisition").
209. Bartha Maria Knoppers & Claude Laberge, DNA Banking/Collecting: A Canadian
"Sample" of Consent Forms, in LEGAL RIGHTS AND HUMAN GENETIC MATERIAL, supra note 33,
at 33, 49 (arguing that such outlandish promises of future wealth should be banned); see also
OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUES AND CELLS, supra note 19, at 104 ("For researchers to divulge
such information could convince subjects to participate in research on the basis of
misinformation, unreasonable expectation, or for the sole purpose of financial gain.").
210. Professor Mahoney highlights in particular the international practice of
bioprospecting, where "gene prospectors" visit "remote, inbred populations" in the developing
world who are "potentially vulnerable to the entreaties of profit-seeking First World
organizations." Mahoney, supra note 29, at 191 (footnote omitted).
211. See OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN CELLS AND TISSUES, supra note 19, at 104 (noting that
researchers would be unable to give participants accurate financial forecasts because the profits
are too "vague and speculative at the time the sample is obtained").
212. Michael J. Malinowski, Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Research: Legal and Ethical
Issues: Institutional Conflicts and Responsibilities in an Age ofAcademic-Industry Alliances, 8
WIDENER L. Symp. J. 47, 68 n.96 (2001). "Financial incentives are often used in the early
phases of investigational drug, biologic, or device development, especially when health benefits
to subjects are inconsequential or non-existent." Id. (citing PRICEWATERHOUSE COOPERS, LLP,
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD (IRB) REFERENCE BOOK (Michele K. Russell-Einhom & Thomas
Puglisi eds., 2001)).
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the supply of human tissue for research." 3 Second, while the law must guard
against situations where researchers make false or inaccurate promises in order
to secure the involvement of research participants or cases where individuals
facing financial hardship agree out of desperation to participate in research, the
doctrine of informed consent is specifically designed for just this problem.'
1 4
Indeed, if we deem these participants so vulnerable that they merit protection
from unscrupulous researchers, it is illogical to maintain the current system,
which denies effective recovery to the most vulnerable research participants of
all, those who were not even aware of their research participation or of their
researchers' plans to commercialize their tissue.25 Third, with respect to the
concern that research participants will risk their health for the speculative
promise of profit, it is arguably excessively paternalistic to protect potential
research participants from their own desire to contribute tissue for scientific
experimentation in exchange for valuable consideration. Moreover, as
Professor Mahoney emphasized:
[P]reventing excessive risktaking by banning payments, instead of through
the regulation of collection procedures and required disclosure of relevant
hazards, is a curious strategy. When a conclusion is reached that workers
are exposing themselves to excessive risks, the usual response is to alter
workplace conditions to reduce the risk, not to forbid payments for the
work while suggesting that altruistically minded volunteers perform the
work for free.
It should be acknowledged, however, that widespread societal acceptance
of the notion that research participants possess a property interest in their tissue
217will lead individuals to expect compensation for their research participation.
This problem leads many commentators to express concern that such a system
would erode notions of community and discourage altruistic donation not just
of tissue for research purposes, but also inhibit gratuitous donation of organs
and blood.218
213. This very notion underlies the opinion of the Moore court, which ultimately took a
different approach in order to ensure researchers' access to human tissue for experimentation.
214. Depending upon the factual circumstances, a plaintiff may also have recourse to one
or more of the doctrines of fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, duress,
undue influence, unconscionability, and professional disciplinary laws.
215. Supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
216. Mahoney, supra note 29, at 213.
217. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text (noting the increased expectation of
some research participants for compensation and control in the research process).
218. See Mahoney, supra note 29, at 164 (outlining the arguments against paid tissue
donation, including the belief that a market system "may discourage gratuitous transfers").
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6. Recognition of Research Participants'Property Rights in Their Tissue
Will Neither Erode Appreciably Notions of Community
nor Discourage Altruism
Denying research participants property rights in their tissue does not necessarily
foster notions of community or disseminate widely the fruits of biotech research.
Instead, the tissue taken from research participants without compensation is used by
researchers and biotech firms to develop commercial products, some of which maybe
priced beyond the reach of most consumers. 219 Our legal and economic systems are
premised upon the notion that promise of reward for individual effort, not
communitarian ideals, will stimulate biomedical research and innovation that will
redound to the benefit of society.
Nonetheless, some commentators fear that recognition of property rights in
human tissue ultimately will discourage altruism in other areas where it is typically
practiced, such as gratuitous donation of organs220 and blood221 to human recipients.
With respect to organ donation in particular, it is important to recall that federal law
already prohibits the sale of human organs for transplant.222 There are several policy
reasons why federal law defensibly could continue to encourage altruistic transfer of
human organs for transplant but nonetheless recognize property rights in human tissue
that is either (1) regenerative; (2) not vital for the healthy functioning of the human
body, or (3) required to be removed for purposes of diagnosis or treatment.
223
219. See supra notes 168-71 and accompanying text (describing the current exploitation of
human tissue for commercial profit).
220. See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 249 Cal. Rptr. 494, 539 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1998) (George, J., dissenting) (citing as an argument against recognition of property rights
in the human body "the potential for adverse effects on organ donation for transplantation
usage" (footnote omitted)).
221. See, e.g., RICHARD M. TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM HuMAN BLOOD TO
SOCIAL POLICY 245-46 (1971) (warning that a system of providing financial remuneration to
blood donors results in a decrease in the number of charitable donations and also erodes the
communitarian and collectivist attitudes necessary for a strong society).
222. See supra note 34 (noting that Congress prohibits the sale of solid organs for
transplant). It should be recalled, however, that individuals presumably can sell their solid
organs for research purposes. Id.
223. See supra note 164 (observing that these types of tissues do not present the same
removal risks as solid organs and that a market in these tissues will not lead to the type of
unethical bargaining that one might imagine with organs). This Article does not take a position
on whether a market should exist in human organs for transplant, a topic that legal academic
literature has treated at great length. Instead, this work advocates for federal legislation
according research participants property rights in certain human tissue used in research, and
contends that transplantable human organs and other sorts of tissue are sufficiently distinct, for
the reasons set forth at note 164 supra, that the U.S. Congress could recognize property rights in
the latter without reversing long-standing federal legislation barring the sale of the former.
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With respect to other types of tissue, where donative and sales regimes exist side
by side, such as blood and plasma, there is no evidence that a commercial market
decreases charitable donations, as theorized by Richard Titmuss, a leading British
social policy analyst.224 As explained by one commentator, "[t]he legality of a market
in blood for transfusion in the United States has far fiom eliminated the donation of
blood for that purpose."225 Even if one accepts the notion that overall blood donations
have declined since the implementation of a commercial regime,226 it is not clear that a
causal relationship exists between these two factors. In response to Professor Titmuss,
Professor Kenneth Arrow, an American Nobel Laureate in Economics, has offered an
alternative explanation: that the United States instituted a system of monetary
compensation for blood in response to the inadequacy of an entirely donative
system.227 Thus, any shortage in the nation's blood supply may result simply from the
American public's disinclination to behave altruistically,228 as opposed to the
availability of payment for their blood and plasma.
224. See TITMuss, supra note 221, at 245-46 (positing an inverse relationship between the
availability of compensation for blood and the likelihood that donors will give blood
voluntarily).
225. Harrison, supra note 34, at 93 (footnote omitted).
226. See, e.g., Kenneth Baum, Golden Eggs: Towards the Rational Regulation of Cocyte
Donation, 2001 BYU L. REV. 107, 138 (2001) (stating that, since the 1971 publication of
Titmuss's book, "trends in blood donation have shifted" such that "[c]haritable donations have
declined, resulting in a shortage of blood" and "demand now outpaces supply" (footnotes
omitted)). But see Anne Reichman Schiff, Solomonic Decisions in Egg Donation:
Unscrambling the Conundrum of Legal Maternity, 80 IOWA L. REV. 265, 291 n. 114 (1995)
(arguing that blood donors in the United States have increased their voluntary blood donations
over the past few decades). Specifically, Schiffnotes that:
The number of altruistic donations has increased substantially over the past twenty
years. In 1965-67, only 7% of the blood collected in the United States came from
voluntary donors. Over the next several years, however, a marked change occurred
in the blood collection system. By 1975, only 18% of the blood supply came from
paid donors, and in 1976 this was reduced to 8.6%.
Id.
227. Kenneth J. Arrow, Gifts and Exchanges, I PHIL. & Put. AFF. 343, 350 (1972).
228. Mahoney, supra note 29, at 217. Mahoney goes on to note:
Efforts to stimulate altruistic transfers of human biological materials have been
notable for their failure: The percentage of the population that regularly donates
blood remains low and laws requiring hospital personnel to request surviving
relatives of eligible cadavers to consent to donate organs have not substantially
increased the supply of organs for transplantation.
See also UNITED STATES DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., NEWS RELEASE: HHS
SECRETARY THOMPSON ANNOUNCES NEW BLOOD DRIVE INITIATIVE (Nov. 26,2002) ("Currently
60 percent of the [United States] population is eligible to donate blood, but only 5 percent are
regular donors."), available at http://www.hhs.gov/newspress/2002pres/20021126.html (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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Because so little is understood about the causes of altruistic behavior,229
"[i]t is uncertain whether the existence of payments will cause individuals who
would have acted altruistically to instead opt to receive compensation."
2 30
What is clear is that individuals are highly motivated to pursue their self-
interest, as demonstrated by the actions of the patient advocacy group PXE
International.
III. The PXE Contractual Property Rights Model
While the Moore case posits the altruistic donation of tissue by human
research participants, patient advocacy groups such as PXE International are
contracting around this decision in order to establish property rights in tissue
used by researchers, in what this Article will refer to as the contractual property
rights model. Specifically, this grassroots group, which represents the interests
of individuals afflicted with pseudoxanthoma elasticum (PXE), a genetic
disorder causing calcification of elastic tissue, has negotiated directly with
researchers for a share in the profits from any gene patent that might arise.23'
Sharon Terry, president of PXE International and the mother of two children
afflicted with PXE, has indicated that the group is motivated by its desire to
ensure affordable and widely available genetic tests for the disorder.
232
Ms. Terry and her husband began in 1995 to organize families affected by
PXE, shortly after her two children were diagnosed with the disease.233 After it
became clear to them that researchers with whom the Terry family had banked
blood were not willing to share it with other scientists, Ms. Terry realized that,
229. See Oded Stark & Ita Falk, Transfers, Empathy Formation, and Reverse Transfers, 88
AM. ECON. REv. (PAPERS & PROC.) 271, 271 (1998) ("['l]he questions of how altruism is
instilled and what explains its evolution lie at the very frontier of research on preference
formation and transfer behavior."); see also Jane Mansbridge, Starting with Nothing: On the
Impossibility of Grounding Norms Solely in Self-Interest, in ECONOMICS, VALUES AND
ORGANIZATIONS 151, 153 (Avner Ben-Ner & Louis Putterman eds., 1998) ("Empirical studies of
the innate human tendency to make the good of others our own are in their infancy, but we may
expect experimental and developmental psychology, neuroscience, and evolutionary biology to
produce more evidence on this score in the near future.").
230. Mahoney, supra note 29, at 217 (citing William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner,
Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and
Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 95 (1978)).
231. See Smaglik, supra note 2, at 821 (observing that PXE International requires an
agreement establishing joint ownership over any patent resulting from research using its blood
and tissue bank).
232. Id.
233. Fleischer, supra note 27, at 84.
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in her words, "the research community was not set up to work together. 23 4
Moreover, those scientists studying the disease had located only about four or
five families to study, and therefore could not expect to achieve progress as
quickly as they would with more research participants.235 Indeed, PXE
International estimates that the disease affects only about one in 25,000 births,
and thus qualifies as a so-called orphan disease of little interest to
pharmaceutical companies because even a successful treatment would hold
little prospect of generating large revenues.236
A. Formation and Terms of the Contract Between PXE International and
PXE Researchers
The Terry family realized that they could steer researchers toward PXE
disease by collecting blood and tissue samples and providing funding, and also
that they could maintain some control over the research by exchanging this
valuable property only in exchange for consideration. 237 Although neither
Sharon Terry, an educator, nor her husband, Patrick, a construction manager,
had prior experience in organizing a foundation or in directing biotechnological
research,238 within four years of their children's diagnoses they had located
"2,000 people with the disease, set up a repository to store tissue samples, and
began raising money for research. 2 39 During that time, Ms. Terry also engaged
pro bono legal help to incorporate PXE International, Inc. as a nonprofit
organization and to provide counsel about acquiring samples for the bank.240
234. Id; see also Sara Solovitch, The Citizen Scientists, WIRED, Sept. 1, 200 1, at 146, 148
(quoting Sharon Terry as saying: "Early on we banked our blood with some researchers. They
were fine until some other researchers wanted to use the blood. Then they became hostile.").
235. See Kolata, supra note 27 (noting that the Terrys found researchers who had briefly
studied PXE disease but were not moving forward for lack of research subjects).
236. See Fleischer, supra note 27, at 86 (explaining that because PXE affects relatively few
people, drug companies would ignore it even if the sufferers were forced to take medication for
the rest of their lives).
237. See id. at 87 (relating that the Terrys were "building a fence around their property and
granting access only in exchange for something of value").
238. See id. (concluding that "the Terry's are unlikely players" in the gene patent game
because of their inexperience).
239. Kolata, supra note 27.
240. See Fleischer, supra note 27, at 87 (describing the relationship between PXE
International and the law firm of Testa, Hurwitz & Thibeault). At present, the Washington,
D.C.-based PXE International has grown into a global organization that coordinates and funds a
consortium of nineteen research labs, provides patient support and information from more than
fifty-two offices worldwide, directs a blood and tissue bank, and maintains a database of
thousands of affected individuals. Press Release, Transgenomic Company Press Release,
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According to Ms. Terry, because PXE International had done so much of
the work of procuring patients and funding, the group had no trouble partnering
with many research teams eager to study the organization's collection of
samples and willing to agree to the group's terms.24' She also noted that, in
light of the Greenberg action that was filed around this time,242 researchers
were particularly concerned about avoiding negative publicity,243 and,
presumably, potential litigation. According to the contract between the
researchers and PXE International, the latter was entitled to retain ownership
rights in any patent applications arising from the research, thereby enabling the
foundation to share in any revenue from the discoveries, to ensure broad and
affordable availability of genetic tests, and to influence future licensing of the
intellectual property.2 "4 This marked the first time that researchers who isolated
a gene had filed a joint patent application with a patient advocacy group.
245
In February 2000, University of Hawaii pathobiologist Charles Boyd
isolated the gene associated with PXE.146 While Dr. Boyd listed Ms. Terry on
the patent applications as part of the research team247 and also signed the
Transgenomic Signs Collaboration Agreement with Lay Advocacy Group PXE International
(Oct. 17, 2002), at http://www.pxe.org/research/transgenomic.htmI (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
241. See Kolata, supra note 27 (quoting Sharon Terry as saying that the researchers "are so
delighted that we will do all the grant work").
242. See supra notes 3-14 and accompanying text (describing the claims and contents of
the Greenberg complaint); see also infra Part IV (examining the Greenberg action).
243. See Fleischer, supra note 27, at 87 (noting that few have challenged the intellectual
property conditions imposed by PXE International for fear of receiving bad press).
244. See Kolata, supra note 27 (describing the terms of the contract between PXE
International and the individual research teams working on finding the gene associated with
PXE disease). The patent for this gene was still pending as of late December 2002. See Helen
Altonn, UHMakes Gene Patent History, at http://starbulletin.com/2002/12/23/news/story7.html
(Dec. 23, 2002) (observing that the patent had been filed about one year previously and "is
expected to be issued shortly") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
245. Smaglik, supra note 2, at 821.
246. Fleischer, supra note 27, at 87, 98.
247. In a break with tradition, Dr. Boyd listed Ms. Terry as a co-inventor based on her
success in securing patient participation, recruiting researchers, and alerting researchers of
scientific developments published in journals and presented at conferences. See Fleischer,
supra note 27, at 98 (explaining how the patent was filed and marketed). Moreover, Ms. Terry
is credited with achieving "molecular-level insights that accelerated gene discovery." Id. at 85.
Where inventorship is contested, federal law sets forth the criteria for joint inventorship.
See supra note 140 and accompanying text (outlining the statutes and case law that define the
requirements for joint inventorship). For example, a federal court has held that an individual
who identified an animal virus and provided tissue for researchers to study was not a joint
inventor where a patent "claim[ed] isolation and substantial purification of the virus, as well as
methods for diagnosing the virus," as opposed to discovery of the virus itself. Brown v. Regents
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standard PXE International contract, his agreement with the University of
Hawaii actually granted the university the rights to his inventions. 24 Although
the university had not focused on these conflicting contracts at the time when
Dr. Boyd began working with PXE International in the mid- 1990s, because the
prospect of licensing seemed unlikely for a disease as rare as PXE,249 this had
changed by the time Dr. Boyd had isolated the gene associated with PXE in
2000. The university balked at giving total control over the licensing rights to
PXE International, since the foundation's goals were incompatible with its
own. While the University of Hawaii sought lucrative licensing arrangements,
PXE International's aim was to ensure that any available medications would be
affordable for its members. Ultimately, the parties reached an agreement in
2001.250 The university accorded to PXE International the right to make the
licensing decisions, and the parties agreed to split equally the royalties deriving
from any diagnostic test or marketable product.25'
While PXE International's contract with researchers is unprecedented,
commentators expect others patient groups to follow suit. This trend has
already been observed by executives with Genetic Alliance, a Washington,
D.C.-based advocacy group that assisted PXE International in drafting its
contract with researchers.52 Patient groups such as Cure Autism Now and the
Juvenile Diabetes Research Foundation International have pooled members'
of the Univ. of Cal., 866 F. Supp. 439, 445 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
248. See Fleischer, supra note 27, at 98 (describing the negotiation of an agreement
between PXE International and the University of Hawaii in order to resolve the conflicting
contracts to which Dr. Boyd was a party).
249. See Matt Fleischer, Seeking Rights to Crucial Gene, Parents of Children with PXE
Took Steps to Control Samples Used in Research for a Cure, NAT'L L.J., June 25, 2001, at C1
(noting that only "an estimated 10,000 to 15,000 people in the United States have PXE, far too
few customers to intrigue a big-league drug company").
250. E-mail from Sharon Terry, Executive Director, PXE International, to Donna M.
Gitter, Assistant Professor of Legal and Ethical Studies, Fordham University Schools of
Business (Mar. 21, 2003, 10:30:17 EST) (on file with author).
25 1. Fleischer, supra note 27, at 98. Thus far, PXE International is collaborating with
Transgenomic, Inc., a global company based in Omaha that creates research tools for the life
sciences industry, to develop a diagnostic test for the disease. Press Release, Transgenomic
Inc., Transgenomic Signs Collaboration Agreement with Lay Advocacy Group PXE
International (Oct. 17, 2002), at http://www.pxe.org/research/transgenomic.html (last visited
Oct. 22, 2003) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
252. Kolata, supra note 27. The Genetic Alliance defines itself as "an international
coalition comprised of millions of individuals with genetic conditions and more than 600
advocacy, research and health care organizations that represent their interests" that is dedicated
to forming "partnerships to promote healthy lives for all those living with genetic conditions."
GENETIC ALLIANCE, ABOUT THE GNETic ALLIANCE, at http://www.geneticalliance.org/membersl
aboutus.html (last modified Jan. 13, 2003) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUE
specimens to create biorepositories, and one Genetic Alliance vice president
has indicated that these groups inform her that the terms for access to these
repositories would address intellectual property considerations.253  These
patient groups are likely to be able to exert a great deal of leverage, since
researchers will prefer tissue from these biorepositories, which comes replete
with individual health histories and symptom descriptions, to the millions of
specimens already stored in the U.S.
2 4
The necessity of collaboration among research participants, patient
advocacy groups, and scientists has been recognized by organizations such as
the American Society of Human Genetics (ASHG), a professional association
of human geneticists, including researchers, academicians, clinicians,
laboratory practice professionals, genetic counselors, and nurses.2" The ASHG
emphasizes that these patient groups contribute to biomedical research by
encouraging the participation of their members and creating blood and tissue
banks, raising funds, educating research participants and scientists about the
nature and expectations of the research, as well as the consent process, and
bridging cultural gaps between researchers and participants. 256 In light of the
importance of these groups, it is critical to examine the ramifications of the
contractual property rights model they are embracing.
B. The Advantages of the PXE Contractual Property Rights Approach
One of the main benefits flowing from patient groups' claims to property
rights in the tissue of their members is the potential for enhanced public access
to diagnostic tests and therapeutics for the treatment of disease, to the extent
that these groups demand some control over the licensing of the products
developed from such tissue. Many scholars have written extensively about the
problems that arise when researchers who obtain patents on human genes enter
into exclusive licensing agreements, license their intellectual property to a very
253. Fleischer, supra note 27, at 100.
254. See id. (citing an analyst with RAND's Science and Technology Policy Institute).
255. See Am. SOC'Y OF HumAN GNErics, ABOUrASHG, at http://www.ashg.org/genetics/
ashg/menu-about.shtml (last visited Oct. 15, 2003) (noting that one of the primary objectives of
ASHG is to facilitate "interactions between geneticists and patient" public advocacy groups) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
256. See generally AM. SOC'Y OF HUMAN GENETICS, AM. SOC'Y OF HUMAN GENETICS AD
Hoc COMM. ON CONSUMER ISSUES COMM. REPORT: GENETIC LAY ADVOCACY GROUPS:
SIGNIFICANT OTHERS IN THE CONDUCT OF HUMAN GENETICS RESEARCH (Oct. 1999), at
http://www.ashg.org/genetics/ashg/pubs/policy/pol-46.pdf (last revised Oct. 18,2001) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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limited number of downstream users, or charge particularly high fees for these
products. These practices maximize the profits enjoyed by scientists, the
institutions that employ them, and biotechnology firms, while simultaneously
limiting consumers' access to diagnostic tests and therapeutic treatments.257
While the promise of profits is of course necessary to foster innovation, patient
advocacy groups can help to balance the need to stimulate profits with the goal
of promoting public health. Indeed, PXE International has emphasized
repeatedly that its aim is to promote access to diagnostics and therapeutics, not
only for its own members, but also for others suffering from disease. 58
257. See Lori B. Andrews, The Gene Patent Dilemma: Balancing Commercial Incentives
with Health Needs, 2002 Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 65, 91 (2002) ("In some situations, the
very people whose genes were patented may not be able to afford the test that was created using
their bodily material, or may find that a company has decided to quash entirely a test related to
their condition."); Donna M. Gitter, International Conflicts over Patenting Human DNA
Sequences in the United States and the European Union: An Argument for Compulsory
Licensinganda Fair-Use Exemption, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1623, 1650-51 (2001) (describing the
high royalty fees that Myriad Genetics imposed on medical practitioners conducting genetic
tests for two genes linked to breast cancer, BRCAI and BRCA2, after Myriad had "gained
exclusive patent rights to the genetic tests that screen for mutations in these genes, as well as
patent rights in the genes themselves"); Merz, supra note 36, at 101 (stating that disease gene
patents "are often being exclusively licensed to for-profit laboratories by academic medical
centers where the basic biomedical science was performed," and that these "exclusive
arrangements allow patent holders to enforce their patents in ways that infringe on the practice
nf m iennp r S.tr"irt r, i~irl . . . ;. .-I man 1 .......cach reduce. a ces and.. Invc......
costs of clinical testing services") (footnotes omitted).
Sometimes the opposite problem occurs, and a patent holder refuses to exploit its
intellectual property altogether, because the market for products developed from the patented
invention is too small to pursue. See Jeff Donn, Rush to Patent Disease-Causing Genes Is
Under Way, DESERET NEWS (Salt Lake City), Aug. 23,200 1, at A30 (suggesting that a patent-
holding corporation might ignore a market as small as the PXE community because the disease
strikes fewer than one in 25,000 people).
258. See Fleischer, supra note 27, at 100 (quoting PXE International President Sharon
Terry's statement that her group seeks not only to facilitate access to a future PXE diagnostic
test or treatment, but also to afford individuals suffering from other diseases access to any
diagnostics or therapeutics in which PXE International might hold rights). But see infra notes
274-75 and accompanying text (noting that although the group seeks to represent any disease
sufferer, PXE International is pursuing licensing contracts that maximize access to PXE
treatments and testing).
Like the members of PXE International, the plaintiffs in the Greenberg action emphasized
that their primary goals in participating in Canavan research were to ensure affordable and
accessible carrier and prenatal testing and to "promote the discovery of more effective
prevention techniques and treatments and, eventually, to effectuate a cure for Canavan disease."
Greenberg Complaint, supra note 3, 22. Unlike the members of PXE International, however,
the Greenberg plaintiffs expected the research results from experimentation on their tissue to
remain in the public domain. Id.
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Patient advocacy groups also contribute to the advancement of research in
various ways. These groups help to identify and recruit research participants,259
formulate informed consent policies, 260 engage in efforts to increase public
awareness of their disease and funding for medical research, 26' and even
become so knowledgeable about their disease that they offer researchers
significant medical insights.262
Furthermore, assuming that it becomes more common for patient advocacy
groups to negotiate for property rights in their members' tissue,263 these groups
avoid some of the practical and ethical problems raised by this practice. First,
these groups overcome the fact that "individual sources are rarely substantially
responsible for products of commercial value.",264 For example, Professor
Greely suggests:
[I]n research conducted with users of the Veterans Administration system,
some share of any commercial value could be dedicated to improving the
lives of those in Veterans Administration hospitals. Similar kinds of
collective benefits could be foreseen when doing research with members of
259. See CTR. FOR BIOETHICS, UNIV. OF PA. SCH. OF MED., ETHICS AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: TOWARD AN UNDERSTANDING OF BENEFIT SHARING: BACKGROUND AND
SIGNIFICANCE (2003) (observing that close relationships between patient groups and researchers
"greatly facilitate targeted research by.. .giving highly motivated assistance in identifying and
soliciting potential participants from these communities, lending credibility to the researchers
that can increase trust and participation, and sharing the costs of recruitment"), at
http://www.med.upenn.edu/bioethic/programs/benefit/al.shtml (last visited Oct. 23,2003) (on
file with thi Washington and Lee Law Review).
260. See Smaglik, supra note 2, at 821 (stating that the National Human Genome Research
Institute advised PXE International on informed consent and drew up guidelines limiting how
researchers could use the tissue).
261. See, e.g., Andy Coghlan, Head to Head: People with Inherited DiseasesAre Ready to
Challenge Pro-Lifers over the Future of Medical Research, NEW SCIENTIST, Feb. 24,2001, at 4,
4-5 (describing a biotechnology meeting in Lyon, France where delegates from groups
representing patients with rare diseases, including PXE International, met to form a global
alliance).
262. See supra note 247 (stating that Sharon Terry, executive director of PXE
International, has been credited with accelerating the gene discovery as a result of her insights
and success in recruiting researchers and patients; she is also listed as co-inventor on the patent
application); see also Solovitch, supra note 234, at 148 (quoting Uta Francke, president of the
International Federation of Human Genetics Societies and professor of genetics and pediatrics at
Stanford University School of Medicine, as stating that parents of children afflicted with genetic
disorders "often know more about certain diseases than the health care providers they interact
with" and "want to be involved in the research").
263. See supra notes 252-56 and accompanying text (discussing the leverage of patient
groups that have asserted property rights in their biorepositories).
264. Greely, supra note Ill, at 757-58; see also supra notes 128-30 and accompanying
text (noting that the commercial value of tissue samples results from collecting specimens from
several patients, not from individual samples).
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other kinds of health systems, such as health maintenance organizations, or
in geographically or culturally-defined communities.
265
Second, as noted by Professor Greely, patient advocacy groups also
overcome the problem that the prospect of a share in the profits might "operate
as an undue inducement to someone to participate in research, 2 66 because the
profits would flow to the group rather than the individual research participants.
Moreover, group ownership of the commercial profits flowing from the tissue,
vested in the foundation, would avoid the appearance of profiting from one's
disease, which strikes some as unseemly,267 and also strengthens notions of
community so highly prized by scholars such as Titmuss.2 68
C. The Drawbacks of the PXE Contractual Property Rights Approach
Notwithstanding the many advantages offered by the patient advocacy
groups, it is clear that they do not provide the only or even the best means of
protecting the rights of research participants. For this reason, it is essential
that the United States Congress recognize the right of each individual
research participant to claim a property interest in his tissue.
Among the most obvious limitations of the group rights approach is that
not all patients will locate a patient advocacy group or have easy access to
such a group even if one exists. Some individuals may prefer not to
participate in such groups, either because they suffer a negative psychological
impact from associating with others with their disease or they may fear
genetic discrimination if they are linked with such a group.269 Moreover,
some patient groups may not represent individual patients as they would
265. Greely, supra note I l, at 758. Professor Greely does not seem to favor arm's length
negotiations between scientists and research participants; he states that researchers should
instead donate a share of their revenues, perhaps ten percent, to organizations that represent the
research participants. Id.
266. Id.; see also supra notes 208-1 and accompanying text (examining the concern that
researchers may induce participation by fake or misguided promises of compensation).
267. See supra note 153 and accompanying text (examining the argument that it would be
unfair for an individual to profit from possessing tissue that happens to be valuable to
scientists).
268. See supra note 221 and accompanying text (discussing the drawbacks associated with
financially compensating blood donors).
269. "The fact that genetic diseases are sometimes closely associated with discrete ethnic or
racial groups such as African Americans, Ashkenazi Jews, or Armenians compounds the
potential for invidious discrimination." Larry Gostin, Genetic Discrimination: The Use of
Genetically Based Diagnostic and Prognostic Tests by Employers and Insurers, 17 AM. J.L. &
MED. 109, 111 (1991).
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prefer.27° Thus, individuals should enjoy the legal right to negotiate on their
own behalf with biomedical researchers.
Even for a patient with access to and the desire to join an advocacy
group, it is not clear that such groups always advance scientific research.
Professor Eisenberg has warned that the presence of more parties at the
bargaining table hinders the ability of pharmaceutical firms to negotiate the
licensing agreements necessary to pursue planned drug development
initiatives.271 Moreover, a patient group that exerts control over scientists'
research agendas because of its ownership of scientifically valuable tissue
may choose to pursue research strategies of dubious sdientific merit, thereby
slowing the pace of biotechnological progress.272
Even if a patient group ultimately does negotiate successfully with
researchers for the implementation of scientifically sound research projects,
there is some concern that the group might exercise control over the
discoveries in such a way as to maximize the group's profits, while
simultaneously limiting access to people afflicted by other diseases. For
example, there is evidence that the gene associated with PXE might also
relate to hypertension and cardiovascular disease research. As president of
PXE International, Ms. Terry has asserted that her group will resist bettering
their own fortunes at the expense of other disease sufferers, stating that
although "[i]t's been suggested that we could make a killing because who
cares if we're making the costs of cardiovascular treatment huge," PXE
International does not "just represent people with PXE, we represent anybody
who has anything." 273 As a practical matter, of course, she acknowledges that
the group would insist upon licensing deals that would maximize the access
of PXE patients to a future diagnostic test or treatment.27 Third parties could
hardly fault PXE International for protecting its members above all, in light
270. For example, one commentator has noted that an informed consent form used by PXE
International at one time neglected to mention that a patent application had been filed by the
group. See Anne Nichols Hill, Note, One Man's Trash Is Another Man's Treasure,
Bioprospecting: Protecting the Rights and Interests of Human Donors of Genetic Material, 5
J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 259, 279 & nn. 153-54 (quoting the PXE International, Inc.
informed consent form for blood donors).
271. See Matt Fleischer, Pitfalls of Pro Se Patenting, AM. LAW., June 2001, at 87, 87
(citing Professor Eisenberg's concerns that PXE International's humanitarian demands might
complicate and delay the otherwise profit-driven drug development process).
272. See id. (noting a health policy researcher's concerns that powerful patient groups
might degrade scientific research).
273. Fleischer, supra note 27, at 100.
274. See id. (outlining the goals of PXE International and noting that the group expresses
its desire to avoid profiteering).
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of the fact that these members incurred the inconvenience and risk of
research participation. What is more, it is quite rational for PXE
International to guard its discoveries closely and to optimize its profits from
them, given that orphan diseases such as PXE garner little direct federal
funding. 75
If profits from biotechnological products were to flow to the individual
members of a disease advocacy group, as opposed to the foundation as a
whole, however, this would belie the notion that patient advocacy groups are
necessarily communitarian in perspective. Clearly, the existence of a
foundation does not pieclude the possibility of personal profit, as noted by
the attorney who drafted the patent application for PXE International and
PXE researchers. He stated that: "[T]he awards of group ownership could
include dividends from royalties, despite risking the appearance of getting
paid for their disease. After all, . . . the costs of a lifetime of treating a
chronic disease add Up. ' 276 The payment of such dividends undoubtedly
would provoke an outcry from commentators who accept commercialization
by a community group, but not by an individual.277
Even those who support the property rights model, however,
acknowledge that this approach is insufficient to protect the rights of research
participants who did not negotiate with their researchers, such as those
involved in the Greenberg litigation discussed immediately above. For
reasons that will be examined below, it is critical that federal law mandate
that research participants in this predicament have recourse to a liability
model.
275. See John A. Robertson et al., Pharmacogenetic Challenges for the Health Care
System; Genetically Based Drug Prescribing Could Decrease Overall Health Costs and Fuel
New Drug Development, HEALTH AFF., July/Aug. 2002, at 155, 165 (discussing competition for
research funds). As Robertson described the situation:
Given the competition among disease groups for research funding, it may be hard
for smaller, genotypically segmented groups to lobby effectively for direct research
subsidies. If the population of such groups is less than 200,000, they would still
qualify for the tax credits, clinical testing subsidies, and seven-year sales
monopolies now provided under the 1982 federal Orphan Drug Act.
Id.
276. Fleischer, supra note 27, at 100.
277. Professor Bartha Maria Knoppers is among those who reject the inducement of
research participants through "payment for the voluntary transfer of DNA" or "promises of
individual percentages of future royalties," while acknowledging, at the international level, the
value of "some sharing of eventual profits for humanitarian purposes with the contributing
communities and populations." Bartha Maria Knoppers, Conclusion: Human Genetic
Material-Commodity or Gift?, in LEGAL RIGHTS AND HUMAN GENETIC MATERIAL, supra note
33, at 171, 176-77.
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IV. Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hospital Research Institute, Inc.
The recent action, Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hospital Research
278thAInstitute, Inc., represents the dangers of relying solely upon either the
present market-inalienability or the pure property rights model. It is critical
to resolve this issue because we can expect lawsuits such as Greenberg to
prove more common in light of scientists' enhanced ability to locate the
genetic markers for various diseases. Ultimately, individuals will tend to
refuse to participate in scientific studies if they perceive the law as unfair to
the plaintiff research participants.
A. The Scientific and Legal Background of the Greenberg Action279
1. The Research Relating to Canavan Disease
In 1981, Chicago residents Daniel and Debbie Greenberg gave birth to
their first child, Jonathan.280 While Jonathan seemed normal at birth, his
parents observed problems with his motor skills during his first year, and a
neurologist ultimately diagnosed the child with Canavan disease.28
Tragically, the Greenberg's second child, Amy, born in 1983, also suffered
from the disease.282 In 1987, Daniel Greenberg approached a medical
researcher, Dr. Reuben Matalon, who had never previously studied Canavan,
and requested his involvement in such research. At that time, Dr. Matalon
directed a laboratory that performed clinical testing and research of
phenylketonuria (PKU) and other familial disorders at the University of
Illinois in Chicago.283
Dr. Matalon's research proceeded in two major stages. First, by 1988, he
and his team determined that the deficiency of a certain enzyme, aspartoacylase,
caused Canavan disease. Dr. Matalon achieved this insight by using blood,
urine, and tissue samples provided by the Greenbergs and one other family, as
well as money provided by a nonprofit organization. Armed with knowledge of
278. Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064
(S.D. Fla. 2003).
279. The history of the Greenberg action is described in great detail by Professor Jon Merz
of the Center for Bioethics, University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine, who has worked
closely with the individuals involved in this action. See generally Merz, supra note 36.
280. Greenberg Complaint, supra note 3, 14; Merz, supra note 36, at 102.
28 1. Kolata, supra note 27; see also supra note 2 (briefly describing Canavan disease).
282. Merz, supra note 36, at 102.
283. Id.
61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 257 (2004)
the cause of Canavan disease, Dr. Matalon and his team were able to design a
prenatal screening test. From 1988 to 1990, at least twenty couples, including
the Greenbergs, benefited from prenatal testing developed by Dr. Matalon's
lab.
284
In the second stage of his research, Dr. Matalon began to search for the
gene associated with Canavan disease, both in order to develop a more reliable
prenatal test and to perform carrier screening. 285 By this time, Dr. Matalon was
conducting his research in Miami, where he had been recruited by Miami
Children's Hospital (MCH) to establish and direct a center for research on
genetic diseases, the Miami Children's Hospital Research Institute (MCH
Research Institute).286 This phase of the research relied upon the contributions
of thousands of individual research participants. 8 7 As asserted in the
Greenberg Complaint, the plaintiffs288 provided the researchers with a
combination of blood, tissue, autopsy, and other samples, confidential medical
information, and funding. 289 By early 1993, a graduate student on Dr.
Matalon's team succeeded in cloning the gene associated with Canavan
disease.29 °
2. The Patenting of the Gene Associated with Canavan Disease and the
Licensing Process
Shortly after researchers isolated the gene associated with Canavan
disease, the Canavan Foundation and the National Tay-Sachs and Allied
Diseases Association (NTSAD) began working with local and national groups
to promote Canavan disease testing. The plaintiffs viewed their collaboration
with researchers as a "partnership," and alleged in their complaint that,
"[c]onsistent with their understanding that affordable and accessible testing was
284. Id.
285. See id. (stating that the gene provided "the only reliable method for prenatal testing as
well as carrier screening").
286. Kolata, supra note 27.
287. Merz, supra note 36, at 102-03 (noting that Rabbi Josef Ekstein of Dor Yeshorim
Committee for the Prevention of Jewish Genetic Diseases in Brooklyn, New York provided to
Matalon approximately 6,000 blood samples).
288. The Greenberg plaintiffs included several families affected by Canavan disease, as
well as three nonprofit community groups incorporated in New York State: the Canavan
Foundation, Dor Yeshorim, and the National Tay-Sachs and Allied Diseases Association, Inc.
Greenberg Complaint, supra note 3, IM 4-10; see also Eliot Marshall, Families Sue Hospital,
Scientist for Control of Canavan Gene, 290 SCIENCE 1062, 1062 (2000).
289. Greenberg Complaint, supra note 3, In 16-21.
290. Merz, supra note 36, at 102.
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a 'partnership' goal," in spring 1996 the Canavan Foundation had established a
free testing program at Mount Sinai Hospital in New York City.291 By
November 1998, the plaintiffs Canavan Foundation and NTSAD had persuaded
the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists to issue guidelines
recommending carrier screening of Ashkenazi couples.292
Unbeknownst to plaintiffs, however, MCH Research Institute had filed a
patent application for the gene associated with Canavan disease and related
applications, including carrier and prenatal testing, in September 1994.293 The
United States Patent and Trademark Office issued U.S. Patent No. 5,679,635 to
the MCH Research Institute in October 1997.294 As plaintiffs explained in their
complaint:
Through patenting, Defendants acquired the ability to restrict any activity
related to the Canavan disease gene, including without limitation: carrier
and prenatal testing, gene therapy and other treatments for Canavan disease
and research involving the gene and its mutations. The patent enabled
Defendants to prevent doctors from testing or examining patients for the
Canavan disease gene, even though the doctors could do so using
traditional medical practices and such testing or examination would not
require the use of any product or device invented by Defendants.
295
291. Greenberg Complaint, supra note 3, 27.
292. Id. 1 27; see also Merz, supra note 36, at 103 (describing the work of advocates from
the Canavan Foundation and NTSAD to promote testing for the disease).
293. Greenberg Complaint, supra note 3, 28. Dr. Matalon does not hold patent rights in
the Canavan gene, as his contract with MCH required him to cede to MCH any marketable
intellectual property that he developed in return for $1 million of research funding annually.
Marshall, supra note 288, at 1062.
294. Merz, supra note 36, at 103. Professor Merz stated that, as of December 2002, this is
the only patent owned by Miami Children's Hospital or its research institute. Id.
295. Greenberg Complaint, supra note 3, 28. Numerous scholars and medical
professionals have criticized the patenting of human genes in the United States because it often
diminishes health care consumers' access to diagnostic tests and therapeutics. See, e.g., George
J. Annas, Lori B. Andrews & Rosario M. Isasi, Protecting the Endangered Human: Toward an
International Treaty Prohibiting Cloning and Inheritable Alterations, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 15 1,
155-56 n. 10 (2002) (proposing an international treaty provision that would prohibit human
gene patents due to the danger that the patents might impede the development of, and access to,
diagnostic tests and treatment); Merz, supra note 36, at 99-101 (arguing that disease gene
patents violate the product of nature doctrine and criticizing exclusive arrangements between
academic medical centers and for-profit laboratories); COLL. OF AM. PATHOLOGISTS, GENE
PATENTS DETRIMENTAL TO CARE, TRAINING, RESEARCH (July 5, 2000) (stating that "gene patents
pose a serious threat to medical advancement, medical education, and patient care"), available
at http://www.cap.org/apps/docs/advocacy/advocacyissues/issueGenepat.html. Nonetheless,
such patenting is the norm in the United States, and in other jurisdictions as well. See generally
Gitter, supra note 257 (discussing the arguments surrounding the patentability ofhuman DNA
sequences in the United States and the European Union).
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The plaintiffs allege that it was around 1994 that the defendants first
presented them with a written consent form, at the plaintiffs' suggestion. 6
They contend that this form was inadequate, for its description of the
defendants' purpose as "identify[ing] mutations in the Canavan gene which
may lead to carrier detection within my family" was woefully incomplete in that
it failed to reveal the researchers' commercial aims.297
Shortly after their 1997 receipt of the patent, of which the plaintiffs
remained unaware, MCH began working with a patent consultant on a
marketing plan.298 In late 1998, MCH and MCH Research Institute began
sending letters to clinical laboratories engaged in Canavan testing and to the
plaintiffs, informing them of the patent and the hospital's plans for
commercializing the test.299 These letters indicated the defendants' intent "to
enforce vigorously [their] intellectual property rights relating to carrier and
patient DNA tests for Canavan Disease mutations.' '300 Through these letters,
the plaintiffs learned for the first time, indirectly, of the defendants' patent and
their concomitant ability to earn royalties from the research in which the
plaintiffs had participated with the goal of ensuring affordable and accessible
carrier and prenatal screening and, ultimately, contributing to a treatment or
cure for Canavan disease.30'
The parties differ in their views of MCH's marketing plan. According to
Professor Merz, whose involvement the plaintiffs requested in their
negotiations with MCH, °2 there were to be two stages of licensing.303 First, "a
296. Greenberg Complaint, supra note 3, 37; Merz, supra note 36, at 108.
297. Greenberg Complaint, supra note 3, 37. Dr. Matalon has stated that all of his
research was approved by MCH's Institutional Review Board (IRB), which ostensibly waived
any requirement of informed consent. Professor Merz has criticized the IRB, stating that he sees
"no justification for a waiver of fully informed consent to the prospective collection of blood
and other tissue samples for genetic studies." Merz, supra note 36, at 108. He has added that
Dr. Matalon's research team submitted several proposals for NIH funding of their research,
which were denied. "IRB approval and compliance with the federal Common Rule, 45 C.F.R.
Part 46, would have been strictly required before such funding was provided." Id. at n.29. The
federal Common Rule provides for informed consent. See supra note I 1. Thus, federal
funding of the Canavan research likely would have ensured the Canavan plaintiffs the protection
they lacked.
298. Merz, supra note 36, at 103.
299. Id.; Greenberg Complaint, supra note 3, 30.
300. Greenberg Complaint, supra note 3, 30 (referring to Exhibit A of the Complaint).
301. See id. (alleging that the plaintiffs first learned of MCH's patent of the gene and the
screening test from the enforcement letters to testing centers).
302. See Merz, supra note 36, at 104 (noting that the Canavan Disease Screening
Consortium invited Professor Merz to discuss the ethical concerns regarding MCH's restrictive
licensing scheme).
303. Id. at 103.
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limited number of academic laboratories (likely to be a subset of the many
already performing the testing) would be granted nonexclusive licenses to
perform an annually limited number of tests" for a "fixed $12.50 per test
royalty. ',304 During the second phase, "a large commercial laboratory would be
licensed as a 'market leader' with what would be, in effect, an exclusive license
to the remainder of the testing volume.
30 5
Professor Merz sharply criticizes both the substance of MCH's negotiation
demands and its negotiation strategy. With respect to the substance, he refutes
what he terms MCH's "justification" for exclusive licensing, namely that "a
large reference laboratory would be able to spend the resources for outreach
and education needed to ensure screening and testing of all couples at risk.
30 6
Professor Merz notes that testing for Tay-Sachs disease is widespread even
though testing methods "have never been restricted," and attributes this success
to community groups such as NTSAD and Dor Yeshorim, which "stand as
testaments to the ability of community-based organizations to develop and carry
out population education and screening. 30 7 With respect to MCH's negotiation
strategy, Professor Merz contends that the hospital unfairly established a set of
rules that imposed a gag on participants to the negotiation, and acted vengefully
by prohibiting physicians at his institution, the University of Pennsylvania
School of Medicine (Penn), from sending samples to any licensed lab for
Canavan disease testing so long as MCH and Penn were unable to reach a
licensing agreement. 8 What is more, once MCH refused to license Penn, the
hospital callously disregarded human health in its pursuit of profits, according
to Professor Merz, by withholding information from physicians at Penn as to
304. Id.; see also Greenberg Complaint, supra note 3, 31 ("MCH ... restricted public
accessibility to testing through 'volume caps' that limited the number of tests to be performed
by licensed laboratories and by requiring all such laboratories to pay royalty and licensing fees
to MCH.").
305. Merz, supra note 36, at 103; see also Greenberg Complaint, supra note 3, 31
("Defendants MCHRI and MCH ... sought to substantially restrict the number of laboratories
authorized to conduct Canavan disease testing through exclusive licensing agreements."). An
exclusive licensing arrangement permits the licensee to charge a monopolistic price, thereby
increasing the overall royalty payments flowing to the patent holder. See Gene Patents and
Other Genomic Inventions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 79 (2000) (statement of Jon F. Merz,
assistant professor of bioethics, Center for Bioethics, University of Pennsylvania School of
Medicine) (reporting on survey results showing that "14 of a sample of 27 disease gene
patents... had been licensed as of the date of our survey ... [and] all licenses were exclusive").
306. Merz, supra note 36, at 103.
307. Id. at 104.
308. See id. at 104-06 (describing MCH's actions as retributive and contrary to notions of
common decency).
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which labs were licensed to perform the testing, simply because MCH
intended soon to grant one exclusive license and terminate the limited
licenses it had granted to academic labs. 3°9
MCH maintains that, while it had initially "considered donating the
gene patent to the public and forgoing royalties on any test," it eventually
declined to do so out of fear that, because "there were so few people who
needed the test that laboratories would not bother to publicize it."3 10 Thus,
according to MCH, after months of deliberations and negotiations with
academic and commercial laboratories, MCH decided to charge a royalty
fee of $12.50 per test.311 This money would be used to defray MCH's costs
in funding Dr. Matalon's research, and some of it would be devoted to
publicizing the test.
312
In April 2000, MCH offered the plaintiffs approximately $20,000 per
year of the estimated $375,000 in annual royalties, with such funds
intended to educate the public about Canavan disease and to subsidize the
cost of testing for qualifying families.13 MCH also abandoned its plans to
implement exclusive licensing.1 4 Nonetheless, the parties failed to reach
an agreement, in large part because MCH's offer of funding was
conditioned upon the plaintiffs' promise that they would cease public
criticism of the hospital's licensing program and royalty fees, a requirement
that the plaintiffs refused to accept.1 5
309. See id. at 104-06-(outlining the negotiations between MCH and the Penn laboratory).
310. See Kolata, supra note 27 (describing the explanation offered by MCH's patent
marketing consultant).
311. The Greenberg plaintiffs contest the reasonableness of the $12.50 fee for a diagnostic
test for Canavan disease. According to Judith Tsipis, vice president of the NTSAD: "If we go
to testing people for 25, 50, and eventually maybe 100 genes, and each one carries a $12.50 fee,
then the cost of testing becomes prohibitive-or only the rich will get tested." Donn, supra note
257. In response, a hospital spokeswoman claims that MCH ultimately will lose money on its
Canavan research, since MCH will enjoy a limited monopoly under patent law only for twenty
years. Id.
312. See Kolata, supra note 27 (describing the explanation offered by MCH's patent
marketing consultant).
313. Merz, supra note 36, at 106.
314. See id. (noting that MCH stopped searching for a "market leader" laboratory).
315. See id. (stating that the consortium "welcomed the financial help," but declined to
accept the conditions set forth by MCH).
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3. The Legal Proceedings in Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hospital
Research Institute, Inc.
In October 2002, Daniel Greenberg, along with his coplaintiffs,3 16 filed a
lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
against defendants MCH, MCH Research Institute, and Dr. Reuben Matalon.
31 7
The six counts of the complaint included lack of informed consent,31 breach of
fiduciary duty,319 unjust enrichment,3 20 fraudulent concealment,
32l conversion3 22
and misappropriation of trade secrets.323. The gravamen of the Greenberg plaintiffs' complaint was that they
were not informed of, and did not consent to, the patenting of the gene
associated with Canavan disease and the commercialization of carrier and
prenatal tests.324 When they furnished researchers with tissue, autopsy,
blood, urine, and other pathology samples, as well as personal familial data
and funding, the plaintiffs expected Canavan research to remain in the
public domain in order to facilitate the development of a cure for the
disease, and they also intended for carrier and prenatal testing to be
affordable and accessible to as many families as possible. 325 According to
316. See supra note 288 (noting that the Greenberg plaintiffs were families affected by
Canavan disease as well as three nonprofit community groups).
317. See generally Greenberg Complaint, supra note 3. The Illinois court transferred the
case to United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, on the grounds that the
Illinois court lacked jurisdiction and venue over all of the defendants. Supra note 3.
318. Greenberg Complaint, supra note 3, 7 33-39.
319. 1d. %40-45.
320. Id. IN 46-54.
321. Id. 55-60.
322. Id. 61-67.
323. Id. 7 68-75.
324. Id. 21-22, 34-36. The plaintiffs alleged that Dr. Matalon first presented them with
informed consent forms in 1994, several years after the research had begun, and that these forms
were deficient in that they failed to reveal the defendants' financial interest in the research, id.
37, as required under Moore. See supra note 76 and accompanying text (describing physician-
researchers' duty to disclose personal economic interests that may affect their medical
judgment).
325. Greenberg Complaint, supra note 3, M 21-22. The plaintiffs' belief that Canavan
research would remain in the public domain stemmed in large part from their knowledge that the
patent for the gene associated with Tay-Sachs disease, a condition that is also particularly
prevalent among Jews of Eastern European descent, is in the public domain. Id. In the case of
the Tay-Sachs gene, the patent holder is the United States government. See Palmer, supra note
1, at 12 (noting that the United States government owns the patent because a National Institute
of Health researcher identified the gene and diagnostic test). As stated by Professor Palmer,
"[t]he federal government's ownership of the patent helps guarantee that the Tay-Sachs disease
test is both inexpensive and widely available." Id. at 12-13 (footnote omitted).
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the plaintiffs, they would have refused to participate in the research had
they known of the defendants' "true intentions to commercialize their
genetic material through patenting and restrictive licensing, ' 26 or else
would have "imposed conditions.., to avoid commercialization of the
Canavan disease gene or opted to donate their samples to other researchers
who shared their common goals of accessible and affordable testing."
327
The plaintiffs also alleged conversion, claiming a "property interest in
their blood, tissue, urine and autopsy samples and those of their minor
children, and in the genetic information contained therein, 02' as well as in
the "Canavan Registry," a compendium of contact information and medical
data about families worldwide afflicted with Canavan Disease compiled by
Daniel Greenberg in conjunction with the NTSAD.329 Plaintiffs contended
that their purpose in contributing their bodily materials was to promote the
"good of the public at large, 3 30 and that the defendants wrongfully
converted their plaintiffs' property for "their exclusive economic
benefit.
33
B. Analysis of the Greenberg Decision
Given the parallels between the Greenberg and Moore actions, the
court alluded to the latter case when deciding the former, though declining
to follow it in some respects. 3 .2 Ultimately, the Greenberg court dismissed
with prejudice five of the six claims brought by the plaintiffs, permitting
326. Greenberg Complaint, supra note 3, 38.
327. Id. 59.
328. Id. 62.
329. Id. 63. The plaintiffs also alleged that the defendants' misuse of the Canavan
Registry gave rise to a cause of action for misappropriation of trade secrets. Id. 68-75.
330. Id. 67.
331. Id. 66.
332. See Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064,
1070-71 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (rejecting the Greenberg plaintiffs' claim for lack of informed consent
on the grounds that the action is distinguishable from Moore, where the researcher and the
plaintiff had a therapeutic relationship). The Greenberg plaintiffs ultimately filed a motion to
amend their complaint to allege a "doctor-patient relationship and/or.., confidential
relationship" between the plaintiffs and the defendants, see Motion for Leave to File Amended
Complaint, Case No. 02-22244-CIV-Moreno (S.D. Fla., 2003), a motion denied by Judge
Moreno on July 22, 2003. Pacer, Civil Docket for Case # 02-CV-22244, Greenberg, et al v.
Miami Children's Hospital, at http://pacer.flsd.uscourts.gov/dc/cgi-bin/pacer740.pl (Sept. 26,
2003) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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only the unjust enrichment cause of action to survive.333 Although the
court considered the issues in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,3 as
opposed to a full trial on the merits, the Greenberg holding provides a
telling example of how courts will adjudicate cases involving research
participants. This decision clearly demonstrates the necessity for a
federally recognized property right inhering in research participants with
respect to their tissue.
1. Lack of Informed Consent
The Greenberg court dismissed the plaintiffs' first claim, lack of
informed consent, based on several grounds. 335 First, the court questioned
whether researchers who lack a therapeutic relationship with the research
participant even owe that individual a duty of informed consent.336
Assuming arguendo that researchers do owe such a duty, 337 the court
declined in the instant action to extend this obligation to include disclosure
of a researcher's economic interests, stating that this requirement "has no
support in established law, and more ominously,. . . would have pernicious
effects over medical research, as it would give each donor complete control
over how medical research is used and who benefits from that research."33
The court emphasized, in response to plaintiffs' citations of cases that
support the notion that a researcher must disclose economic interests, such
as Moore339 and Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute, Inc.,340 that those
333. Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1077-78. As noted above, the parties to this action
have reached a confidential settlement agreement. Supra note 14.
334. Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1068.
335. Id. at 1070-71 (declining to extend the duty of informed consent to the disclosure of
researchers' economic interests).
336. Id. at 1070 (stating that Florida law regarding a duty of informed consent for research
subjects is "unsettled and fact-specific").
337. The Greenberg court was persuaded by the fact that the defendants had conceded at
oral argument the existence of some level of duty to the research participant, a situation not
present in every proceeding. Id. at 1070.
338. Id. at 1070 (agreeing with the defendants' argument against extending the duty of
informed consent).
339. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 485 (Cal. 1990)
(recognizing a duty on the part of the physician-researcher to disclose to research participants
any personal interests that might affect the physician's medical judgment).
340. See Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 834-35 (Md. 2001)
(holding that "the very nature of nontherapeutic scientific research on human subjects can, and
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cases from other jurisdictions were not controlling authority in Florida.3 41
Most of all, the court was persuaded by "the practical implications of
retroactively imposing a duty" of informed consent, namely that such an
obligation would "chill medical research as it would mandate that
researchers constantly evaluate whether a discloseable event has occurred"
and would give research participants too much control over medical
research.342
There are several significant critiques of the Greenberg court's rejection
of plaintiffs' claim of lack of informed consent. First, as explained above,
courts have recognized that, even more so than a treating physician, a
researcher owes a duty of informed consent to a research participant.
43
Second, given the fact that most scientific research is commercial in nature,344 it
is critical to extend this duty of informed consent to include researchers'
economic interests, in order to preserve the autonomy of research
participants. 345 As the plaintiffs noted, the defendants, in failing to reveal their
commercial interests, treated the research participants like "treasure troves.
346
Third, the court drew a specious distinction between Mr. Moore, who was an
unwitting research participant, and the Greenberg plaintiffs, who were aware
normally will, create special relationships out of which duties arise").
341. Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064,
1070 (S.D. Fla. 2003). The court also emphasized the lack ofatherapeutic relationship between
the defendants and the plaintiffs in Greenberg. But see supra note 332 (noting that the
Greenberg plaintiffs ultimately filed a motion to amend their complaint to allege a confidential
relationship between the plaintiffs and the defendants, a motion ultimately denied by the court).
342. Id. at 1070-71.
343. See supra notes 103-07 and accompanying text (advocating that researchers should be
held to a higher duty of disclosure because the research participants receive little personal
benefit from their involvement). The Greenberg plaintiffs also maintained that, like a
researcher, a hospital participating in a scientific study owes the research participant the duty of
informed consent and the fiduciary duty. Plaintiffs' Consolidated Response to Defendants'
Motions to Dismiss and Transfer Venue, Case No. 00-C-6779 (N.D. Ill., 2000), at 23
[hereinafter Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motions to Dismiss] (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). What is more, the Greenberg plaintiffs emphasized that
MCH dealt directly with them by requesting their consent to research in 1994. Id. at 27.
344. See supra note 87 (giving examples of scholarship that notes the trend of academic
research becoming increasingly commercialized).
345. The court noted that the American Medical Association Code of Ethics has provided,
since 1994, that "[p]otential commercial applications must be disclosed to the patient before a
profit is realized on products developed from biological materials" and "[h]uman tissue and its
products may not be used for commercial purposes without the informed consent of the patient
who provided the original cellular material." Greenberg, 264 F.Supp. 2d at 1070 n.2 (quoting
AMA CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS § E-2.08(2)-(3) (American Medical Association's Council on
Ethical and Judicial Affairs 2001)).
346. Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motions to Dismiss, supra note 343, at 3.
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that they were participating in research. By classifying the latter plaintiffs as
willing donors, the court misses an important point: A research participant can
be a voluntary donor for one purpose (that is, noncommercial research), but not
for another (that is, commercial research). To hold otherwise would be to
encourage scientific researchers to overstep the bounds of their described
research agenda to conduct upon research participants additional experiments to
which they had not consented.
2. Breach of Fiduciary Duty
The Greenberg court also dismissed the plaintiffs' second cause of action,
breach of fiduciary duty, on two grounds. First, just as the court had declined
to find a duty of informed consent between the researcher and the research
participant with respect to disclosure of the researcher's economic interests,347
the court held that "[t]here is no automatic fiduciary relationship that attaches
when a researcher accepts medical donations. 3 48 Second, the court held that
the plaintiffs must allege not only that they placed trust in the defendants, but
also that the defendants accepted that trust, and that the Greenberg plaintiffs
had failed to plead this second element.349 According to the court, "the
acceptance of trust ... cannot be assumed once a donation is given. 350
The problem with the court's approach, however, is that it departs from
the accepted notion that physicians owe their patients a fiduciary duty.35' As a
practical matter, research participants perceive their researchers as fiduciaries,
even in the absence of a therapeutic relationship, and will tend to repose trust in
them. Indeed, without such a relationship of trust and confidence, the scientific
collaboration could not proceed. If researchers are not required to honor this
trust, the situation is ripe for exploitation of the research participants.
347. See supra notes 335-42 and accompanying text (discussing the court's finding that
such disclosure would give "each donor complete control over how medical research is used and
who benefits from that research").
348. Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064,
1072 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479,484-85 & n. 10 (Cal. 1990)
(holding that a physician owes a fiduciary duty to a patient to "disclose all facts material to the
patient's decision"). But see supra notes 195-97 and accompanying text (explaining how the
California Supreme Court placed significant limitations on this concept of fiduciary duty,
thereby diminishing its effectiveness in protecting research participants).
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3. Fraudulent Concealment
In light of its holding that the defendants owed no fiduciary duty to the
plaintiffs, the Greenberg court also rejected the plaintiffs' claim for fraudulent
concealment, stating that there existed "no special relationship that gives rise to
a duty to speak. 3 52 Indeed, the court placed the onus on the plaintiffs to
uncover facts about the issuance of the patent, stating that "if they were so
concerned about a possible intent to patent then a simple phone inquiry to the
Defendants would have uncovered the fact."053 This holding clearly decreases
protection for the research participant, requiring him to inquire about the
possibility of a patent, despite the fact that it is the researcher, not the tissue
contributor, who is most knowledgeable about potential plans to commercialize
the scientific findings resulting from the research.
4. Conversion and Misappropriation of Trade Secrets
Although the Greenberg court noted, in its analysis of the plaintiffs' claim
of lack of informed consent, that Moore did not represent controlling authority
in Florida,a54 the court nonetheless invoked Moore in deciding the conversion
claim. The court cited Moore for the proposition that the "[p]laintiffs have no
cognizable property interest in body tissue and genetic matter donated for
research under a theory of conversion."' 5  The court also emphasized that,
under Florida law, a research participant cedes property rights in blood and
tissue samples once the sample is voluntarily given to a third party.
35 6
Furthermore, the court held that a property right inheres in the information
contained in the plaintiffs 'tissue, not the tissue itself, and that this information
was developed through the efforts of the defendants, not the plaintiffs.357
According to the court, "[i]f adopted, the expansive theory championed by
352. See Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1073 (stating that "[a]llegations of fraudulent
concealment by silence must be accompanied by allegations of a special relationship" that give
rise to such a duty).
353. Id. at 1074.
354. Id. at 1070.
355. Id. at 1074.
356. See id. at 1075 (stating that "limits to the property right that attach to body tissue have
been recognized in Florida state courts" and that "the property rights in blood and tissue samples
also evaporates once the sample is voluntarily given to a third party").
357. See id. (citing Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc. v. Holden Found. Seeds, Inc., 1987 WL
341211 (S.D. Iowa 1987), affd, 35 F.3d 1226 (8th Cir. 1994)) (supporting the proposition that
defendants' efforts in gathering and arranging the genetic information entitled them, and not the
plaintiffs, to property rights therein).
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Plaintiffs would cripple medical research as it would bestow a continuing right
for donors to possess the results of any research conducted by the hospital."05
8
The court's ruling on the conversion cause of action invites several
challenges. First, although the court relied upon the notion of voluntary
donation by the plaintiffs, this justification proves to be entirely fictional when
one considers that the plaintiffs were unaware of the true use of their tissue,
largely because they did not have the benefit of informed consent. Second, the
court conflated the notion of property rights in human tissue and ownership of
the patented invention developed from it.359 The law must distinguish between
the two, recognizing a research participant's property rights in the tissue itself,
even if patented invention ultimately belongs to another. The commercial
profits from the invention, along with the characteristics of the tissue and the
behavior of the researchers, should be considered in calculating the damages
due to the research participants. 3
The court also rejected the plaintiffs' claim of misappropriation of trade
secrets in connection with the Canavan Registry, holding that the complaint
proved inadequate in two respects. First, the plaintiffs failed to allege that the
economic value of the registry derived from its confidentiality.361 Second, the
plaintiffs failed to demonstrate reasonable efforts on their part to maintain the
secrecy of the registry.
3 62
5. Unjust Enrichment
Only the plaintiffs' unjust enrichment cause of action survived the
defendants' motion to dismiss. The court recognized "a continuing research
collaboration that involved Plaintiffs also investing time and significant
resources in the race to isolate the Canavan gene. 363 For the purposes of this
claim, the court recognized that the defendants' patent did not relieve them of
responsibility to compensate the plaintiffs for the valuable tissue they furnished
358. Id. at 1076.
359. See supra notes 139-43 and accompanying text (discussing how a federal law
according research participants a property interest in their tissue need not necessarily grant them
the right to control the intellectual property developed from the tissue, absent a finding ofjoint
inventorship).
360. Id.
361. Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research Inst.,Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1072
(S.D. Fla. 2003).
362. Id.
363. Id. at 1072-73.
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to researchers. 3 4 This approach is too ad hoc, however, to be relied upon for
future research participants.
Had the Greenberg plaintiffs negotiated expressly with their researchers,
as PXE International has done, it is likely that they would have been able to
enforce their contractual rights. Reliance upon a property rights model alone,
however, fails to protect those research participants who remain unaware of
their researchers' commercial agenda. This situation arises often, as
demonstrated by the Moore and Greenberg actions. Indeed, the decisions in
these cases increase the likelihood that scientists will not divulge their
economic interests to research participants, in light of the Moore court's
holding that a physician-researcher is not a patient's financial advisor3 65 and the
Greenberg court's decision exempting researchers who lack a therapeutic
relationship with their research participants from the law of informed consent
and fiduciary duty.366 Thus, Congress should recognize explicitly research
participants' property rights in their tissue through a hybrid property
rights/liability model. This approach would safeguard the rights of entities such
as PXE International that choose to negotiate with researchers, and also ensure
that individuals facing the same situation as the Greenberg plaintiffs in the
future will recover damages when researchers deprive them of information that
would allow them to bargain effectively for rights in their tissue.
V. Proposalfor Congressional Enactment of a Hybrid Property
Rights/Liability Model Recognizing the Property Interest of Research
Participants in Their Body Tissue
Current United States policy regarding research participants' rights in their
tissue lacks transparency, consistency, and equity. As one commentator stated:
The current state of affairs presents some of the least attractive features of a
new and uncivilized frontier. Information is poorly distributed, if not
concealed, and the failure to develop a social policy for the many is
mitigated only by the self-help of the few-in particular, those few who are
fittest for bargaining or litigation. When problems emerge in an activity so
central to biomedical research, there is a public interest in promoting
364. Id.
365. See supra note 191 and accompanying text (discussing the Moore court's holding that
a researcher does not have a duty to protect the financial interests of a research participant).
366. See supra Parts IV.B.1-2 and accompanying text (noting the Greenberg court's
reliance on the practical implications of such duties and its concern that such obligations would
hinder medical research and give research participants too much control).
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transparency and developing a rationally articulated policy for social,
economic and professional responsibility. 
367
As discussed above, this leads to an anomalous situation in which research
participants such as the members of PXE International enjoy property
rights in their tissue, on the one hand, whereas the Moore and Greenberg
plaintiffs do not, even though the only significant difference between their
research participation is that the members of PXE International were aware
that they were participating in commercially motivated research, while the
others were not.368
Commentators suggest that "legislatures may be in the best position to
design and institute appropriate remedies" for this problem, 369 a view
shared by the Moore majority, which emphasized that "[1]egislatures...
have the ability to gather empirical evidence, solicit the advice of experts,
and hold hearings at which all interested parties present evidence and
express their views. 3 70 This Article proposes that Congress implement a
hybrid property rights/liability model that: (1) recognizes that individuals
possess 'property rights in their tissue and therefore have the right to
exchange it for valuable consideration, or to waive such rights if they prefer
to make a gratuitous donation; 371 and (2) permits individual research
participants to maintain an action for conversion of their tissue in the event
that: (a) they were not informed that researchers were using their tissue for
commercial purposes; or (b) they did enter into an agreement regarding the
use of the tissue that is voidable under the doctrines of fraud, duress, undue
influence, or mutual mistake.
There is ample precedent for federal regulation of property rights in
human tissue. First, federal law already prescribes certain rules concerning
the treatment of human research participants involved in federally-
sponsored research, 372 and FDA regulations apply to research involving
367. Harrison, supra note 34, at 81.
368. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text (discussing the different situations of
the members of PXE International and the plaintiffs in Moore).
369. Harrison, supra note 34, at 83 (citing James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property
Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 440, 477
(1995)).
370. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479,496 (Cal. 1990) (citing Foley v.
Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654,694 n.31 (1988)); see also supra note 33 (discussing the
suitability of the legislature for addressing broad issues of public policy).
371. See supra note 118 (suggesting that a research participant ought to manifest her
waiver of her rights in writing, just as she typically indicates her informed consent).
372. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101-124 (2002) (describing the Department of Health and
Human Services' basic policy for protection of human research participants).
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experimental drugs, biological products, and medical devices that are
subject to FDA approval.373 In addition, Congress recognizes property
rights in intangible intellectual property created by human ingenuity, in
part to stimulate such innovation, 74 and can similarly create an incentive to
supply tissue by affording research participants a property interest
therein.375
A. Parameters of the Property Rights/Liability Model
In order for the property rights/liability model to operate, research
participants ought to be able negotiate mutually satisfactory agreements with
their researchers, fully informed as to all the risks associated with the research
and the scientists' economic interests.376 In addition, research participants
should possess the right to initiate an action for conversion, a strict liability tort,
against any researcher who uses their tissue without informed consent. In
conversion cases, researchers' participants would be entitled to compensation
only if the researchers earned a profit from commercializing their tissue, as the
research participants essentially would be functioning as investors who donate
capital and stand to lose the value of their investment. Despite fears about a
proliferation of conversion actions, research participants likely would file
lawsuits only if they were sufficiently aggrieved, and could expect a rather
small damage awards if their tissue were not unique.
B. Advantages of a Property Rights/Liability Model
A property rights/liability model promises to stimulate biomedical research
in many ways. First, the promise of compensation encourages research
373. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 50.1, 56.101 (2002) (describing the scope of the regulations).
374. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1129 (2000) (setting forth the federal trademark statute); 17
U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (2000) (setting forth the federal copyright statute); 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376
(2000) (setting forth the federal patent statute).
375. See supra note 95 and accompanying text (explaining that research participants might
be less likely to undergo the risks associated with biomedical research without a legally
protected right to compensation).
376. Another issue to be considered is whether individuals ought to be able to sell their
entire body to researchers after their death, with the proceeds either enjoyed by them before
death or flowing to their estate. On one hand, acceptance of this practice might decrease the
number of individuals who make charitable donations of their bodies upon their death. On the
other hand, the promise of profit, while decreasing gratuitous donations, may increase overall
the number of people who permit scientists to conduct research on their bodies after death.
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participation by individuals who might otherwise decline to behave
altruistically while others profit, and, what is more, who face the
inconvenience, medical risks, loss of privacy, and possibility of genetic
discrimination inherent in such participation.377 Second, the promise of profits
also fosters self-checking by individuals who will initiate significant research
by informing biomedical researchers of the value and uniqueness of their
tissue.3 7' Third, the possibility of a liability action creates even greater
incentive for researchers to provide informed consent, 79 especially because the
monetary damages will prove great enough to serve a deterrent effect.3a 0
Fourth, this model's recognition of research participants' right to bargain with
researchers will help to ensure that the tissue ends up in the hands of the
highest bidder, who, it is hoped, will put the tissue to its most valuable use.3"'
Fifth, and just as important, notions of equity militate that research participants,
who supply useful scientific raw materials, 382 and encounter risks through their
participation,8 3 are entitled to compensation, in light of researchers' own
pecuniary gain. Any other approach threatens to lead to a decrease in public
support of such research,38 4 lest the public perceive that researchers obtain
scientific inputs from them for free and then charge them for the commercial
outputs.
377. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of
compensating research participants). As noted above, a research participant who prefers to
make a gratuitous donation would be free to waive the right to share in the profits of biomedical
research. See supra note 118 (stating that such a provision would protect researchers from
financial liability in cases where a research participant expresses a desire to make a gratuitous
donation).
378. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text (noting that medically affected
individuals are often among the first to recognize scientifically significant phenomena within
themselves).
379. See supra note 132 and accompanying text (citing Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of
Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 494 (Cal. 1990), in support of the proposition that the threat of a conversion
claim may help enforce a patient's right of informed consent).
380. See supra notes 189-205 and accompanying text (discussing the likelihood that
plaintiffs will recover very little in damages under only the theories of lack of informed consent
and breach of fiduciary duty).
381. See supra notes 134-38 and accompanying text (noting the advantages of the market
system, which puts tissue in the hands of the researcher likely to use it most productively).
382. See supra notes 147-52 and accompanying text (explaining that human tissue is just
as important a part of the research process as the chemical reagents or other equipment used).
383. See supra note 154 and accompanying text (noting examples of the potential harm
research participants may encounter due to their involvement in scientific research, including
the loss of privacy, the dangers of negative consequences from the release of their medical
information, and the risk of learning emotionally disturbing information about their health).
384. See supra note 158 and accompanying text (stating that if general public support for
biomedical research declines, so too will government support).
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C. An Examination ofAlternative Models
1. The Harrison Hybrid Donative/Liability Model
In an extremely thoughtful article considering the issue of compensation
for human research participants, one commentator, Ms. Charlotte Harrison, a
former Fellow in Medical Ethics at Harvard Medical School during the 2000-
2001 academic year, proposed retention of the general rule of tissue donation
(premised, of course, upon the research participant's consent), along with
implementation of an objective, nonmarket mechanism for compensating
research participants after scientists have commercialized their research results.
She advocates remuneration of the research participants only in those rare cases
where the tissue proves of significant commercial value, and considers various
objective third parties that could reach this determination, including an
administrative agency, an arbitration panel, or a tribunal. In cases where tissue
donors cannot be tracked, or do not wish to receive compensation, the
companies would be required to dedicate the adjudicated sum to a charitable
purpose, thereby discouraging biotech firms from intentionally losing linking
information or from dissuading research participants from claiming their share
of the proceeds.385 Ms. Harrison highlights the significant advantages of the
proposed system, including that it would "enable the acquisition and study of
tissue to go forward without the delays, commodifying tendencies and other
disadvantages of up-front negotiations;" "would operate evenhandedly after the
fact of use;0 86 and "could be applied uniformly ... to the full range of tissues
collected in hospitals anywhere in the world."
38 7
385. Harrison, supra note 34, at 93-100.
386. Id. at 99. While this proposed donative/liability model offers the advantage that the
research participant's compensation is calculated after the value of the biomedical product
developed from her tissue is known, the property rights/liability model advocated in this Article
achieves the same purpose in cases where plaintiffs institute litigation after the
commercialization of products made from their tissue. In other cases, the parties can avoid the
need for the involvement of a third party by negotiating in advance to establish the
consideration to be exchanged for the tissue.
While the donative/liability model also offers the advantage of a predictable, consistent
pricing scheme, the development of a sophisticated market will eventually serve the same
purpose, with the parties closest to the issue, research firms and research participants, setting the
prices. The government certainly could institute regulation, as it has in markets such as those
for securities and energy. Nonetheless, the existence of a market can help to deliver tissue to the
user who will value it most highly. See supra note 134 and accompanying text (explaining that
the current system fails to allocate human tissue used in research to the highest bidder, and that
a change in the system could help to put the material to its most productive use).
387. Harrison, supra note 34, at 99; see also id. at 100-03 (explaining that one of the
major advantages of her approach is that it is compatible with Western Europe's traditional
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While the Harrison donative/liability model does address many of the
deficiencies of our current system, it is marked by two significant flaws. First,
this model does not take into account that relationships between scientists and
research participants are increasingly governed by private arrangements
negotiated by the parties, as in the case of PXE International. As a related
matter, Ms. Harrison's model does not address research participants'
noneconomic interests, in particular the right to participate in licensing
decisions,388 an issue of fundamental importance to those afflicted by disease,
as demonstrated by the degree to which the members of PXE International and
the Greenberg plaintiffs devoted their efforts toward ensuring availability of the
commercial products developed from their tissue. The model proposed in this
Article offers scientists and research participants the opportunity to negotiate
agreements regarding the licensing of intellectual property developed from
human tissue. As noted above, in those instances where researchers did not act
in good faith, courts could consider, as an equitable remedy, permitting tissue
contributors to participate in the decision-making with respect to the licensing
of the intellectual property developed from their tissue. 8 9
2. A Gene Trust
Some commentators also have proposed the establishment of a human
genome trust, to prevent ownership by private entities. 390 According to this
objection to the commodification of the human body and the prevailing view in that region that
research participants' donation of their tissue furthers the goal of improved public health, a view
that naturally holds more sway in countries with nationalized health care systems than in the
United States).
388. See id. at 83 n.39 (acknowledging that the proposal does not address issues of
"ownership and control"); see also id. at 87 ("[Tlhe extent of protection afforded to a tissue
contributor's non-economic interests is a public policy question that goes beyond the scope of
this article.").
389. See supra text accompanying note 142 (describing factors to be considered when a
research participant has neither negotiated for, nor expressly or impliedly waived, her right to
payment).
390. See, e.g., Patricia A. Lacy, Comment, Gene Patenting: Universal Heritage vs.
Reward for Human Effort, 77 OR. L. REv. 783, 804-05 (1998) ("Promoting proper
dissemination of genetic information, protecting intellectual property rights, and implementing
regulatory guidance for genetic research could best be served by the establishment of an
international body to hold in trust the human genome as it is discovered."); Barbara Looney,
Note, Should Genes Be Patented? The Gene Patenting Controversy: Legal, Ethical, and
Policy Foundations of an International Agreement, 26 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 231, 268-69
(1994) (stating that an international body holding the Human Genome in trust would address the
"ethical, legal, and policy interests at stake in the gene patenting controversy"); see also Gold,
supra note 135, at 1246-47 (suggesting that ownership of cell lines should vest in a nonprofit,
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view, "[t]o ensure proper dissemination of genetic information, protection of
intellectual property rights, and regulatory guidance for genetic research, an
international body should be established to hold in trust the Human Genome as
it is discovered, granting rights for continuing research that may culminate in"
patentable inventions.39' In addition, such a system acknowledges the growing
globalization of science,39 2 as it renders United States law compatible with
widespread European opposition to commercialization of the human genome.393
Creation of such an institution would be difficult to achieve, however, in light
of the need for widespread international cooperation and financial support.394
Most importantly, as noted previously, the creation of a nonprofit, non-
governmental organization to control valuable tissue is unlikely,3 9 as private
ownership of human DNA sequences is already firmly entrenched in both the
United States and throughout Western Europe.396 For this reason, a hybrid
property rights/liability model proves a superior solution.
VI. Conclusion
The Greenberg litigation illustrates the inadequacies of our current system
of apportioning property rights among the participants in biomedical research
on human tissue. Although the Greenberg plaintiffs remained unaware during
their participation in research on Canavan disease that researchers aimed to
commercialize the results of these experiments, the Moore holding serves to
deny the plaintiffs relief under the theories of lack of informed consent and
breach of fiduciary duty. The Greenberg court interpreted Moore to oblige
nongovernmental organization such as the Red Cross).
391. Looney, supra note 390, at 268.
392. Id. at 271-72 (noting the lack of international consensus regarding patenting of the
human genome).
393. For a discussion of the opposition to commercialization of the genome prevalent
throughout the European Union, see Gitter, supra note 257, at 1656-59.
394. See David Keays, Patenting DNA and Amino Acid Sequences-An Australian
Perspective, 7 HEALTH L.J. 69, 87 (1999) (noting that "creation of a Human Genome trust would
require a major collaborative effort on an international level," and cautioning that "one is likely
to encounter political tension, imbalances of power and bureaucratic waste"); see also Looney,
supra note 390, at 269 (noting the political tension inherent in the establishment of a single
international genome policy).
395. See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text (observing that the biomedical
research industry rests firmly upon free market principles, at least insofar as it concerns the
exchange of materials among researchers).
396. See Gitter, supra note 257, at 1660-61 (setting forth reasons why private ownership of
human DNA sequences is likely to continue in the United States and Western Europe).
OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUE
only physicians who have a therapeutic relationship with the research
participant, not pure researchers, to honor these duties. What is more, the
Moore court declined to extend the strict liability tort of conversion to apply to
human tissue, out of concern that every tissue sample would become the subject
matter of a lawsuit.
Had the Greenberg plaintiffs negotiated in advance with their researchers,
as the patient advocacy group PXE International has done, it is possible, though
hardly assured, that they would have enjoyed the right to control the use of their
tissue. No court has yet ruled on the legitimacy of such agreements, which
seem to conflict with legal precedent and some scholarly opinion that suggest
that it is inappropriate to recognize a market in human tissue. Nevertheless, it
is clear that researchers, tissue banks, and tissue brokers, as well as patients
themselves, already buy and sell human biological material, including blood
and gametes.
In light of the fact that a market in human tissue already exists, this Article
advocates for congressional enactment of a hybrid approach to property rights
in human tissue. The law should entitle plaintiffs to invoke a property rule
where they negotiated in advance for rights in their tissue, and, when necessary,
to invoke a liability rule in the form of an action for conversion when
researchers withheld from them vital information that would have facilitated
their ability to bargain for such rights. As noted above, it is inequitable to deny
relief to the Greenberg plaintiffs, who contributed valuable tissue to research
just like the members of PXE International, yet were not informed of their
researchers' goal of commercialization. While the Greenberg court's apparent
acceptance of the plaintiffs' unjust enrichment argument is promising, such an
approach is too ad hoc to lend certainty to this pressing issue.
The hybrid property rights/liablity approach proposed in this Article will
create an incentive for individuals to participate in research, compensate them
equitably for their contribution, and also enable them to make decisions that
will foster the availability and affordability of diagnostic and therapeutic
biomedical products to other consumers. What is more, under this system, it is
more likely that tissue will end up in the hands of researchers who will use it
most productively, as evidenced by their willingness to pay valuable
consideration for it. Congressional enactment of legislation implementing this
model offers the opportunity to advance biotechnological innovation, enhance
the public accountability of researchers, and foster citizen involvement in
pressing public health decisions, all while ensuring honorable and equitable
treatment of research participants.

